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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Accountants-Unauthorized Practice of Law in Federal Tax Matters
A recent California lower court decision, Agran v. Shapiro,1 has
rekindled the dispute between lawyers and accountants as to what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law 2 in the federal taxation field,
and the issues involved have not yet been settled.8 These issues are
relatively new because of the increasing complexity of federal tax problems in recent years. 4 Although efforts have been made by the lawyers
and accountants to settle their disputes, 5 these efforts have been nullified to some extend by such cases as .Agran, in which the two professions have filed amicus curiae briefs.
In order to understand the issues in the Agran case, it is necessary
to refer to some of the related cases for background purposes. Many
cases, concerning laymen, including accountants, in the unauthorized
practice controversy, have involved advertising in one form or another,
and the courts, especially where the layman has designated himself as
a "tax expert" or the like, 7 have prohibited such advertising. This
seems to be a fair result since the general practitioner of law cannot
advertise or hold himself out to the public as a specialist.8 Moreover,
'Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P. 2d 619 (Cal. App. Dep't 1954). According to
40 A.B.A.J. 775n. (1954), judgment was stayed pending application to the U. S.
Supreme Court.
2The practice of law embraces conveyancing, the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such action and proceeding on behalf of clients before judges and courts, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and in general all advice to clients
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law. People ex rel.
Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 IIl. 102, 109, 187
N. E. 823, 826 (1933).
'The judge, writing the Agran opinion, said that the avenue is open for
review by the Supreme Court because of the federal constitutional question.
Apparently, this question arises because of the conflict between state law and
certain federal regulations: 26 U. S. C. A. § 1111, Rule 2 (Supp. 1953), which
applies to practice before the Tax Court; and 31 CoDE FED. REGS. § 10.2 (f)
(1949), which applies to practice before the Treasury Department.
'1 MERTrS, LAw OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION iii (1942).
'Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal Taxation, 37 A. B. A. J. 517 (1951).
' Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. 2d 27 (1943); Gardner
v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951) ; Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v.
Libutti, 100 A. 2d 406 (R. I. 1953); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of
America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1941).
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, supra note 6; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers
of America, supra note 6; Gardner v. Conway, supra note 6.
8
Mandelbam v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 169 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y. Supp.
462 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936); Gardner v. Conway, supra note 6; THE CANONS OF
PRorESsioNAL ETHICS OF THE AmEImCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, §§ 27, 45 (1954).
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the members of the American Institute of Accountants do not contest
these rulings.0
Also closely allied to the main issues in the principal dispute are
those cases where laymen, not necessarily within the three classes of
accountants,' 0 and corporations have participated in the adjustment
of state or municipal tax assessments. Thus, where a layman or a
corporation attempted to reduce property tax assessments,,. to reduce
sales taxes,12 to recover illegally collected occupation taxes, 13 or to
advise in a tax foreclosure suit,' 4 the courts have held that these laymen and corporations were practicing law and as a result have declared
their contracts void for illegality, 15 have held these laymen in contempt
of court,'" have enjoined such practices,' 7 and have found them guilty
8
of a misdemeanor'1
Where laymen are permitted to represent their clients under the
rules of certain state administrative boards, 19 some courts have held
that it does not matter whether the unauthorized practice was done in
the office, before a court, or before an administrative tribunal. The
real test, according to these courts, is "the character of the act done, and
not the place where it is committed. ' 20 The fact that the administrative tribunals permit laymen to practice before them is of no avail
according to these courts, because it is the inherent power of the judiciary to define and regulate the practice of law; and the legislature
oStatement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal Taxa-

tion, 37 A. B. A. J. 517 (1951); BY-LAWS, NoRTH CAROLiNA
ED PuBaic ACCOUNTANTS, INC., Art. XVII, § 2 (1952).
0

Ass'N oF CERTI-

" These classes are: (a) certified public accountants (authorized by law to
use their title to certify financial statements); (b) public accountants; and (c)
bookkeepers
and others. 17 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcricE NEWS 3 (Dec. 1951).
"1 Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N. W. 2d 914
(1942) ; Stack v. P. G. Garage, Inc., 7 N. J. 118, 80 A. 2d 545 (1951) ; Kountz
v. Rowlands, 46 Pa. D. & C. 461 (1943) ; People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of
Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N. E. 823 (1933).
" Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y.
Supp. 462 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
"Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38
N. E. 2d 349 (1941).
1, State ex rel. Hunter v. Daugherty, 136 Neb. 490, 286 N. W. 783 (1939).
15
Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y. Supp.
462 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936) ; Stack v. P. G. Garage, Inc., 7 N. J.118, 80 A. 2d
545 (1951).
"Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N. W. 2d 914
(1942) ; State ex rel. Hunter v. Daugherty, 136 Neb. 490, 286 N. W. 783 (1939) ;
People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 Ill.
102, 187 N. E. 823 (1933).
" Kountz v. Rowlands, 46 Pa. D. & C. 461 (1943); Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill.
App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1941).
18 Stack v. P. G. Garage, Inc., 7 N. J. 118, 80 A. 2d 545 (1951).
10 People ex. rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. 2d 941
(1937) (industrial commission); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of
America, 312 Ill.
App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1941) (department of finance).
20 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill.
346, 357, 8 N. E.
2d 941, 947 (1937).
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can only make provisions to punish those acts which the judiciary has
found to constitute the unauthorized practice of law.21 However, other
cases hold that since the legislature cannot tell the judiciary who shall
be attorneys, the courts cannot tell the administrative boards whom
they shall receive before them when these boards have the power to
22
formulate their own rules.
In the field of federal taxation the problem of what constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law becomes more complicated. "The
ascertainment of probable tax effects of transactions frequently is
23
within the function of either a certified public accountant or a lawyer."
Apparently the two professions were in accord that when these ascertainments raise uncertainties over the interpretation of tax or general
law, the accountant should advise his client to enlist the aid of a lawyer.2 4 However, a sharp line cannot be drawn here because the accountant, in order to work effectively with figures, must have an
adequate acquaintance with departmental rulings and judicial decisions
25
which federal taxation has produced.
The state courts have gone so far as to permit the accountant or
layman to fill out simple income tax returns. 20 However, where the
layman, incidental to the preparation of the return, solved "knotty
questions of law," such as deciding whether a man could file a joint
return with his common-law wife and whether she could be a partner
in his trucking business when he had control but shared the profits,2 7
advised as to the tax advantages and disadvantages' of corporations
and partnerships, merger and dissolution of corporations, and the increase and decrease of capital stock,2 8 advised

modification of con-

tracts, interpreted laws, and gave opinions to effect compliance with
the tax laws,29 the state courts have held this to be the unauthorized

practice of law.
The Agran case followed the "knotty question of law" test. The
plaintiff, who was the auditor and accountant for a corporation owned
"t re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935); See
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill.
346, 352, 8 N. E.2d 941,
947 22(1937).
Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 217
Cal. 244, 18 P. 2d 341 (1933); Comment, 35 MIcEr. L. REv. 442 (1937); accord,
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v.Libutti, 100 A. 2d 406 (R.I.1953).
2 Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal Taxation, 37 A. B. A. 3. 517, 537 (1951).
Ibid.

2
-See
2

Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 183, 52 N. E. 2d 27, 32 (1943).
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. 2d 27 (1943) ; Blair v.
Motor
Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939).
2
Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951).
2 Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939).
2
Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n In re Standard Tax &
Management Corp., 43 N. Y. S. 2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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by the defendant, prepared the defendant's individual tax returns. He
sued the defendant for the services rendered to him as an individual,30
which services consisted of advising the defendant on certain carryback losses and subsequent conferences with revenue agents which
ultimately led to a reduction of the amount due the government by
the defendant. The court held the contract void for illegality on the
ground that the advice involved the question whether the loss could
be carried back, and this in turn depended on whether it was a loss
attributable to the operation of a trade or business regularly carried
on by the taxpayer within the meaning of that phrase as used in the
Internal Revenue Code.
The Agran decision and the Gardner v. Conwa301 decision, by their
holdings and dicta, rejected the "incidental" test which was used by
an intermediate. New York court. The New York court held Bercu,
a certified public accountant, guilty of contempt of court when he advised a corporation that it could take certain unpaid 1935-1937 city
taxes as deductions if paid in 1943 even though the company was on
the accrual basis.32 The court, basing its decision on the necessity of
protecting the public against incompetent legal service, held that since
Bercu was not the company's regular auditor, he could not be called
in for a fee to interpret the law. However, the court implied that if
Bercu had been the company's regular auditor, he could have solved
this question as an incident of that regular job without being in contempt of court.
The Agran, Bercu, and Gardner cases by necessity deal directly or
indirectly with federal administrative rules in the federal tax field. The
Federal Administrative Procedure Act does not "grant or deny to any
person who is not a lawyer the right to appear for or represent others
34
33
before any agency or in any agency proceeding," but specific statutes
give the Tax Court and the Treasury Department the right to make
their own rules of procedure. The Tax Court permits laymen to
argue before it on the conditions that they be of good moral character
and pass a written and sometimes oral examination, while a lawyer
is automatically admitted if he is a member in good standing of the
bar of the highest court in his state or the Supreme Court of the United
'0 Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P. 2d 619 (Cal. App. Dep't 1954). Plaintiff sued for
$2,000.00. The court reversed and remanded, saying that the plaintiff could
not recover for services which were illegal but that he could recover the value
of the services which were legal.
" Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951).
" Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n In re Bercu, 273 App.
Div. 524, 78 N. Y. S. 2d (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd without opinion, 299 N. Y.
728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949).
"60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1005a (1952).
"53 STAT. 159 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 1111 (1952) (Tax Court); 23 STAT.
258 (1884), 5 U. S. C. § 261 (1952) (Treasury Department).
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States.3 5 The latter Court has upheld the power of the Tax Court to
make such a rule.86 The rule of the Treasury Department gives any
properly enrolled agent, including accountants, the same rights, powers
and privileges that enrolled lawyers have before the Department. However, enrolled agents cannot prepare any instrument which transfers
title to personal or real property for the purpose of affecting federal
taxes, "nor shall such enrolled agent advise a client as to the legal
sufficiency of such an instrument or its legal effect upon the federal
taxes of such client: and provided further, that nothing in the regulation in this part shall be construed as authorizing persons not members
of the bar to practice law.' 3
Relying on the last phrase, the court
in the Agran case held the contract void for illegality.
The most important issue between the lawyers and the accountants
is whether the federal administrative rules are binding on the state
courts. The Florida court has held that a person who was admitted
to practice before the Tax Court, the Treasury Department, and the
Supreme Court of the United States could not practice as a federal
tax counsel in Florida unless he was a member of the Florida bar,
even though the federal agencies before which he intended to practice
permitted him to do so. 38 The Missouri court, on the other hand, held
that a layman, who was permitted to practice before the Interstate
Commerce Commission under the rules of that agency, could collect
for services rendered to his client even though such a contract was
void tnder the state's public policy protecting the public against incompetent legal service. The court said that the contract was made
legal by federal law, and if the court declared the contract void for
illegality, it would be interfering with a federal function. 9
The Supreme Court of the United States, if and when it decides
the issues presented in such cases as Agran, will be faced with the problem of whether states, by court action, can interpret federal administrative regulations so as to deprive the accountants of their federal
right to advise their clients in federal tax matters. Sooner or later,
the Supreme Court will be faced with a case where the accountant is
admitted to practice before the Tax Court, but who has been barred
from that practice by a state court, even though the rules of the Tax
Court do not contain a clause saying that nothing shall be construed
-- 26 U. S. C. A. § 1111, Rule 2 (Supp. 1953).
16Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926),
where the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel defendant to admit him
to practice before the defendant, whose rules, at that time gave the Board dis-

cretion to refuse any certified public accountant the right to practice before it.
1"31 CoDE Fa. REGs. § 10.2 (f) (1949).
" Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953).

" De Pass v. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S. W. 2d 146 (1940); In
re Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N. E. 2d 74 (1938); accord, Brooks v. Mandel-White
Co., 54 F. 2d 992 (2nd Cir. 1932).
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to permit a person not a member of the bar to practice law. Then the
Court will have to decide whether the federal regulations are superior
to state public policy.
If the Supreme Court hears the Agran case, it could follow the
Bercu test and hold that since Agran was the defendant's regular accountant, he could solve legal problems incidental to the preparing
of the defendant's return. If the Court rejects the Bercu test it could
hold with Agranis "knotty question of law" test, but would have to
interpret the regulations involved. The difficult question, as related
to the Agran case, is whether the Treasury Department rule which
says "that nothing in the regulation .

.

. shall be construed as authoriz-

ing persons not members of the bar to practice law" forbids Agran
to give the type of advice he gave. The state courts by their interpretation of this clause, have practically limited the accountant to filling
out simple income tax returns. The Court could find that by such
an interpretation the rights and privileges granted to laymen under
the regulation are practically nullified because it is rare that a taxpayer, who files a simple income tax return, would need representation of any kind before the Treasury Department.
Furthermore, if the issues presented in the Agran case are ever
argued before the Court, it will undoubtedly uphold the right of the Tax
Court and the Treasury Department to make their own rules, and it
would seem that the Court would also say that the federal law in this
field is superior to state public policy because the representation of
federal taxpayers must be free from state interference.
Public policy prohibition of incompetent legal service is the basis
upon which the state courts have refused to allow the accountants to
interpret "questions of law" in the federal income tax field; but as
a practical matter taxable business income is, to a large extent, determined by such accounting factors as inventory pricing, capital transactions, prepaid income and expenses, depreciation and bad debt writeoffs. The protection of the public is, indeed, a very important consideration in these cases; consequently, the courts should consider the
dual cost to the taxpayer of paying an accountant and a lawyer for
advice that is not exclusively of a legal nature.40 A bill 41 has been
submitted to Congress, which if passed, would alleviate this problem by
allowing properly enrolled accountants to engage in the settlement of
"According to the American Institute of Accountants, 55,960,236 income tax
returns were filed during the fiscal year of 1952. Out of this number, 9,400
cases required discussion for settlement at upper levels of the Revenue Service,
1,200 cases were decided in the Tax Court, and only 636 were decided in courts
of law.
"H. R. 9922, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
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their clients' tax liability with the Internal Revenue Service on a more
extensive basis than the state courts now permit.
HERBERT S. FALK, JR.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-State Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations for Collection of Use Taxes
Defendant, a Delaware corporation, occasionally sold furniture to
Maryland residents who came to defendant's Delaware store to make
purchases. Some of the purchases were consigned to Maryland addresses and shipped by common carrier, while others were delivered
directly to Maryland customers by defendant's truck. Defendant was
not qualified or registered to do business in Maryland, maintained no
branch office or agencies there, and solicited no orders from Maryland
residents through traveling salesmen, mail or telephone. The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the Delaware corporation was engaged in business in the state within the meaning of the Maryland use
tax statute,' and consequently liable for the collection of the use tax 2
from its Maryland customers. 3 In reversing the Maryland court, the
United States Supreme Court (four justices dissenting) held that
Maryland had no jurisdiction over defendant corporation, and, therefore, to require it to collect a use tax was a violation of due process. 4
In previous cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state may
'MD. ANN. CoDa, art. 81 § 371 (1951) provides: "Every vendor engaged in
business in this state and making sales of tangible personal property for use,
storage or consumption in this state which are taxable under the provisions of
this subtitle, at the time of making such sales, or if the use, storage or consumption becomes taxable hereunder, shall collect the tax imposed by this sub-title
from the purchaser." 368(k) of the same act defines the term "engaged in
business in this state" as selling or delivering in the state, or any activity in
connection therewith, tangible personal property for use, storage or consumption
within the state.
2 The purpose of the use tax is to complement and support the sales tax,
usually in two respects. First, it protects state merchants from competition with
out-of-state merchants whose sales are not taxed, and second, it prevents the
loss of state revenue by removing from its residents the advantage of non-taxed
out-of-state purchases.
'Miller Brothers v. State of Maryland, 201 Md. 535, 95 A 2d 286 (1953).
Maryland entered suit against defendant to recover use taxes assessed by the
state comptroller and attached a station wagon belonging to defendant. Defendant filed a petition to quash the writ of attachment on the grounds that the
assessment was unconstitutional. In holding that the defendant was subject
to the use tax statute the court relied on the fact that it delivered merchandise
to purchasers in Maryland. Other factors advanced on argument for holding
defendant liable were as follows: (a) Defendant delivered some purchases to
common carriers consigned to Maryland addresses. (b) It occasionally mailed
sales circulars to all former customers, including Maryland customers. (c) It
advertised with Delaware papers and radio stations knowing that such advertisements would reach Maryland inhabitants.
'Miller Brothers v. State of Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 342 (1954) : "Seizure
of property by the state under pretext of taxation when there is no jurisdiction
or power to tax is simple- confiscation and a denial of due process of law."
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require a foreign corporation to collect a use tax on goods destined
for the use of residents of the taxing state, where the vendor shipped
to an agent in the state for delivery, 5 engaged in intrastate business
as well as interstate activities there, 6 rented offices for general agents
within the state, 7 or merely dispatched soliciting agents thereto.8
Likewise, the Court has sustained statutes making foreign corporations liable for the collection of a sales tax where they maintained offices in the taxing state.0 But the Court reached a different conclusion
as to a sales tax in McLeod v. Dilworth,10 the apparent distinction
Monomotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934).
'Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359 (1941); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U. S. 373 (1941). The question in these cases was
whether Iowa could require the companies involved to collect a use tax on orders
sent directly from Iowa customers to out-of-state mail order houses and filled by
shipment direct to those purchasers by mail or common carrier. In holding that
the state could do so, the Court took the view that the mail order business was
a general business being done as a whole through the companies' local stores
and otherwise in the state; and also, since the sellers were doing business in the
state, they were subject to its territorial jurisdiction.
7 Felt and Tarrent Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939). Agents in
this case had the exclusive right to solicit orders in. California, and had authority
to employ sub-agents. Sometimes orders were filled by shipment from the outof-state office directly to the customer, and at other times shipment was made
to the agents for subsequent delivery.
'General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
Defendant was not qualified to do business in Iowa and maintained no office
or permanent agents therein. The extent of its activity consisted of sending
traveling salesmen from Minnesota into Iowa where they solicited orders subject to acceptance or rejection at the Minnesota office. Orders were filled by
shipping merchandise to Iowa customers by common carrier or mail. This case
is generally regarded as the Supreme Court's most liberal extension of the power
of a state over an out-of-state corporation with respect to making it a collector
of the use tax. For a discussion of the case see, Note, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1086
(1944) and Roesken, State Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporationsfor Collection
of Use Taxes, 22 TAXEs 296 (1944). To date, at least two states have indicated reluctance to follow the General Trading Co. case: In Creamery Package
Mfg. Co. v. State Board of Equilization, 62 Wyo. 265, 166 P. 2d 952 (1946),
the Wyoming court distinguished a similar fact situation in finding that the
Wyoming use tax statute did not define "retailers doing business within the
state" to include foreign corporations dispatching agents into the state; and
in Richmond Crosby Co. v. Stone, 204 Miss. 122, 37 So. 2d 22 (1948), the
Mississippi court held that the procedural rule that a corporation must he
doing business within the state for the purpose of service of process, prevented
the state from having jurisdiction over the plaintiff corporation, the reasoning
being that Mississippi decisions do not consider that the mere presence of
soliciting agents within a state constitutes doing business within the procedural
rule. But for an indication that the procedural rule may be losing force,
see Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 311 (1945); Johns v. Bay State
Abrasive Product Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (1950); Compania de Astral, S. A.
v. Boston Metals Co., 107 A. 2d 357 (Md. 1954); Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture
Labs., 257 P. 2d 727 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1953); Jeter v Austin Trailer Equip.
Co., 265 P. 2d 130 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1954). The General Trading Co. case
was applied favorably in People v. West Pub. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 80, 216 P. 2d 441
(1950).
McGoldrick v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940); McGoldrick v. Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U. S. 70 (1940).
10322 U. S. 327 (1944). The only differenuce between the facts of this case
and those of General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U. S.
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being that in the former cases the transfer of title and consummation
of sale took place within the taxing state; whereas, in the latter case,
title was found to pass upon delivery to the carrier in the vendor's
state.
In addition to the due process problem, a major barrier which the
states had to overcome in all of these cases was the question of the
effect of the statutes with respect to the commerce clause. The general rule is that a state must not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce."
Thus, among other things, a state is prevented
from singling out interstate commerce for special tax burdens;12 subjecting it to cumulative taxes of similar nature;13 taxing the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce;14 and discriminating against interstate commerce in favor of its local trade.'5
A tax may fall if it affects interstate commerce in any of the above
mentioned ways, even when there is sufficient contact between the taxed
incident and the taxing state to satisfy the due process requirement.
335 (1944), is that the tax involved in the General Trading Co. case was a use
tax, while here the tax involved was a sales tax. Obviously, it is a case where

the Court looked more at the labels than the economic incidents of the two taxes.
See McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 332 (1944) (dissenting opinion) ; McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 349 (1944) (Mr. Justice Rutledge combines
dissenting opinion in the Dilworth case and concurring opinion in the General
Trading Co. case.)
" "Despite mechanical or artificial distinctions sometimes taken between the
taxes deemed permissible and those condemned, the decisions appear to be predicated on a practical judgment as to the likelihood of the tax being used to place
interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage." Galveston, H. &. S. A. R. R.
v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
' McGoldrick v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
". International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135 (1918); Looney
v. Crane, 245 U. S. 178 (1917); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. O'Connor, 223
U. S. 280 (1911); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1909). In
these cases the Court held that a license fee based on a percentage of the entire
capital stock of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce was an undue
burden, since each state in which the corporation did business could impose a
tax measured by all of its interstate business. The Court has also struck down
taxes on gross receipts derived from interstate business on the theory that every
state in which the corporation engaged in business could similarly tax its gross
receipts. Gwin, White, & Prince v. Hennefore, 305 U. S. 434 (1939); J. F.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); Galveston, H. & S. A. R. R.
v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908); Philadelphia & S. M. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887); Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 (1887).
But.taxes have been sustained when apportioned to capital resulting from intrastate business. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331 (1939) ; International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429 (1929); National Leather Co. v.
Massachusetts, 277 U. S. 413 (1928). In International Harvester Co. v. Dep't
of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 (1944), and Dep't of Treasury v. Wood Preserving
Co., 313 U. S. 62 (1941), the Court refused to consider the problem of cumulative taxation in holding that a state could tax gross receipts from interstate
transactions taking place within its borders.
"'Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Washington, 297 U. S. 403
(1936).
8

" Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62 (1891).
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So, though somewhat overlapping, the questions of due process and
the commerce clause are not identical.' 6
In the instant case, the Court did not rule on the commerce question, but based the decision on its opinion that the conduct of the
Delaware corporation was not of such character as to bring it within
Maryland's taxing power. In dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas (The
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark concurring)
urged that the defendant's frequent delivery of goods into Maryland, its
knowledge as to the destination of goods shipped by common carrier,
and its regular injection of advertising into media reaching Maryland
residents established sufficient contact with the state to form a basis
for requiring the defendant to collect the tax.
The principle that in such case there must be some intrastate activity on the part of the foreign vendor appears fundamental. But the
members of the Court disagree as to the degree of activity necessary,
and decisions to date fail to establish any clear-cut formula for determining when intrastate activities are sufficient for jurisdictional purposes.' 7 Perhaps, in speaking of the lack of invasion and exploitation
of the consumer market in the instant case, Mr. justice Jackson gives
some indication as to a very important part of the test,18 and it may
well be that some form of aggressive, active competition with the local
market, coupled with an entry such as in the instant case, would establish the necessary jurisdiction. Such a test is consistent with previous
decisions,' 0 and might be justified on the theory that the state is entitled to compensation for furnishing a market in which the out-of"MMcLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 349, 353 (1944) (Mr. Justice Rutledge combines dissenting opinion in the Dilworth case and concurring opinion
in the General Trading Co. case).
1' It should be noted that discussion here is limited to activities which bring
a foreign corporation within a state's jurisdiction with respect to collecting the
use tax. For a discussion of intrastate activities sufficient to require a foreign
corporation to domesticate as compared with those sufficient for service of process, see Note, 45 Mica. L. REv. 218 (1946). Recent Supreme Court extensions of the procedural rule that a foreign corporation must be doing businesswithin a state for purpose of service of process are discussed in Note, 7 Alum.
L. R v. 403 (1953); Note, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 500 (1951).
18 In distinguishing General Trading Co., where soliciting agents were sent
into the taxing state, Mr. Justice Jackson said, "The Court could properly approve the state's decision to regard such rivalry with its local merchants as
equivalent to being a local merchant. But there is a wide gulf between this
type of active and aggressive operation within a taxing state and the occasional
delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than
incidental effects of general advertising. Here was no invasion or exploitation
of the consumer market in Maryland. On the contrary, these sales resulted
from purchasers traveling from Maryland to Delaware to exploit its less taxburdened selling market." Miller Brothers v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 347
(1954).
1" In all cases cited in footnotes 4 through 7, there was local solicitation in
some form.
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state corporation receives the same benefits and protection as intrastate vendors. 20
If such an analysis is correct, the decision should have little practical effect upon the present administration and collection of use taxes, 21
because the way will have been left open to impose tax collecting obligations on foreign corporations which make deliveries into a taxing
state after encroaching upon its markets by inducing (e.g., by direct
advertising, mail and telephone solicitation, etc.) its customers to cross
the state line for tax-saving purposes. On the other hand, if this
decision means that such corporations may now escape liability, its
effect will no doubt be to increase the number of merchants seeking
to capitalize on the sales tax of neighboring states at the expense of
the local market, thereby further increasing the difficulties of administration and collection of the use tax.
WILLIAm

E. GRAHAM, JR.

Constitutional Law-Equal Protection Clause-Exclusion of a Class
from Jury Service
Twenty years ago the United States Supreme Court decided that
discrimination of a nature prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution' occurs
when it is shown by a Negro defendant that for a generation or longer
no person of African descent has been called for jury service although
qualified Negroes are available within the county wherein the trial
is held.2 The rule is sometimes referred to as the "Norris" rule.
Recently in Hernandez v. Texas,, the Court was faced with the
" In People v. West Pub. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 80, 91, 216 P. 2d 441, 448 (1950),
the California Supreme Court held the defendant publishing company liable for

the collection of the use tax where it maintained offices and soliciting agents
within the state. In so holding, the court used the following language: "The
state provided a market in which appellant operated in competition with local
law book publishers, and its salesmen received the same protection and other
benefits from the state as salesmen carrying on business activities for a company engaged in intrastate business."

21 Of course, the decision might have some effect because the collection of
the use tax through the vendor is the most effective method of enforcing the
tax and the decision exempts one *class of foreign vendors from that responsibility. However, at present few state statutes are as broad as the Maryland
statute in defining companies "engaged in business within the state," but they
are, for the most part, directed at foreign corporations maintaining places of
business within the state or engaging in some form of local solicitation or advertising.
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deny to any person
within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
2 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
No Negro had served on the
jury within the memory of witnesses who had lived in the county for life. The
pronounced rule is one of presumption, and may be overcome by a sufficient
showing of facts by the state.
374 Sup. Ct. 667 (1954).
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question of whether the rule should be extended to cover nationalities
as well as races.
In this case the defendant, an American citizen of Mexican descent,
was indicted for murder, tried and convicted. In his appeal to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals he stated that no person of Mexican
extraction had served on a county grand jury or petit jury for the
past twenty-five years, although qualified persons of Mexican descent
resided within the county. Though unable to prove actual discriminati6n, the defendant insisted that the "Norris" test should be applied
to prove his allegations. Countering, the state maintained that the
rule applied only to members of different races, and that since persons
of Mexican descent are primarily members of the white race no presumption of discrimination should be found. The defendant's conviction was affirmed, 4 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.5
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court, reversed the conviction, holding: (1) that the state court erred in limiting
the application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the white and Negro races; (2) that the "Norris" rule
applied; and (3) that the state had failed to rebut the prima facie
showing of discrimination.
By way of background, the Supreme Court has long held that a
6
state may not pass a law prohibiting Negroes from serving on juries.
"Whenever by any action of a state, whether through its legislature,
through its courts or through its executive or administrative officers,
all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of their
race or color, from serving as . . . jurors in the criminal prosecution
of a person of the African race, the equal protection of the laws is
denied to him. ... ."
The list of persons from which the jury is to be drawn must contain
a cross-section of the defendant's community. 8 However, there is no
'Hernandez v. Texas, 251 S. W. 2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
Hernandez v. Texas, 346 U. S. 811 (1953).Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370
0 Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 (1882).
(1880), involved a statute whereby qualified voters could serve as jurors, and
by the Delaware Constitution only whites could vote. Strouder v. West Vir-

ginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879).

"Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442,447 (1900). Here the trial court refused
to hear witnesses offered by the defendant to prove his allegation of discrimination. In Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 231 (1904), the court refused to
pass on the question of the defendant's rights under the Alabama Constitution
on a motion to quash the indictment. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565
(1896), involved the Mississippi constitutional provision that no person could
be a juror unless a qualified voter, able to read and write. See also Neal v.
Delaware, supra note 6.
' Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 220 (1946). "The American
tradition of trial by jury . . . necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community."
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guaranty to him of a jury composed entirely of members of his own
race,9 nor even a mixed jury.10 But jury commissioners may not
limit those from whom juries are selected to persons of their own
personal acquaintance, for "if there has been discrimination, whether
accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand."'"
It is a commissioner's duty to familiarize himself "with the qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race or
2

color."'
Where the evidence introduced by the defendant shows only that
no Negro served on the grand jury that indicted and the petit jury
that tried him, a motion to quash the indictment based on alleged discrimination is properly denied. 13 But a prima fade case is made out
upon a showing of long continued, systematic exclusion of Negroes. 14
Uncontroverted affidavits are sufficient to show a systematic and arbitrary exclusion because of race or color.' " And, where white and
yellow tickets were used by jury commissioners, for the white and
Negro races respectively, and no Negro appeared on the jury panel,
though qualified members of that race resided in the county, a prima
facie case of discrimination was established.' 6
Discrimination against members of a defendant's political party has
been held unconstitutional.' 7 So too, where there was deliberate and
' Preleau v. United States, 271 Fed. 361 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
10 Aldns v. Texas, 325 U. S.398 (1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S.316
(1906) (the defendant demanded a mixed jury as a matter of right).; Virginia
v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1879) (the defendant moved that the venire, which
was composed entirely of whites, be modified so as to allow one third thereof
to be composed of Negroes.).
" Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 132 (1940). Jury commissioners testified
that the reason they failed to select Negroes was that they did not know the
names of any who were qualified.
1"Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 283, 289 (1950).
1"Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S.592 (1896).
See Thomas v. Texas, 212
U. S.278 (1909) ; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S.316 (1906).
"' Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282
(1950) (out of twenty-one grand juries, only a few contained one Negro, while
seven per cent of the eligible voters were Negroes); Patton v. Mississippi, 332

U. S.463 (1947) (one third of the population was Negro, but none had served on
the grand jury for thirty years) ; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S.400 (1942) (8,000 of
the 66,000 poll tax payers in the county were Negroes); Smith v. Texas, 311
U. S.128 (1940) (for seven years, during which time thirty-two grand juries
had been called, only five Negroes served, while twenty per cent of the population1 was Negro). See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S.345 (1939).
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S.613, 616 (1938).
" Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S.559 (1953). The Court made no mention of
the 17rule that there has to be shown a systematic exclusion.
Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452 (C. C. E. D. Ky. 1905), re7/d on other
grouds, 201 U. S.1 (1906). The defendant, a Republican, was charged with the
crime of being an accessory before the fact to murder. He had been convicted by
the trial court three times, and on each occasion the appellate court sent the case
back for a new trial due to error. He petitioned for removal to the federal
court, on the ground that he had a right to be tried by jurors without discrimination against those who belonged to the same political class to which he
belonged, to wit, Republican, and that members of that class had been excluded,
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systematic exclusion of members of a particular religious fTith,' 8 and
where wage earners were arbitrarily excluded from service on a jury
panel, 19 discrimination was found. The systematic and intentional
exclusion of women from grand or petit jury panels in a federal district court was held to warrant a dismissal of an indictment against
a woman charged with a federal offense. 20 The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a state from excluding from jury service certain
occupational groups, 21 and the use of a special or "Blue Ribbon" jury
in counties of one million or more people in certain 22classes of cases
does not on its face deny equal protection of the laws.
As to procedural aspects, one who wishes to avail himself of the
defense that there was discrimination in the selection of the jurors who
indicted or tried him should raise the constitutional question in the
state court during the trial, and if overruled should appeal to the
highest state court. If he fails to do so, he cannot have the adverse
Generally a challenge to the
decision reviewed by a federal court.P
array before trial is used to quash the indictment,24 or a motion is
denying him his right to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The petition was denied and the case came before
the federal court on a motion for habeas corpus to remove him from the custody
of the state and put him in the custody of the United States. In granting the
motion the federal court stated that the defendant was entitled to such removal
upon a showing of such discrimination.
"SJuarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. App. 297, 277 S. W. 1091 (1925). (Criminal prosecution for selling liquor, in a state court, and the defendant petitioned
to have the indictment set aside because Roman Catholics had been excluded
from jury service, and that he was a member of that denomination, and that
such exclusion denied him his equal rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Held: it was the duty of the court to hear the evidence and if such discrimination1 were found the indictment should have been set aside.)
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 (1946). This was a civil
action brought in a federal court under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
The exclusion of daily wage earners from the jury panel was held to be reversible error, not on constitutional grounds, but on the ground of improper
administration of the jury system in the federal courts.
"0Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946). The woman had
violated a federal criminal statute and the Court said that in a state where
women are permitted to serve as jurors under local law, a federal jury panel
from which women are intentionally and systematically excluded is not properly
constituted and the Court will exercise its power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts to correct the error. The Court
was upholding the tradition that trial by jury contemplates an impartial jury
from a cross-section of the community.
If the exclusion of the class
2 Rowlings v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638 (1906).
is for the good of the community, then the law is proper. (Statute excluded
from jury service lawyers, ministers, preachers, doctors, dentists, railroad firemen and engineers).
"In a metropolis with
" Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 271 (1947).
notoriously congested court calendars we cannot find it constitutionally forbidden
to set up procedures in advance of trial to eliminate from the jury panel those
who, in a large proportion of cases, would be rejected by the court after its
taken in examination to ascertain their disqualifications."
time hadrebeen
Wood, 140 U. S.278 (1891).
"It
2 Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128,
130 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 584 (1896).
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made to quash the trial jury panel. There is a possible alternative
procedure: a defendant who is denied or cannot enforce in a state
court any law providing for the equal civil rights of United States
citizens may have the case removed to a federal district court.25
Apparently no state court has held, as did the Supreme Court in
the principal case, that systematic exclusion of a nationality from jury
service violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as to a defendant descended from that nationality, but there are
dicta to that effect. 26 Language used by the Texas court itself in
several cases denotes a belief that exclusion of citizens of a particular
nationality from jury service is a denial of equal protection of the laws
where there is proof of actual discrimination.2
In fact, when the
instant case was before the state court, it was stated that "it cannot
be said, in the absence of proof of actual discrimination, that appellant
28
has been discriminated against in the organization of such juries...."
(Emphasis supplied). In Juarez v. TeXas,2 the systematic exclusion
of Catholics from jury service was held to be violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. So it appears that the Texas court has had no trouble
applying the "Norris" rule to classes other than white or Negro, except where the question presented involved the exclusion of persons
of Mexican descent, and even there it intimated that the rule should
be applied to the latter group if actual discrimination were shown
against the defendant. No valid reason was given for the distinction.
The decision in the principal case extends the "Norris" rule for
the first time. That the Court ruled correctly is manifest from the
trend established in the prior decisions. It is equally manifest that
the Court will continue to expand the application of the rule if the
occasions arise. The Fourteenth Amendment, though enacted and
ratified because of fear of discrimination against a particular race, is
2 16 STAT. 144 (1870),
28 U. S. C. 1443 (1952). "Any of the following
actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a state court may be removed
by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing wherein it is pending:
"(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of
such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens
"
of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; ....
Apparently Strouder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879) restricts this to
cases where the discrimination is by the constitution or laws of a state.
2 State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 205, 63 S. E. 2d 99, 101 (1950).
"It has
been the consistent holding of this jurisdiction . . . that the intentional, arbitrary
and systematic exclusion of any portion of the population from jury service,
grand or petit, on account of race, color, creed, or national origin, is at variance
with the fundamental law and cannot stand." See Richards v. State, 144 Fla.
177, 181, 197 So. 772, 774 (1940).
"Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. Rep. 463, 181 S. W. 2d 87 (1944);
Carrasco v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. Rep. 659, 95 S. W. 2d 433 (1936) ; Ramirez
v. State,
119 Tex. Crim. Rep. 362, 40 S. W. 2d 138 (1931).
"8 Hernandez v. State, 251 S. W. 2d 531, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
0 102 Tex. Crim. App. 297, 277 S. W. 1091 (1925).
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not restric.ted in its application to members of that race. Its protection
is also available "when the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated,
and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single
out that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable
classification." 80
CH.Ans KivBar.

Criminal Law-Premeditation and Deliberation-Jury InstructionsBrutality of the Killing as Affecting
It is proper in North Carolina in a first degree murder trial
for the question of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation to
go to the jury with the instructions that the jury may use the conduct
of the accused before and after the crime, along with other attendant
circumstances, in deciding whether the elements of premeditation and
deliberation were present.1 Our court has held to be admissible as
evidence of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation: absence3
2
of quarrels between the accused and the deceased, previous threats,
preparations made for the crime, 4 absence of provocation, 5 declarations
made by the accused, 6 and subsequent acts of the accused,7 other than
s
flight.
But there is some uncertainty in the holdings of the court as to
the exact circumstances in which the jury should consider the subsequent acts of the accused in determining premeditation and deliberation. This uncertainty arises when cases approving an unqualified in"Hernandez v. Texas, 74 Sup. Ct. 667, 670 (1954).
State v.Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S.E. 2d 188 (1950) ; State v.Chavis, 231

N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949); State v.Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 38 S.E.

2d 29 (1943); State v.Evans, 198 N. C. 82, 150 S. E. 678 (1929).
'State v.Watson, 222 N. C. 672, 24 S.E. 2d 540 (1943); State v. Baity,
180 N. C. 722, 105 S. E. 149 (1920). It isinteresting to note that while the
absence of quarrels between the accused and the deceased has been held to be
evidence from which the jury could infer premeditation and deliberation, the
presence of quarrels between the accused and the deceased has only been held
by our court to be evidence from which the jury may infer malice and illfeeling.
State v. Hawkins, 214 N. C. 326, 199 S.E. 284 (1938); State v. Bowner,
214 N. C. 249, 199 S.E. 31 (1938) ; State v. Payne, Z13 N. C. 719, 197 S.E.
573 (1938) ; State v. Grainger, 157 N. C. 628, 73 S. E. 149 (1911).
'State v. Baity, 180 N. C. 722, 105 S. E. 200 (1920) ; State v. Daniels, 164
N. C. 464, 79 S.E. 953 (1913).
' State v. Stewart, 226 N. C. 299, 38 S. E. 2d 29 (1946) ; State v. Cain, 178
N. C. 724, 100 S.E. 884 (1919).
' State v.Johnson, 172 N. C. 920, 90 S. E. 426 (1916).
"State v.Westmoreland, 181 N. C. 590, 107 S.E. 438 (1921).
' State v. Blanks, 230 N. C. 501, 53 S. E. 2d 452 (1949); State v. Evans,
198 N. C.82, 50 S.E. 2d 678 (1929) ; State v. Steele, 190 N. C.506, 130 S.E.
308 (1925). The reason for not holding flight as evidence from which the jury
might infer premeditation and deliberation is that flight from a crime might
just as easily result from a fear of guilty circumstances as from a guilty conscience.
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struction to the jury that they may consider evidence of the defendant's
conduct before and after the crime in determining premeditation and
deliberation,9 are contrasted with the case of State v. Westmoreland,'°
which would seem to require a qualification of the instructions. In
that case the court considered in detail the effect of subsequent acts
of the accused. The court cited authority which it noted might indicate, depending on the circumstances of the case, that any unseemly
conduct toward the corpse of the person slain, any indignity offered
it by the slayer, or the concealment of the body might be evidence of
express malice and of premeditation and deliberation in the killing.
A close examination of the only North Carolina case 1 ' cited in this
authority reveals that the court was saying that these acts of the accused should be considered in determining malice, and that it did not
consider the issue of premeditation and deliberation. It was the conclusion of the Westmoreland case that the better rule is that acts subsequent to the crime should be considered in determining whether there
was premeditation and deliberation only when those acts were of the
type which show a preconceived plan,' 2 which continues to completion
after the commission of the crime. The court felt that this should be
the criterion used by the jury in inferring premeditation and deliberation from the.subsequent acts of the accused. So the present position
of the North Carolina Supreme Court is probably that subsequent acts
of the accused should be considered to determine premeditation and
deliberation only when the subsequent acts of the accused are in furtherance of an obviously preconceived plan on the part of the accused
to take the life of the deceased.
This is further accentuated by those cases holding that acts by the
accused subsequent to the crime are evidence only of the general guilt
of the accused as opposed to the specific elements of premeditation and
deliberation.' 8 Against this background, the court is now allowing
the question of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation to go
to the jury with the unqualified instruction that they may use the defendant's conduct after the crime in determining premeditation and
"State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950) ; State v. Chavis, 231
N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949); State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 38 S. E.
2d 29 (1943) ; State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82, 150 S. E. 678 (1929).
10 181 N. C. 590, 107 S. E. 438 (1921).
State v. Robertson, 166 N. C. 356, 81 S. E. 689 (1914).
12In the Westmoreland case, the defendant, immediately after the killing
began to dispose of the body of the deceased. He secretly concealed it in an old
well, and his attempt to dispose of it was accompanied with such precision and
certainty that it was obvious that it was a part of his preconceived plan to kill
the deceased. His actions after the killing were only in completion of this
preconceived plan.
s State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 506, 130 S. E. 308 (1925); State v. Atwood,
176 N. C. 704, 97 S. E. 12 (1918).
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deliberation. 4 This is probably being understood by juries to mean
that the conduct after the crime may be considered in finding premeditation and deliberation of the defendant without considering whether this conduct is a part of the preconceived plan of the defendant to
take the life of the deceased. This seems to be contrary to the previous
holdings of the court that these subsequent acts of the defendant are
to be considered only a evidence of guilt generally, and not of premeditation and deliberation.
In further examining the wide discretion of the jury in considering
the circumstances of the crime in its determination of premeditation
and deliberation, it becomes obvious that the discretion is the same
if the killing is done methodically without violence, as when it is accomplished in a brutal and ferocious manner. However, in a case of
the latter type, should the jury be allowed to infer premeditation and
deliberation from the brutal manner of the killing alone?
While this question has not been directly decided by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, it has said in State v. Stanley,15 "The vicious,
ferocious, and brutal manner of the slaying by two slashes of the razor
which almost decapitated the victim engenders an inference of premeditation and deliberation distinct from the presumption of second
degree murder by the intentional use of a deadly weapon and merged
therein." The other evidences of premeditation and deliberation in this
case were strong and no doubt conclusive. However, the court's
language on the aspect of brutality may show a tendency to misconstrue the early cases in such a manner as to destroy the conventional
distinction between malice and premeditation and deliberation.1 6 Simi14 State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950); State v. Chavis,
231 N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949); State v. Harris, 233 N. C. 697, 38
S. E. 2d 29 (1943) ; State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82, 150 S. E. 678 (1929).
" 227 N. C. 650, 654, 44 S. E. 2d 196, 199 (1947); accord, State v. Bynum,
175 N. C. 777, 782, 95 S. E. 101, 103 (1918), where this language was used:
"There was an absence of any altercation or quarrel which might point to a killing without malice and without a deliberate intent to kill. The manner of the
killing, cutting the throat from ear to ear, the beating up of the head and the
breaking in of the nose would indicate or at least was evidence from which
the jury could infer that the killing was not merely from malice which would
make it murder in the second degree but was a deliberate intent to kill in order
to conceal this crime or his intent to commit crime against the person of the
victim. These were matters for the jury." The evidence here would have
heavily favored a verdict of first degree murder occurring in an attmpt to

commit rape.

" Under the common law the court several times held that the brutality of the
killing would permit an inference of malice. State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (1839) ;
State v. Chavis, 80 N. C. 364 (1879); State v. Boon, 82 N. C. 879, 19 S. E.
705 (1894). Under statutory murder, however, the court was to determine
whether all the evidence which allowed a permissible inference of malice at
common law would permit the additional inference of premeditation and deliberation. Despite the language of the Stanley case, 227 N. C. 650, 654, 44
S. E. 2d 196, 199 (1947), it is believed that in the cases there relied on the
court has fallen more in line with the common law cases and held brutality
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larly, the court has allowed the brutality of the killing to affect its
17
disposition on the question of legal provocation.
Definitions of premeditation and deliberation as expounded by the
court have varied little. To premeditate is to think beforehand, the
length of time being immaterial; to deliberate is to form an intention
to kill, which intent is executed in a cool state of blood in furtherance
of a fixed design to accomplish the unlawful purpose of taking the life
of another.18 Deliberation connotes weighing the thought of the killing with some semblance of reason, if only for a brief moment. Ferocity and brutality in a killing do not logically seem to result in an
inference of premeditation and deliberation, since it does not seem
that the killing would be more deliberately and coolly executed because
it was accomplished in a brutal and vicious manner. Psychologically,
extreme violence usually suggests thoughtlessness, passion, and even
insanity, and while psychological tests may not alw.ys be applied to
the realm of the law, they may have much significance here.'9
of the killing as an inference of malice rather than premeditation and deliberation.
In State v. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. E. 49 (1904), the court held that the
brutality of the crime would be attributed to a malicious disposition. In State
v. Robertson, 166 N. C. 356, 81 S. E. 189 (1914), the court cited the common
law case of State v. Jarratt, 23 N. C. 76 (1840), in saying that the manner of
the killing was evidence of express malice. In State v. Bynum, 175 N. C. 777,
95 S. E. 101 (1918), the court again considered the brutality of the killing. It
held that the brutality of the killing was evidence from which the jury could
infer premeditation and deliberation, but it is believed that the jury considered
that the brutality of the killing was done to cover up the crime of rape or an
assault with intent to commit rape on the deceased, and that the brutal manner
of the killing was to be considered in that aspect in determining premeditation
and deliberation in the case. Thus, in an examination of the traditional use of
drawing an inference of malice from the manner of the killing, it is uncertain
whether the court would actually want to draw an inference of premeditation
and deliberation from the brutal manner of the killing standing alone, although
the dictum in the Stanley case does seem to support such a conclusion.
"'In at least two cases the North Carolina Supreme Court has left the
impression that there can be no provocation sufficient to justify a killing in a
brutal manner, and that when there is such a killing that there can be no such
thing as a sufficient legal provocation. In State v. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 689,
47 S. E. 49, 51 (1904), the court's language was that when the killing is done
in a brutal and ferocious manner it "will be attributed to a malicious disposition and not to a provocation." Accord, State v. Bynum, 175 N. C. 777, 782, 95
S. E. 101, 103 (1918), where the court used these words: "There could hardly
have been any provocation to cause the beating up of a woman and cutting
her throat from ear to ear but the deliberate intent to kill." Quacre as to
whether the brutality of a killing should entirely negative a legal provocation,
though the possibility of a provocation sufficient to justify such a brutal killing
might seem remote.
" State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950); State v. Wise,
225 N. C. 746, 36 S. E. 2d 230 (1945) ; State v. French, 225 N. C. 276, 34 S. E.
2d 157 (1945) ; State v. Hawkins, 214 N. C. 326, 199 S. E. 284 (1938) ; State
v. Payne, 213 N. C. 719, 197 S. E. 573 (1938); State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82,
150 S. E. 678 (1929).
"' Premeditation and deliberation are mental elements connected with thought.
Since, of necessity, they must be determined by circumstances, if the circumstances suggest absence of thought they could be helpful in determining the
mental attitude of the accused.
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Before the Act of 1893,2 which divided the crime of murder into
first and second degree, malice was presumed from the fact of the
killing, and the killing having been shown, the offense was murder
unless the contrary appeared from circumstances of justification, alleviation, or excuse. Such a killing was the present equivalent, in effect,
of murder in the first degree. 21 With the enactment of the statute,
the elements of premeditation and deliberation were added to malice to
constitute the elements of the crime of first degree murder.22 As the
court differentiated between these two degrees and the elements necessary to establish them, it allowed an inference of malice from such general states of mind as hate, spite, and a general design to effect harm,
or to take life without just cause,23 while proof of premeditation and
deliberation same to require some evidence of thought. 24 Therefore,
in examining the elements that constitute first degree and second degree
murder it would seem to be more logical to make the legal effect of
brutality in a killing a permissible inference of malice rather than of
premeditation and deliberation.
This is not meant to intimate that the circumstances surrounding
the killing should not be used to determine the presence of the elements
of premeditation and deliberation, but that the brutality and viciousness
of the actual killing would not be a true test of the mental attitude of
the killer. A circle might be drawn around the time of the killing at
a point which did not take from the jury consideration of the circumstances leading up to and after the killing. Within this circle the jury
should be instructed concerning permissible consideration of the bru2
oN. C. PUB. LAws, 1893, cc. 85, 281; Now codified as N. C. GEN. STAT.
(1953).
§ 14-17
State v. Hicks, 125 N. C. 636, 34 S. E. 247 (1899); State v. Johnson,

"I

48 22
N. C. 266 (1855).

N . C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 14-17 (1953).

" State v. Benson, 183 N. C. 795, 799, 111 S. E. 869, 871 (1922), Chief
Justice Stacy, speaking for the court said: "Malice is not only hatred, ill-will
or spite, as it is ordinarily understood-to be sure that is malice-but it also
means that condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another
intentionally without just cause or justification. It may be shown by evidence
of hatred, ill-will, or dislike, and it is implied in law from the killing with a
deadly weapon." Accord, State v. Williams, 185 N. C. 643, 666, 116 S. E. 570,
582 (1923) : "Malice may arise from personal ill-will or grudge, but it may
also be said to exist (in a legal sense) wherever there has been a wrongful or
intentional killing of another, without lawful excuse or mitigating circumstances.
This is implied or legal malice."
2, State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950); State v. Chavis,
231 N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949) ; State v. Brown, 218 N. C. 415, 11 S. E.
2d 321 (1940) ; State v. Hawkins, 214 N. C. 326, 199 S. E. 284 (1938) ; State
v. Bowser, 214 N. C. 249, 199 S. E. 31 (1938) ; State v. Payne, 213 N. C. 719,
197 S. E. 573 (1938). Some of the cases have held that if the circumstances
show a formed design to take life, this is murder in the first degree. However,
this formed design to take life must have in it the elements of premeditation
and deliberation to comply with the statutory requirements. See State v. Stewart,
226 N. C. 299, 38 S.E. 2d 29 (1946).
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tality of the killing in determining premeditation and deliberation, to
prevent confusing those elements with malice.
North Carolina and other jurisdictions are in accord in sending the
issue of the premeditation and deliberation of the defendant to the
jury with the instruction to consider all attendant circumstances of
the crime. 25 Some jurisdictions seem to lean toward an attitude which
would allow the brutality of the killing alone to be evidence from which
the jury could infer premeditation and deliberation. 2 1 Though no trend
can be shown, primarily because the courts have not considered whether
premeditation and deliberation could be inferred from the brutality of
the killing alone, there is a probability that they are allowing the traditional differences between malice and premeditation and deliberation to
be confused, by not instructing the jury specifically on the legal effect
of a killing accomplished in a brutal manner.
In determining the presence of premeditation and deliberation, it
is generally true that there are several factors involved, with the jury
weighing all of them at the same time. What weight they give to each
factor is not ascertainable. Of course, the brutal manner of a killing
cannot be entirely disregarded where a jury is attempting to determine
the elements of premeditation and deliberation. It probably always
plays an uninvited role since a brutal manner of killing will naturally
have more effect on the emotions of the jurors than the situations in
which this element is lacking. Nor would it be advisable to minimize
those aspects of brutality and atrocity that might really aid in determining whether premeditation and deliberation were present. This
situation might occur where there was an extension of brutality into
such a period of time that it bordered on torture, or where the circumstances of brutality and atrocity which lead up to the crime are
such as obviously indicate plan or design. However, evidences of
brutality in the actual killing would ordinarily seem to be no evidence
of premeditation and deliberation.
A ghastly murder makes objective determination of the facts difficult
under any circumstances. The aim of the court is to have the jury
consider the circumstances of the case in its most reasonable and
thoughtful state of mind. With this in view the trial judge may, in
his discretion, refuse to allow the jury to see horrible and ghastly photo" Bramlett v. State, 202 Ark. 1165, 156 S. W. 2d 226 (1941) ; Craig v. State,
205 Ark. 1100, 172 S. W. 2d 256 (1943) ; Robinson v. State, 69 Fla. 521, 68 So.
649 (1915); State v. Cox, 128 N. J. L. 108, 23 A. 2d 555 (1942); State v.
Leakey, 44 Mont. 354, 120 Pac. 234 (1911) ; State v. Fitch, 65 Nev. 668, 200 P.

2d 991 (1948) ; State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 108 P. 2d 641 (1941).

Craig v. State, 205 Ark. 1100, 172 S. W. 2d 356 (1943); People v. Sanducci, 195 N. Y. 361, 88 N. E. 385 (1909) ; Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa.

434, 128 Atl. 77 (1925). But ef. People v. Heslen, 27 Cal. 520, 163 P. 2d 21
(1945); State v. Porello, 33 N. E. 2d 23 (Ohio 1940).
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graphs of the crime if no purpose would be served other than to excite
the emotions of the jury.27 As a parallel to this commendable limitation on the use of photographs, it would be desirable to limit the permissible inference which can be drawn from the brutality of the killing to malice rather than premeditation and deliberation, with the
exceptions stated previously. When the fact of brutality is brought
to the attention of the jury without specific instructions concerning its
consideration, the jury is left with absolute freedom to give whatever
weight, emotional or otherwise, to the brutal manner of the killing.
Thus, it is very possible that the brutality connected with the actual
killing is affecting the juries of North Carolina, as well as other jurisdictions, in a very persuasive manner on the issue of the premeditation
and deliberation of the accused. Such reasoning could be very injurious
to justice in a particular case, and it would appear that the dicta of
the North Carolina Supreme Court would tend to condone such a re28
sult, if reached.
The law should deal with the shrewd, the calm, the butcher, and
the madman in the same manner. By no other procedure can it truly
adhere to those rules of reason which we call our law. The trial judge
can, with more discriminatory instructions, better guide the jury in
rendering a verdict which is not tainted with uncertainty as to the true
state of the law, and that is more in accordance with legally sanctioned
interpretations of premeditation and deliberation. By so doing he
will aid in limiting the use by the jury of emotions which have arisen
because of the brutal manner of the killing.
WILLIAM

C.

BREWER, JR.

Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Evidence of Speeding Violations Obtained by Use of Radar
Increasing use of the electronic speed meter, or "whammy"' as it
is more generally known, by law enforcing agencies in an effort to
7

2 STANSBURY, NoRaT

CAROLIWA EVIDENCE , § 118 (1947).
" State v. Stanley, 227 N. C. 650, 654, 44 S. E. 2d 196, 199 (1947).

'The electronic radar speed meter, or "whammy" as it is generally known,
is one of the latest mechanisms by which state and local officials are combating
highway speed violations. The operation of the instrument requires the use
of two automobiles placed approximately one-quarter of a mile apart along a
highway. Each automobile is equipped with a radio so that the radar-patrol car
team is able to communicate with one another. One automobile contains a
radar transmitter, receiver, and recording dial. The transmitter casts an electronic beam across the highway and when a vehicle passes through the beam,
energy is reflected to the receiver, converted into "miles per hour," recorded
on a tape, and indicated on a dial. If the speed is excessive, the "interceptor
car," or other member of the team, is contacted by radio, given the speed and
description of the automobile, and the violator is arrested by the interceptor.

See the discussion in People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
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control excessive highway speeds has raised the issue of admissibility
in evidence of the findings of such devices. The primary objection to
such evidence has been that the radar speed meter, as a scientific apparatus, has never been judicially recognized as being a reliable instrument for recording the speed of a vehicle on the highway.2 Since
it is a scientific apparatus which has not been so recognized, certain
facts must be shown before the evidence can be admitted.8 It must
be shown (1) that the apparatus is scientifically sound as an instrument for measuring speed, (2) that the particular piece of equipment
used is of a standard make and was in reliable condition when used,
and (3) that the testifying witnesses who used it are qualified in its
4
use.
In one 5 of the four reported cases concerning the use of radar
evidence, there was no objection to the introduction of evidence of
the expert, the testing0 of the device, or the qualifications of the operators, and a conviction was sustained based on radar evidence only.
In another case, 7 the evidence of the expert and radar-patrol car team
as to the testing of the instrument was admitted over objection, and
the conviction of the lower court was sustained based on radar evidence
only. Another case s held that the evidence of the testing of the speed
meter by the radar-patrol car team was inadmissible as hearsay and
reversed a conviction on that and other grounds. The fourth case 9
was decided on other grounds.
A careful comparison of People v. Offerman,10 which held such
evidence inadmissible as hearsay, with State v. Dantonio,1 which admitted the evidence over a hearsay objection, would indicate that the
reason for the variance in the holdings of the courts was due to the
manner in which the evidence was presented.
fState v. Moffitt, 100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super Ct. 1953).
3Ibid.4Ibid.
"Ibid.
' The testing of the apparatus each time it is set up consists of "zeroing," or

calibrating the electrical and mechanical equipment so that each piece of equip-

ment is set exactly alike and records the spped of oncoming cars alike. After

the power supply is connected to the radar equipment and the tubes are heated the
tests begin. Test cars are run through the operating area at varying speeds
and on each run the operator of the test car notes the speed of the car as
registered by his speedometer. At the same time the radar operator notes the
speed of the test car as registered on his radar speed dial. Adjustments are
made in the radar device until each instrument records exactly the same speed
on several given runs. When all devices record the same speed, radar operations commence. See discussion in State v. Dantonio, 31 N. J. Super 105,
105 A. 2d 918, 920 (1954).
'State

v. Dantonio, 31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).

'People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
'People of City of Buffalo v. Beck, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
The trial court took judicial notice of the operation and accuracy of the radar

device and was reversed for that reason.
'0 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
1131 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
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In the Offerman case, Officer A of the testing team testified that
several times earlier, on the day of the arrest, the test car had been
driven by him through the radar area and at these times he had reported by radio to Officer B, who was operating the radar set the
speed of the test car as recorded by its speedometer. He also testified
over objection that the speed of the test car agreed with the reading
on the radar dial as radioed to him by Officer B. Then Officer B.
testified that he observed the radar dial and found that in each instance the reading of the dial agreed with the reading of the speedometer of the test car as reported by Officer A. Counsel for the
defendant argued that the testimony of each was hearsay as Officer B
could not have known the reading on the speedometer of the car except
as told to him by Officer A, and that Officer A could not have known
of the reading on the radar dial except as told to him by Officer B.
The court stated that it seemed clear that each officer, in giving his
testimony, relied upon what the other had told him by radio; therefore, it was hearsay.' 2
Deft handling of the witnesses in the Dantonio case permitted the
court to reject the contention that the evidence was hearsay. The
test car operator testified that he passed through the operating zone
several times at certain varying speeds, and the radar operator testified that he observed the test car and recorded the speed on each run.
The test car operator thereby established the fact that his car passed
through the operating zone at various speeds, while the radar operator
established the fact that at the same time and place a car, identified
as the test car, passed through the operating area, the same speeds
being indicted on the radar speed dial. Thus each has testified as to
independent facts, and little reference, if any, need be made to the
radio communication between the two witnesses. Any reference to
the conversation would be incidental to the independently established
facts.
Even as presented in the Offerman case the evidence could very
well have been admitted, in spite of the hearsay objection, as the conversations were not necessary to prove the facts intended to be proved.
The hearsay rule excludes extrajudicial utterances only when offered
as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted.' 3 Evidence of oral
statements of others, which would otherwise be termed hearsay, can be
used to explain or throw light on the subsequent actions or conduct
of the person to whom they were made.1 4 It could have been con" People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179, 182 (Sup. Ct.

1953).3State v. Black, 230 N. C. 448, 43 S. E. 2d 443 (1949).
"Terry v. United States, 51 F. 2d 49 (4th Cir. 1931).
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tended in the Offerman case that the evidence of the conversation
between the two officers was necessary to show how the tests were
performed, and not to prove that the same speeds were registered by
each of the two devices. The witnesses' independent testimony as to
what they actually observed could be used to prove the speeds as indicated by the speed meter and the speedometer.
North Carolina has still another basis upon which such evidence
could be admitted. The peculiar rule in North Carolina which permits
a corroborating witness to relate past conversations with the first testifying witness would allow this type of evidence, if used for corroboration only and not as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. 15
Each officer could "corroborate" the other as to the conversation between the two. As this peculiar rule is already overworked and has
been criticized,1 6 this method of getting the evidence before the court
is not recommended.
While there have been no reported decisions in North Carolina concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained by use of the "whammy,"
there is no reason why such evidence should not be admitted if it
is properly presented. To prevent any possible contention that the
evidence of the radar-patrol car team is hearsay, it is suggested that
the procedure by which the evidence was presented in the Dantonio
case be followed.
MICHAEL P. MCLEOD.

Federal jurisdiction-The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine-Actions
Against Federal Officials-Equitable Relief and Mandamus
The doctrine of the sovereign's immunity from suit has been a part
of our jurisprudence at least since the days of Edward I of England.'
It is elementary that the sovereign is not amenable to suit in his courts
unless he has consented to be sued. Amendment XI of the Constitution of the United States expressly grants to states in the union immunity from suits brought in the federal courts by citizens of other
states or .by citizens or subjects of any foreign state;2 however, the
doctrine of the immunity of the federal government from suit is judge3
made.
" Burnett v. Wilmington, New Bern and Norfolk Ry., 120 N. C. 517, 26 S. E.

8191"(1896).
State v. Parrish, 79 N. C. 610 (1878).
1 United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 205 (1882).
2By judicial construction, the Amendment extends to suits against a state
brought by a citizen of that state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
Furthermore, foreign states cannot sue one of the United States without its
consent. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S.313 (1934).
'Justice Frankfurter has said, "As to the states, legal irresponsibility was
written into the Constitution by the Eleventh Amendment; as to the United
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The United States cannot be sued without its consent, and any
person who seeks to assert a claim against the United States can do
so only within the limits of federal statutes granting jurisdiction of
suits against the United States to the district courts and the Court
of Claims.4 Although the federal government has consented to be
sued for damages in actions involving contracts, it has long been established that the United States has not consented to suits for specific
performance of contracts to which it is a party. 5 With certain enumerated exceptions, the federal government is now subject to suit in
tort for damages inflicted by its agents, 6 but no statute consents to suits
States, it is derived by implication."

Corp., 337 U. S.682, 708 (1949).

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce

The legal issues involved are the same whether a state or a federal official is involved, and the same rules are applied to determine if a suit against
an official of either government is in reality a suit against the government
which employs him, a suit which cannot be maintained absent consent of that
government. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944); In
re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887).
The suability of a governmental corporation depends upon the terms of the
statute creating it. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S.
381 (1939).
If the defendant is a governmental agency, the tests to be applied to determine if the action is in effect one against the sovereign without its consent
are the same as with individual defendant officials. Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. MacArthur Mining Co., Inc., 184 F. 2d 913 (8th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 943 (1951).
'The Court of Claims, established in 1855, has jurisdiction over claims
against the United States founded upon the Constitution, any Act of Congress,
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort. 28 U. S. C. § 1491 et seq. (1952). The Court of
Claims has appellate jurisdiction of final judgments of the district courts arising
under the Tort Claims Act, if all of the appellees consent. 28 U. S. C. § 1504
(1952).
The district courts have original jurisdiction of petitions for partition of
lands wherein the United States has an interest as tenant in common or as
joint tenant. 28 U. S. C. § 1347 (1948). Since 1946 the district courts have
had exclusive jurisdiction of tort claims against the United States. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346(b) (1952). Since 1887 the district courts have had original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the Court of Claims, of claims not exceeding $10,000 founded
upon the Constitution, any Act of Congress, an executive department regulation, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346(a) (2) (1952).
'United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1 (1888) (Although the plaintiff's claim
may be based on some equitable interest or on equitable grounds, money damages only are allowed under what is now 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a) (1952) and 28
U. S. C. § 1491 (1952).)
The United States does not waive its immunity by instituting an action
against those who seek to, assert a counterclaim against it which could not
have been asserted in an original action, if that counterclaim would not be a
defense against the original action as between private litigants. United States v.
Patterson, 206 F. 2d 345 (5th Cir. 1953).
828 U. S. C. § 1346(b) (1952). Customs officers are answerable personally
for their torts. 28 U. S. C. § 2680(c) (1952) ; Nakasheff v. Continental Ins.

Co., 89 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. N. Y. 1950).
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in equity against the United States for relief controlling the tortious
activity.
Undoubtedly it is this unavailability of specific performance against
the United States and the freedom of the sovereign from equitable
decrees curbing tortious activity which have given rise to the complex
development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in suits against
federal officials. Courts of equity generally allow specific relief between
private parties whenever money damages are inadequate or the plaintiff makes a showing of need; in many situations such relief is also
desirable in suits against the United States, but the only possible way
to obtain it is to seek a decree against the individual officials involved.
If the court holds that the suit is in *effect one against the federal
government, it must dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This
is illustrated in the leading case of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.7 In this case the plaintiff contracted with the Regional
Director of the War Assets Administration to buy surplus coal. The
plaintiff arranged an irrevocable letter of credit payable to the War
Assets Administration in spite of the Regional Director's insistence
that under the terms of the contract the plaintiff was to deposit cash
with a named bank. The Director cancelled the contract and arranged
to sell the coal to another party. The plaintiff proceeded against the
War Assets Administrator, contending that title to the coal had passed
to it, that the defendant was acting "illegally," and that his refusal
to effect a delivery of the coal was "unauthorized," and prayed that the
defendant be enjoined from selling or delivering the coal to anyone
other than the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
was asking relief against the United States, for the reason that the
Regional Director had authority to construe the sales contract whether
or not he had actually made an error in construction, and that the
complaint must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The significance of this and other cases dealing with suits against
federal officials can be more readily ascertained by dividing the subject matter into several categories.
1. Suits involving official action in excess of valid authority or pursuant to invalid authority. An official's actions are his individual acts
and not those of the sovereign if he acts in excess of or without authority, or if the grant of authority itself is unconstitutional,8 and he may be
sued.9 The language of the court in the Domestic & Foreign case re7 337 U. S. 682 (1949).
' Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,

223 U. S.
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (state official).

605, 620 (1912); Ex parte Young,

'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952); joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951); Lincoln

19551

NOTES AND COMMENTS

affirmed this rule and emphasized that a mere showing that the defendant official made an error in the interpretation or application of
his authority did not meet the requirements for jurisdiction. 10 Even
when it was contended that the officer had made an error so gross as
to amount to total lack of authority, the rule has been applied."
2. Suits to prevent wrongful withholding or unconstitutionaltaking
of plaintiff's property. Many cases proceed upon the basis of the right
2
under general law to recover specific property wrongfully withheld.'
Several early cases allowed suits for specific relief against federal officers to prevent a wrongful taking without careful examination of
whether the officials were acting for the United States pursuant to
authority granted or were acting only as individuals. 13 In Land v.
Dollar,'4 decided shortly before Domestic & Foreign, the Maritime
Commission contracted with stockholders in a financially weak corporation to grant it an operating subsidy, release certain obligations,
loan it money, and procure a loan for it from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, all for a delivery of the stockholders' shares indorsed in blank to the Commission. When the debtor corporation's
Electric Co. v. Forrestal, 334 U. S. 841 (1948); Mine Safety Appliances Co.
v. Forrestal, 326 U. S.371 (1945); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925) ;
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912) ; Harper v. Jones, 195 F. 2d
705 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U. S.821 (1952); Noce v. Edward E. Morgan
Co., Inc., 106 F. 2d 746 (8th Cir. 1939); Ferris v. Wilbur, 27 F. 2d 262 (4th
Cir. 1928).
"Larson
0
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.682, 695 (1949).
The Court rejected the contention that an officer given the power to make decisions is authorized only to decide correctly. Id. at 695. This strict rule is a
departure from earlier cases. Payne v. Central Pacific R. R., 255 U. S. 228

(1921).

Rogers v. Skinner, 201 F. 2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953) ; American Dredging Co.
R'
v. Cochrane, 190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Metropolitan Training Center v.
Gray, 188 F. 2d 28 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Fay v. Miller, 183 F. 2d 986 (D. C.
Cir. 1950). Contra: Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125 (N. D. Cal. 1949)
(court decided that officials did not strictly adhere to provisions of the Veteran's
Preference Act of 1944 in discharging the plaintiff, thereby acting in excess
of statutory authority, and distinguished the Domestic & Foreign decision as
dependent
upon the sovereign property therein involved).
2
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.731 (1947).
" Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937) (wrongful invasion of property rights
is enjoinable); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536 (1926) (wrongful trespass
against personal property is enjoinable) ; Lane v. Watts, 235 U. S. 525 (1913)
(plaintiff can restrain Secretary of Interior and subordinates from acts which
would cast a cloud upon plaintiff's title, even though such acts were under color
of office) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (officials can be ejected
from plaintiff's land to prevent an unconstitutional taking). Cf. Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 112 (1940) (Court found that defendant acted
pursuant to valid authority and rejected plaintiff's contention that there was
a tortious invasion of private rights); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S.
605 (1912) (courts have jurisdiction of actions to prevent wrongful invasions
of property rights, but plaintiff loses on the merits if official was acting pursuant
to a valid grant of authority); Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473 (1906)
(contention rejected that sale of Indian lands pursuant to Act of Congress would
be an unconstitutional taking from the tribe).
1'330 U. S.731 (1947).
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successor corporation had fully paid all its debts to the United States
the members of the Maritime Commission refused to return the shares,
contending that the stock had been transferred outright, not pledged
as collateral.' 5 The stockholders instituted proceedings against the
members of the Commission to compel return of the stock, alleging
that it had been merely pledged and that the defendants were unlawfully in possession and wrongfully withholding the shares, or, even if
the stock had been transferred outright, the defendants were exceeding
their authority 16 which allowed the Commission to receive only property
pledged as collateral. The Supreme Court held that if the shares were
pledged the defendants could be sued to compel a return to the rightful owners; therefore, since the jurisdictional issue depended upon a
decision on the merits, the district court had jurisdiction to determine
its jurisdiction. Subsequently the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided that there had been only a pledge of the shares
17
and granted coercive relief to compel their return.
After stating that the two major categories of cases where there
will be jurisdiction are (a) where the officer acts in excess of his
authority and (b) where his authority is unconstitutional, the Domestic & Foreign opinion emphatically rejects the contention that there
is a third category in which official action may be directed or restrained-the category of cases which proceeds upon the theory that
the official is "wrongfully" or "illegally" withholding the property of
the plaintiff.' 8 The Court states that such a theory is erroneous in
that it confuses the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a cause of action. 19 The argument that
the sovereign cannot authorize the commission of a tort is also rejected
as the Court points out that under agency law the fact that the agent
acts tortiously does not mean that ipso facto he has exceeded his authority, to the extent that he would be acting for himself alone and not
for his principal. 20 The Court uses broad language to the effect that
specific relief compelling the return of property tortiously taken or
withheld cannot be had against a government officer unless his acts
conflict with the terms of a valid grant of authority and would not be
"Subsequently, the members of the Commission voted the stock at the corporation's annual meeting and participated in the conduct of corporate affairs.
Land v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 366, 369 (D. C. Cir. 1951).

'-49 STAT. § 1988 (1936), as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 1117 (1952).
Dollar v. Land, 184 F. 2d 245 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 884
1 T

(1950).

For subsequent developments in the Dollar litigation see Land v. Dollar,

190 F. 2d 366 (D. C. Cir. 1951) ; Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 623 (D. C. Cir.
1951); United States v. Dollar, 188 F. 2d 629 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Sawyer v.
Dollar, 344 U. S. 806 (1952) (dismissed as molot).
" Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 692 (1949).
1
9Id. at 693.
20
Id. at 695.
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regarded under the law of agency as the actions of the principal.21 A
government, like a corporation, can act only through its agents; therefore, to hold that an action will be entertained against an official who
is acting within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of the
sovereign merely because the officer is withholding property "wrongfully" would amount to a rejection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Court distinguished earlier cases which ostensibly allowed tortious withholding of property as being hinged upon uncon22
stitutional action or lack of authority.
The language used in Domestic & Foreign would seem to be a
repudiation of all that Land v. Dollar stands for, but the Court did
not overrule the latter case. The Court explained the case 23 on which
Land v. Dollar principally relied as one involving an unconstitutional
taking of property, and stated that Land v. Dollaritself proceeded upon
allegations in the complaint that the members of the Maritime Commission were acting without authority. 24 The two cases cannot easily
be reconciled. Jurisdiction of the action against the members of the
Maritime Commission was entertained even though the shares of stock
were only pledged, which was exactly the security transaction allowed
by the statute.2 If the Commissioners in Land v. Dollar had received
an outright transfer of the shares, then their acts would have conflicted
with their statutory authority. If the Domestic & Foreign majority
meant by their explanation 26 of Land v. Dollar that jurisdiction there
depended upon whether the Maritime Commissioners were authorized
to commit the tort of retaining the shares after the principal debt had
been discharged, this would be inconsistent with the Court's attempt to
focus attention in all cases to an examination of the official's grant of
authority, whether he had exceeded it or merely made an. erroneous
interpretation, and whether as a matter of agency law the official's acts
were attributable to his principal. 27 In almost any case it would seem
that the plaintiff could show that there was no specific authority to
28
retain the tortiouslywithheld property.
The courts have not decided whether a tortious or wrongful with"Id. at 695.
"Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536 (1926); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U. S. 605 (1912) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882).
"United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882).
"Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 702 n. 26
(1949). The footnote states that the complaint in Land v. Dollar alleged that
any acquisition by the Commission which was not a mere pledge of collateral
would violate its statutory authority; therefore, the complaint alleged that the
defendants acted in excess of statutory authority.
"See note 16 supra.
28 See note 24 supra.

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 695 (1949).
"No court has explained the Dollar case as involving an unconstitutional
taking.
',
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holding would also be unconstitutional so as to allow jurisdiction
whether or not the officer's activities conflicted with the terms of his
grant of authority. A taking of property pursuant to an invalid grant
of authority may be enjoined;29 however, a grant of authority otherwise valid would probably not be held unconstitutional merely because
it allows government officials tortiously to withhold property belonging
to private persons.30 In situations involving government property, recent
cases where the plaintiffs proceeded upon a theory of wrongful taking
or withholding of their property have not met with success ;31 for instance, if plaintiff seeks an order compelling the defendant official to
release irrigation waters in which plaintiff has vested rights, relief
will be denied if it requires operation of federal dams and the release
32
of federally owned water impounded behind them.
Under the language employed by the Supreme Court in Domestic
& Foreign it seems certain that if allegations are made that the officer is withholding plaintiff's property without authority, or in such
a manner as to amount to an unconstitutional taking, if not frivolous,83
will entitle the plaintiff to affirmative relief if he proves the allegations,
even though he might also have an action for money damages under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.

4

3. Suits involving the sovereign's property. It was well established
that relief which sought to control the disposition of sovereign property
would usually be denied. This result was reached either on the theory
that the action was in effect one against the sovereign, or because the
United States would have to be joined as party defendant.3 5 However,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952).
County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. No. 1 v. Robbins,
213 F. 2d 425 (5th Cir. 1954).
"' Stack v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1950), rev'd on other grounds
191 F. 2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (dispute over possession of gold coin of the United
States).
In Story v. Snyder, 184 F. 2d 454 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 866
(1950), plaintiff sued trustees of Library of Congress Trust Fund to recover
a sum for services due, contending that the defendants held his money as constructive trustees, citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947), as supporting
his claim for relief. The court rejected his contentions, pointing out that the
defendants in the Dollar litigation were torifeasors.
"Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. No. 1 v. Robbins, 213
F. 2d 425 (5th Cir. 1954).
" West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert.
detied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954).
"For the magic effect of the allegation "unconstitutional" see Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D. C. 1953) (although officer
had authority to make an incorrect decision, plaintiff was entitled to his day
in court on basis of allegations that defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously
so as to deprive plaintiff of property without due process of law).
" Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371 (1945) (action
to compel official to cease withholding payments due held to be an action designed
to reach money owned by the United States); Maricopa County, Arizona v.
Valley Nat. Bank of Phoenix, 318 U. S. 357 (1943) (national bank stock in
possession of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation); Minnesota v. United
-2

"Hudspeth
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if the plaintiff had acquired title to what had formerly been sovereign
property, federal officers could be restrained from wrongfully interfering with plaintiff's property rights.36
Domestic & Foreign contains no language which could be construed
to relax the established rule where disposition of sovereign property is
sought;37 moreover, most recent decisions have reaffirmed that doctrine.2 8 However, in this connection West Coast Exploration Co. v.
McKay?9 should be noted. There the plaintiff owned certificates, called
"scrip" which gave the owner the right to select public lands for
entry. The Director of the Bureau of Land Management with the
concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior rejected plaintiff's application for a certain location on the ground that the land sought was
mineral land, not subject to selection and entry by any "scrip" holder.
The relief sought was a decree compelling approval of plaintiff's application and issuance of a patent to the land, based upon the defendant
Secretary of the Interior's alleged lack of authority in rejecting the
States, 305 U. S. 382 (1938)

(attempt by state to condemn land held in trust

by the United States for Indians); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52 (1917)
(where dispute is over title to public lands, the United States is entitled to
be heard); United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218 (1913)
(bidder cannot compel delivery of surplus warship owned by the United States
Navy); Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473 (1906) (action to restrain sale
by official of lands held by the United States in trust); Oregon v. Hitchcock,
202 U. S. 60 (1906) (action to restrain officials from alienating Indian lands);
Young v. Anderson, 160 F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 824
(1947) (action to restrain official from leasing lands of the United States).
But a suit to restrain the Secretary of the Interior from placing the burden
upon the states to show that swamp lands are non-mineral in character in order
to acquire title is not a suit against the United States, even if the disposition
of sovereign property might ultimately be affected, where the Secretary acted
in excess of his authority. Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925).
"Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937) ; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525 (1913).
"7Vinson, C. J., in the majority opinion stated, "In a suit against the officer
to recover damages for the agent's personal actions that question is easily
answered. The judgment sought will not require action by the sovereign or
disturb the sovereign's property." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949). "Of course, a suit may fail, as one against
the sovereign, even if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief requested cannot be
granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will

require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably
sovereign property ....
8

"

Id. at 691 n. 11

New Haven Public Schools v. General Services Administration, 214 F. 2d
592 (7th Cir. 1954) (public land) ; New Mexico v. Backer, 199 F. 2d 426 (10th

Cir. 1952) (Bureau of Reclamation and Development dam) ; American Dredging
Co. v. Cochrane, 190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951) (United States' barge) ; Stack
v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1950), rezvd on other grounds, 191 F.
2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (gold coin of the United States). Accord: Seiden v.
Larson, 188 F. 2d 661 (D. C. Cir. 1951), overruled by West Coast Exploration
Co. v. McKay, 213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954)
insofar as it held that a suit could not be maintained against a federal officer
where government property was involved even if the official acted without
statutory authority.
so213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954).
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application and alleged clear duty to issue the patent. Even though
there was a dictum in Domestic & Foreign that there would be no
jurisdiction of an action against a federal official which would require
disposition of sovereign property despite claims that the officer acted
in excess of statutory authority, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia stated that it would be proper to entertain the action if
the Secretary had in fact acted without authority, and then proceeded
to the merits to the extent necessary to decide the question of author-

ity.4 1

4. Suits turning on the necessity of joining the United States as
party defendant. Some of the earlier cases turned on consideration of
the indispensability of or the necessity of naming the United States as
party defendant. 42 Of course if the United States must be joined this
cannot be done without its consent, and the whole action is dismissed.
This would seem to be merely a shorthand way of deciding whether the
original action is in fact one against the United States, but a dismissal
for failure to join a necessary or indispensable party is not technically
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 4 The use of this technique often
"Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 691 n. 11
(1949). See note 37 supra. The Court of Appeals pointed out that a homesteader or the locator of a mining claim satisfying requirements under the law
could be arbitrarily denied patents and have absolutely no recourse in the courts,
just because sovereign property was involved, if the dictum in the Domestic &
Foreign opinion were followed. West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213
F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954). Apparently the
court felt that the Supreme Court did not intend to preclude relief in the nature
of mandamus, where the plaintiff was otherwise entitled to it, solely because
government property was involved.
"' The court came to the conclusion that the Secretary of the Interior was
authorized to make the decision he made, and remanded the case with directions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.
2d 582, 610 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954). Other federal
courts have been more strict in allowing jurisdiction when government property
is involved. In New Haven Public Schools v. General Services Administration,
214 F. 2d 592 (7th Cir. 1954), plaintiff was seeking a decree compelling conveyance of public land, and he alleged that the official was acting wrongfully
in privately contracting to sell the land. The court readily affirmed a dismissal by the district court; however, in this case dismissal could have been
for failure to state a claim for relief. In Stack v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54
(S. D. N. Y. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F. 2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951), it
was claimed that the defendant Secret Service agent took a gold coin of the
United States from the plaintiff while acting wrongfully and without authority.
The action was dismissed. See Seiden v. Larson, note 38 supra.
"Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382 (1938) (proceeding against
property in which the United States has an interest) ; Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S.
335 (1918) (action to restrain Assistant Postmaster General from cancelling
mail carrying contract and from putting new plan into effect); United States
ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218 (1913) (bidder for surplus warship
sought to compel delivery of the craft by Navy Secretary) ; Young v. Anderson, 160 F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 824 (1947) (action to
restrain Secretary of Agriculture from leasing government land). Cf. Goltra v.
Weeks, 271 U. S. 536 (1926) (United States not a necessary party in action
to enjoin Secretary of War from unauthorized seizure of plaintiff's barges).
"'Block, Suits Against Government Officers and The Sovereign Immunitv
Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. Rxv. 1060 (1946).
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avoids consideration of the basic questions whether the relief asked
would interfere with the administration of governmental affairs,' or
whether the acts complained of were in fact the acts of the sovereign
because the official was acting within the scope of his authority. Domestic & Foreign does not attempt to alter this approach to the basic immunity question, but it is encouraging to note that recent cases have
met the issue of sovereign immunity squarely and have not approached
the issue from the standpoint of45 whether the United States is an indispensable or necessary party.
5. Suits where official action is necessary to effectuate the relief
asked. Although the claim for relief is based upon allegations that
the official acted as an individual in injuring the plaintiff's legally protected interest, an issue which might affect the availability of relief
in every case is whether the relief sought would require action by
the defendant in his official capacity. Seemingly there would be very
strong reasons for refusing to entertain an action which seeks to con46
trol or direct the official activities of members of the executive branch,
but the courts have never refused relief on this ground alone; rather,
they seem to use this factor only as a make-weight.4 7 Indeed, any
" Cases recognizing the importance of the effects of the action upon governmental affairs: Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940) (many suits
had frustrated the policies of the Public Contracts Act and had tied up its
administration for more than a year); Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335 (1918)
(an intolerable interference with governmental processes to seek to compel
Assistant Postmaster General to retain old-fashioned methods of mail delivery);
Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627 (1913) (suit would disturb the whole
revenue system and affect the revenue to be anticipated if defendant were ordered to revise tariff rates).
Two exceptions: Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F. 2d 145 (D. C.
Cir. 1951); Jackson v. Sims, 201 F. 2d 259 (10th Cir. 1953).
The complaint may be dismissed for failure to name another official as defendant. Snyder v. Buck, 340 U. S. 15 (1950) (successor in office not joined
in time); Cha-toine Hotel Apartments Building Corp. v. Shogren, 204 F. 2d
256 (7th Cir. 1953) (failure to join Federal Housing Administrator) ; Payne v.
Fite, 184 F. 2d 977 (5th Cir. 1950); N. Y. Technical Institute of Maryland,
Inc. v. Limburg, 87 F. Supp. 308 (D. Md. 1949). Cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D. C.), aff'd, 342 U. S. 820 (1952)
(President of United States not necessary or indispensable party when Commerce Secretary being sued for proceeding under invalid grant of authority).
"Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335 (1918).
Codray v. Brownell, 207 F. 2d 610 (D. C. Cir. 1953), cert. denlied, 347 U. S.
903 (1954) (prayer that defendant be ordered to issue license authorizing payment of plaintiff's claim, or pay the plaintiff out of seized assets of alien corporation; controlling reasons for denying relief: official discretion involved, and
failure to join Alien Property Custodian); American Dredging Co. v. Cochrane, 190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951) (plaintiff sought to compel return of
surplus barge formerly owned by it; controlling reasons for dismissal: defendants
acting pursuant to authority, sovereign property involved, and no purely ministerial duty to deliver the barge to plaintiff); Payne v. Fite, 184 F. 2d 977
(5th Cir. 1950) (prayer that postmaster be ordered to deliver mail three times
daily instead of only once; controlling reasons for denying jurisdiction: official
discretion involved, failure to join Postmaster General). Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951); United States ex rel.
Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218 (1913).
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suit for specific relief against a government official wherein the doctrine of sovereign immunity might have application necessarily involves the official capacity of the defendant. He is sued only because
he holds an office; the relief sought of necessity would restrain official action or require affirmative official action.4 8 If the officer has
acted without authority or unconstitutionally the jurisdictional question should not hinge upon whether an order rectifying damage done
to the plaintiff requires action or inaction in some official capacity. 49
If the jurisdiction of the courts depended upon whether the relief asked
would control official action, federal officials would be absolutely immune from suit.50 The very fact that official activity can be directed
and controlled by court decree in itself shows that there is more fiction
than fact to the theory that there will be jurisdiction if the official
acted in an "individual" capacity rather than as an agent of the sovereign.
6. Suits against officials to compel payment of money due under

contract. The rule remains unchanged by Domestic & Foreign that
an action against an official which has as its object the payment of
money pursuant to the terms of a contract made with the defendant
in his official capacity, or which prays for money damages because of
breach of such a contract, cannot be maintained.5 ' The only course
In Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 623 (D. C. Cir. 1951) the Secretary of
Commerce had been ordered to indorse and return certain shares of stock to
the plaintiffs; the Secretary contended that he could not be required to act
in an official capacity, i.e., indorsing the stock as Secretary of Commerce. The
Court of Appeals held that since it had been decided that the defendant had
possession of the stock as an individual, he could be required by court decree
to yield whatever possession he had, with appropriate indorsements.
"'Plaintiffs proceeding against g'overment officials for affirmative relief
invariably substitute defendant's successor in office as party defendant, in case
of death or retirement. Substitution is governed by FFD. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
"In Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D. C.
1953) the court states by way of footnote, "This court interprets the reference
in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., . . . to a 'suit for specific
relief against the officer as an individual' to mean a suit against the individual
officer in his official capacity where necessary to effect the relief sought, as distinguished from a suit against the officer which is in effect a suit against the
United States." Id. at 76n.
"That they should not be so immune: West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay,
213 F. 2d 582, 596 (D. C. Cir. 1954), and Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 623
(D. C. Cir. 1951).
6 Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371 (1945) , Nimro v.
Davis, 204 F. 2d 734 (D. C. Cir. 1953); Burkley v. United States, 185 F. 2d
267 (7th Cir. 1950); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. MacArthur Mining Co.,
Inc., 184 F. 2d 913 (8th Cir. 1950).
There is no jurisdiction to entertain such actions even under the theory of
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947), to the effect that the plaintiff owns the
money and the defendants wrongfully withhold it from him. Story v. Snyder, 184
F. 2d 454 (D. C. Cir. 1950) (plaintiff contended that defendants held the money
in trust for him).
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open to the complaining party is to proceed against the United States
52
for damages in the district courts or in the Court of Claims.
7. Suits to compel performance of purely ministerial duties. The
Domestic & Foreign opinion also leaves substantially unchanged the
availability of relief in the nature of mandamus against an officer to
compel performance of a clear legal duty. 53 It had never been held
that an action to compel the performance of a purely ministerial duty
is in effect a suit against the United States or one requiring the joinder
of the United States as a party defendant.5 4 On the other hand, if
the action is to compel performance of an official duty which involves
the exercise of discretion it is a suit against the United States if that
exercise is pursuant to the terms of a grant of authority. 55 If the
question of clear legal duty turns on the authority of the defendant
to refuse to release the property the plaintiff is seeking, then the
Domestic & Foreign rule that the defendant's acts must conflict with
the terms of the grant of authority comes into play.56 This illustrates
the close interrelationship and interplay of established rules in every
suit against federal officers.
Although many actions against federal officers might be disposed of
on non-jurisdictional grounds such as failure to exhaust available remedies before seeking equitable relief, 57 it is desirable that the jurisdic-Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F. 2d 145 (D. C. Cir. 1951);

see note 4 supra.
"' Chapman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 204 F. 2d 46 (D. C. Cir. 1953).

Although FE. R. Civ. P. 81(b) abolishes the writ of mandamus, the remedy
itself is still available and may be obtained by appropriate action or motion.
Hammond v. Hull, 131 F. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1942). The general principles
governing its use are: (1) the duty should be clearly defined and the obligation
to act peremptory; (2) the party seeking relief must show that defendant has
breached his duty; (3) the courts have no general supervisory power over
the executive branch; (4) if the defendant's duty requires an interpretation of
the law governing that duty, it will not be interfered with absent arbitrariness
or capriciousness on the part of the official; (5) generally, the party seeking
this relief must exhaust any administrative remedies available. Hammond v.
Hull, 131 F. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
'Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U. S. 442 (1934); Houston v. Ormes, 252 U. S.
469 (1920); Smith v. Jackson, 246 U. S. 388 (1918).
'Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335 (1918).
"West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954) ; Codray v. Brownell, 207 F. 2d 610 (D. C. Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 903 (1954); American Dredging Co. v. Cochrane,
190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
" Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U. S. 86 (1953); Rogers v. Skinner, 201 F. 2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953). One district court has stated that if the
threat of irreparable injury is serious or if the officer is allegedly acting without
authority or unconstitutionally, other remedies need not be exhausted. Parker v.
Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300, 307 (N. D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 191 F. 2d 1020
(9th Cir. 1951); Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125, 127 (N. D. Cal. 1949).
Cases which could have been disposed of on the ground that plaintiff had
suffered no injury to a legally protected interest: New Haven Public Schools v.
General Services Administration, 214 F. 2d 592 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Guiberson v.
Reconstruction Finance Corp., 196 F. 2d 154 (5th Cir. 1952). In some cases
this was the reason for dismissal. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113
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tional question be decided when raised. Because of the uncertainty
of the application of the immunity doctrine, to decide the issue of jurisdiction first would avoid prolonging the litigation in a substantial number of cases.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity with all of its subtleties is one
which frequently confronts the federal courts. It has been suggested
that a test avoiding all fictions should be adopted, that only those suits
should be dismissed which would unduly interfere with government
operations.5 s This measure of jurisdiction would certainly be more
in keeping with the fundamental nature of a form of government which
derives its authority and power from consent of the governed; however,
such a test is not without shortcomings. If adopted it would place
upon the courts the heavy burden of predicting the effect of each action
upon the operations of the governmental machinery involved, and the
necessity of weighing that effect against the interests of the plaintiff
and all persons similarly situated.
There is little, if any, likelihood of Congressional action on this
subject; therefore, future cases will in all probability continue the same
pattern of case by case adjudication and application of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to the peculiar facts of the litigation before the
court.
R. G. HALL, JR.
Insurance-Recovery under Windstorm Clauses
As a result of the recent hurricane which struck North Carolina,
many problems will arise as to what damages are recoverable under
windstorm clauses of insurance policies. This note is an attempt to
set forth some of the rules of law applicable to windstorm clauses.
The extended coverage endorsement generally in use in North
Carolina covers direct loss by windstorm. Expressly excepted are
all losses caused directly or indirectly by water, whether driven by
wind or not, unless the water entered the building through an opening
made by wind. Damage to seawalls, docks, piers, boathouses, cabanas,
and bulkheads is also excepted.'
(1940); Royal Sundries Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 136 (E. D. N. Y.
1953).
"Advocated in Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovcreigis
Immunity Doctrine, 59 HAV. L. REv. 1060 (1946).
'An example of the usual extended coverage endorsement approved by the

North Carolina Fire Insurance Rating Bureau is: "EXTENDED COVERAGE:

In consideration of the premium for this coverage shown on the first page of
this policy, and subject to provisions and stipulations (hereinafter referred to
as 'provisions') herein and in the policy to which this endorsement is attached

including riders and endorsements thereon, the coverage of this policy is extended
to include direct loss by Windstorm, Hail. ...
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The term windstorm means a wind of unusual violence. It is a
storm characterized by high winds with little or no precipitation. It
must be more than an ordinary gust of wind, no matter how prolonged.
It need not have the twirling features of a cyclone or tornado, but it
must assume the aspect of a storm-that is, an outburst of tumultuous
force. 2
Accepting this as a definition of a windstorm, the courts have experienced difficulty in finding a standard by which the facts can be
measured to determine whether a windstorm did in fact occur. 3 A
few courts have adopted as a standard the velocity of the wind.4 One
court approved an instruction to the effect that the wind had reached
windstorm proportions if the wind was blowing with sufficient force
to blow down a tree.5
"PROVISIONS APPLICABLE ONLY TO WINDSTORM AND HAIL:
This Company shall not be liable for loss caused directly or indirectly by (a)
frost or cold weather or (b) ice (other than hail), snowstorm, waves, tidal
wave, high water or overflow, whether driven by wind or not.
"This Company shall not be liable for loss to the interior of the building or
the property covered therein caused, (a) by water, rain, snow, sand or dust,
whether driven by wind or not, unless the building covered or containing the
property covered shall first sustain an actual damage to roof or walls by the
direct force of wind or hail and then shall be liable for loss to the interior of
the building or the property covered therein as may be caused by water, rain,
snow, sand or dust entering the building through openings in the roof or walls
made by direct action of wind or hail or (b) by water from sprinkler equipment or other piping, unless such equipment or piping be damaged as a direct
result of wind or hail.
"Unless liability therefor is assumed in the form attached to this policy by
separate and specific item(s), or by endorsement hereon, this Company shall
not be liable for damage to the following property; (a) Cloth awnings and
their frames; (b) fences; (c) seawall, property line and similar walls; (d)
greenhouses, hothouses, slathouses, trellises, pergolas, cabanas and outdoor equipment pertaining to the service of the premises: (e) wharfs, docks, piers, boathouses, bulkheads or other structures located over or partially over water and
the property therein or thereon."
- Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 151 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177
(1911) ; Sabatier Bros. v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 152 So. 85 (La. App.
1934); Metropolitan Ice Cream Co. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 358 Mo. 727,
210 S. W. 2d 700 (1949); Schaeffer v. Northern Assur. Co., 177 S. W. 2d 688
(Mo. App. 1944); Lunn v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 184 Tenn. 584,
201 S.W. 2d 978 (1947).
'Pearson v. Aroostook County Patrons Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 101 A. 2d 183, 186
CMe. 1953). "To say that a windstorm must be 'an outburst of tumultuous
force' or 'a wind of unusual violence,' hardly more than states the difficulty.
The vital questions are, accepting this definition of a windstorm, how much
force or violence of wind does it take to make a windstorm, and how may it
be measured."
'Bogalusa Gin & Warehouse Co. v. Western Assurance Co., 199 La. 715, 718719, 6 So. 2d 740, 741 (1942) (The court said that the testimony of witnesses
from the United States Weather Bureau is to the effect that the average wind
velocity necessary to constitute a windstorm is twenty-seven miles per hour.
The preponderance of evidence here is that the velocity was not less than thirtyfive miles per hour. "Such being the case, the velocity of the wind reached the
degree of a windstorm."); Clark v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp., 39 N. Y. S.
2d 377 (City Ct. 1943) (a twenty-eight mile per hour wind held not to constitute a windstorm).
'Atlas Assur. Co., Ltd., v. Lies, 70 Ga. App. 162, 27 S. E. 2d 791 (1943).
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The modem trend is for the courts to hold that to constitute a
windstorm, the wind must be of sufficient force and violence to damage
the insured property.6 The courts of Kentucky and Maine have adopted this view with the qualification that the insured property must be
in a reasonable state of repair.7 A result of this interpretation is that
a plaintiff, who proves damages resulting from wind, has established
the right to recover without further evidence that the wind was a
storm or outburst of tumultuous force.
The question of whether a windstorm did in fact occur is a question of fact for the jury.8
The insured, in order to recover, must bring himself within the
terms of the policy by proving that the loss was occasioned by windContra: Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Board of Education of Town

of Rosedale,
201 Okla. 250, 204 P. 2d 982 (1949).
8
Albert Lea Ice & Fuel Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 58 N. W. 2d

614 (Minn. App. 1953); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Education,
201 Okla. 250, 204 P. 2d 982 (1945); Adams Apple Products Corp. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 170 Pa. Super. 269, 85 A. 2d 702 (1952); Gerhard v.
Travelers
Fire Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 625, 18 N. W. 2d 336 (1945).
T
Druggist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 254 S. W. 2d 691 (Ky. App. 1953); Old
Colony Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 256 S. W. 2d 362 (Ky. App. 1953); Pearson v.
Aroostook County Patrons Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 101 A. 2d 183 (Me. 1954).
8 Pearl Assur. Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas. Const. Co., 114 F. 2d 702 (6th Cir.
1940); Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 151 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177
(1911) (The court found that a windstorm had occurred when witnesses testified that the wind lasted all day, that it was the hardest they had experienced,
that well built windmills in the locality were blown down and that visibility
was poor.); Druggist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 254 S. W. 2d 691 (Ky. App. 1953)
(The evidence establishing a windstorm was the testimony that the witness was
awakened during the night by the sound of the wind and the falling of a wall
and testimony of other witnesses that the wind was blowing hard. There was
no damage to other houses in the vicinity. Although there was evidence that
some of the witnesses observed neighbors patching roofs, there was no indication that the patching was made necessary by the damage occurring on the
night in question. Under the standard that a windstorm is a wind of sufficient
violence to be capable of damaging the property, assuming the property in
reasonable repair, the evidence was held sufficient to take the question of
whether the damage was done by windstorm to the jury.); Sabatier Bros. v.
Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 152 So. 85 (La App. 1934) (The insured building was destroyed, hut there was no other damage in the vicinity. The court
said that the evidence indicated that the wind was merely blowing in gusts
and did not rise to the heights of tumultuous violence.) ; Metropolitan Ice Cream
Co. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 358 Mo. 727, 210 S. W. 2d 700 (1949) (The
court found the jury justified in finding that a windstorm had occurred from
testimony that a witness was awakened twice by the noise of the wind and the
rattling of windows. The wind seemed violent when riding in the car and
papers were seen blowing in the street. The wind was heard whistling between
the buildings. The records of the United States Weather Bureau showed a
maximum wind velocity of twenty-three miles per hour and that the velocity
was seventeen miles per hour at the time of the damage. A tower on top of
a building collapsed, and evidence showed that the tower was improperly constructed. The court said that if the insurer wished to limit his liability to
winds of certain velocity, he should so state in the policy.); George A. Hoagland & Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 131 Neb. 105, 267 N. W. 239 (1936)
(On conflicting evidence of whether the storm was accompanied by winds of
fifteen or thirty miles per hour, the question was for the jury as to whether the
wind amounted to a windstorm.)
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storm. This burden is sustained upon establishing by a fair preponderance of evidence that the windstorm was the efficient cause of the
damage incurred.' 0 This can be established by direct and circumstantial evidence and opinions of expert and skilled witnesses.,'
When the insured offers evidence tending to show that the damage
was occasioned by one of the causes insured against, the burden shifts
to the insurer to show that the loss was caused by an excluded cause.' 2
13
The burden is on the insurer to bring the loss within the exception.
Direct loss by windstorm means that the windstorm must be the
proximate or efficient cause of the loss.14 The term "efficient," as applied to windstorm coverage, is not expressly defined but it is often
used in the cases, and where used it meins that the wind must be the
direct cause-the predominating cause without which the loss would
not have occurred. The wind of itself must have been capable of producing the loss without combining with some other cause.15 The court
in Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Muhle construed the policy to mean that
"if the damages sued for were caused by wind, and the damage sued
for would have resulted from the wind alone without the presence of
6
water, recovery was proper."'
These suggested meanings are not quite comprehensive and are not
applicable in certain situations. They leave out the case where an
object is projected against the insured building by the wind.' 7 Recovery is denied, however, when the damage is occasioned by water
0 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895);
Sabatier Bros. v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 152 So. 85 (La. App. 1934);
Styborski v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 169 Pa. Super. 452, 82 A. 2d 543 (1952) ;
Marks v. Lumbermens Ins. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 66, 49 A. 2d 855 (1946).
" Peritp v. Northern Ins. Co. of N. Y., 189 Misc. 204, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 611
(Sup. Ct. 1948); La Bris v. Western Nat. Ins. Co., 59 S.E. 2d 263 (W. Va.
1950•
Loyola University v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of N. Y., 93 F. Supp.
186 (E. D. La. 1951), aff'd, 196 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1952).
'Kinney v. Farmers Mut. F. & Ins. Soc., 159 Iowa 490, 141 N. W. 706

(1913).

"Jordan

v. Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins., 151 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177 (1911)

(One of the main reasons for the trial court's finding loss by windstorm was
the failure of the insurer to show that the exception applied.); Polansky v.

Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Ill., 238 N. C. 427, 78 S. E. 2d 213 (1954)

(automobile policy); Collins v. U. S. Casualty Co., 172 N. C. 543, 90 S. E.

585 (1916)

(health policy).

Contra: Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S. W.

973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).

" Trexler Lumber Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 289 Pa.
13, 136 Atl. 856 (1927).
10 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895).
10208 F. 2d 191, 194 (8th Cir. 1954).
17 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895)
(vessels were blown against the insured bridge) ; Queens Ins. Co. v. I-udnut
Co., 8 Ind. App. 22, 35 N. E. 397 (1893) (boat blown by wind against insured building); Gerhard v. Travelers F. Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 625, 18 N. W. 2d
336 (1945)

(ice blown from a nearby lake against cottage).
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driven by wind,'8 or hail driven by wind under a policy excepting loss

by hail. 19

It is not necessary in all cases to prove injury by direct impact of
the wind or by the wind projecting some object against the insured
property. 20 Recovery was permitted when a horse, terrified by the
blowing in of a barn door, broke his halter and forced his foot through
a timber in the barn so that he could not extricate himself and died
from injuries and exhaustion. 21 Recovery was permitted also for the
displacement of insured property and damage resulting from its being
deposited in water.

22

Whether the windstorm is the efficient cause of the loss is a ques28
tion of fact for the jury.
8 Newark Trust Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 237 Fed. 788 (3d Cir. 1916)
(The court would not accept the insured's argument that because the wind drove
the water agiinst the house the wind was the proximate cause of the loss.).
" Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 64 Kan. 115, 67 Pac. 440 (1902).
20
Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 153 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177
(1911).
21
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Anderson, 81 Ind. App. 124,
130 N. E. 419 (1921).
'Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P. 2d 1016 (1946).
"fiHome Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, 174 F. 2d 945 (5th Cir. 1949) (Eyewitnesses
testified that they saw the roof of the insured building blown off and the wvalls
collapse before the water rose to the window sills or the waves began to beat
against the building. The evidence was held sufficient for the jury to find loss
by windstorm.) ; Pearl Assurance Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas. Const. Co., 114 F. 2d
702 (6th Cir. 1940); North British & Merchantile Ins. Co. v. Sciandra, 54

So. 2d 764 (Ala. 1952) ; Ebert v. Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 40 So. 2d 40 (La.

App. 1949) (The court overruled the finding of the trial court that the loss
resulted from water rather than wind.); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Albers, 167
Md. 599, 175 At. 597 (1934) (A windstorm of fifty miles per hour caused the
island on which the insured house was located to be inundated. The house was
on higher ground and more subjected to the wind. There was evidence that
lower houses were not as damaged and that trees had been blown down.);
Anderson v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 231 Minn. 469, 43 N. W. 2d 807 (1950);
Brown v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 263 S. W. 2d 893 (Mo. App. 1954); Schaeffer v.
Northern Assur. Co., 177 S. W. 2d 688 (Mo. App. 1944) (Where a windstorm
lasted three days in which the velocity of the wind reached forty miles per
hour the first day, thirty-one miles per hour the second, and fourteen miles
per hour the third, and cracking noises were heard throughout the period, the
evidence warranted the finding that the sliding of the roof was directly caused
by windstorm.); Protzmann v. Eagle Fire Co. of N. Y., 272 App. Div. 319, 71
N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1st Dep't 1948) (Photographs of the insured property before
and after the windstorm indicated that a bulkhead which protected the house
had been washed away, and conveyed the impression that the front of the
insured's house was undermined by the ocean. The verdict of the jury that
the loss was caused by wind was held contrary to the weight of the evidence.)
Miller v. Farmers Mutual L. Ins. Asso., 198 N. C. 572, 152 S. E. 684 (1930)
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P. 2d 1016 (1946)
(evidence held sufficient for jury to find that the house was blown from its
foundation into a flooded street rather than carried by water); Murphy v.

Insurance Co. of N. A., 355 Pa. 442, 50 A. 2d 217 (1947); Trexler Lumber

Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co., 289 Pa. 13, 136 AtI. 856 (1927); Styborski v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 169 Pa. Super. 452, 82 A. 2d 543 (Super. Ct. 1952);
Marks v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 66, 49 A. 2d 855 (Super. Ct.
1946) (The peak wind velocity for a five minute period was 82 miles per hour.
There were no eyewitnesses to the damage done to insured's house, but witnesses
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Frequently the loss to the insured property is occasioned by a combination of causes. A cause not insured against may join with the
wind in different degrees to produce the loss. These degrees may be
classified as follows:
(1) Contributing: The general rule laid down by the courts is
that if the cause designated in the policy is the efficient cause of the
loss, recovery may be had though other causes contributed.2 4 The
word "contributed" is used in the sense that it is a minor, secondary
cause of the loss. 2 5 Recovery for loss by a contributing cause is not
permitted when the loss attributable to it can be ascertained. In this
situation, recovery is limited to the damage caused by the efficient cause.
However, if the amount of the damage resulting from the contributing
cause cannot be determined, the party bearing the loss for the predominant cause is liable for the entire loss.28 It would seem that the
general rule stated above would obtain even though the contributing
27
cause was expressly excepted, and it has been so held.
The language used by some courts, however, seems to indicate
otherwise. In the only North Carolina case dealing with loss by windstorm, the court, after laying down the general rule, said: "Of course
the principal enunciated in these cases has no application if liability
for the contributing cause is expressly excluded by the terms of the
' 28
policy.
testified that it had been moved off its foundation and that other damage was
done to the house. Destruction was prevalent throughout the area.).
"4Miller v. Farmers Mutual L. Ins. Asso., 198 N. C. 572, 152 S. E. 684
(1930) (contributory damage by snow accumulated on roof).
2The word "contributed" is not always given this meaning by the courts.
In Palatine v. Petrovick, 235 S. W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) the court said
that water was at least a contributing cause and that was enough to bring it
within the exception in the policy. A further examination of the case reveals
that the court regarded water as a concurring rather than as a contributory
cause.
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895).
27
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895)
(contributory damage by water) ; Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 151
Io va 73, 130 N. W. 177 (1911) (contributory damage by snowstorm to the loss of
the cattle) ; Anderson v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 231 Minn. 469, 43 N. W. 2d
807 (1950) (contributory damage by snow accumulated on roof); Trexler
Lumber Co. v. Allemannia F. Ins. Co., 289 Pa. 13, 136 Atl. 856 (1927) (contributory damage by snow accumulated on the roof); Providence Wash. Ins.
Co. v. Cooper, 223 S. W. 2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (The court found that
the finding of the jury, that no loss was caused by snow accumulated on the
roof, was without support in the evidence, but the court said that the insured
could recover if the windstorm was the efficient cause though other causes
contributed.). It will be noted that most of the cases stating the rule [that if
the cause designated in the policy is the efficient cause, recovery may be had
though there are contributing causes] involve contributory damage by snow.
Where water is involved as a factor in producing the loss, the courts usually
just discuss whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the
wind was the proximate cause.
28Miller
v. Farmers Mutual L. Ins. Asso., 198 N. C. 574, 152 S. E. 684,
685 (1930).
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There are four reasons why the North Carolina Supreme Court
should not follow this deviation from the general proposition. The
statement is dictum because the contributing cause (snow) was not
expressly excepted in the policy. The cases cited for the dictum do
not support the distinction between an expressly excepted contributing
cause and a contributing cause which is not expressly excepted. 20 The
cases cited by the North Carolina Supreme Court for the proposition
that if the cause designated in the policy is the efficient cause, recovery
may be had though other causes contributed, are cases in which recovery was permitted though an expressly excepted cause contributed
to the loss.30 Lastly, though the language of some courts seems to
support the distinction,81 no case has been found which on its facts
stands for the proposition that the general rule does not operate when
the contributing cause is expressly excepted.
(2) Concurrent: When the wind concurs with a cause not insured
against to produce the loss, and neither independently of the other
could have caused the damage, recovery is denied. The policy does
not permit recovery for loss by a combination of wind and some other
cause 2 There is no part of the loss which can be attributed to the
wind alone. Hence recovery is denied.
9 Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co., 98 Fed. 240, 241 (8th Cir. 1899) (The court
approved an instruction to the jury that "all damage done to this building which
was the result of the injury done by hail is not recoverable in this action for
the reason that the policies exempt the company from damage or loss from
hail." But, it was found that the chief damage was caused by hail, the excepted cause. Here the efficient cause was the excepted cause. The court did
not have the precise question before it of whether recovery could be had if wind
were the efficient and hail were only a contributing cause.) ; National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 803, 170 S. W. 187, 187 (1914)
(The insured building was surrounded by water. High wind produced waves which
were driven by the wind against the building. Several witnesses testified that
the damage would not have occurred but for the water. The court said that
"the two concurring causes brought about the damage which neither by itself
alone would have produced." The whole tenor of the opinion is to the effect that
neither the wind nor water independently would have caused the loss. This
is not a case in which the water is only a contributing cause.).
" Phenix v. Charlestown Ins. Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895) (contributory damage by high water); Jordan v. Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Co., 151 Iowa
73, 130 N. W. 177 (1911) (a snowstorm contributed to the loss of cattle).
1 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovick, 235 S.W. 929, 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)
(The court said that water was at least a contributing cause and that was
enough to bring it within the exception in the policy and prevent recovery.
Later in the opinion, when deciding on the motion for rehearing, the court
said: "If therefore under the facts appearing, the loss sustained by appellee
was to any extent due to water, the insurance company was not liable."
After reviewing the testimony of witnesses the court found that from the
evidence no other conclusion could be drawn than that the water did directly
or indirectly concur with the wind in destroying the house. The loss resulted
from the combined effects of wind and water. This was the actual holding and
indicates clearly that water was more than a contributing cause.).
" National F. Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 170 S. W. 187 (1914);
Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S. W. 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920); Palatine
v. Petrovick Ins. Co., 235 S. W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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It would seem that when part of the loss is attributable to wind
alone, recovery may be had for that part, though the wind was not
the efficient cause of the entire loss. It is incumbent upon the insured
to prove the loss by the wind alone. This may logically be inferred
from the statement of the court in Loyola University v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of N. Y.3 "If the cause of the damage or destruction
be not the direct result of the wind alone, but the damage or destruction be caused by a combination of wind and water, and the damage
by either cannot be separated, then, there can be no recovery under
the policy, because the insured bears the burden of proving the cause
of the loss, and if it fails to make that proof, it cannot recover."
Loss to the interior of the insured building by water may be recovered upon proof that the water entered the building through an
opening made by the wind.34 The mere lapse of time between the
damage to the building and the entering of the water through the
opening made by the wind is not sufficient to take the loss outside the
coverage of the policy where efforts were made to have the building
repaired.- Reasonable means must be taken by the insured to prevent
damage to the interior after the opening is made.3 5
Liability for damage to the interior might depend upon the wording of the policy. In Unobsky v. Continental Ins. Co., 86 the policy on
which the action was brought stated that the insurer would be liable
for rain, snow, sand or dust entering the building through an opening
made by the wind. It will be noted that the section of the extended
coverage endorsement dealing with loss to the interior did not include
water as does the extended coverage endorsement quoted in footnote
two herein. The court said that the policy only contemplated damage
by rain which directly entered the building through an opening made by
8393 F. Supp. 186, 190 (E. D. La. 1951), aff'd, 196 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1952);
See also Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S. W. 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
11 Loyola University v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 186 (E. D.
La. 1951), aff'd, 196 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1953); National U. F. Ins. Co. v.
Harrower, 170 Ark. 694, 280 S. W. 256 (1926) ; Parish v. County F. Ins. Co.,
134 Neb. 563, 279 N. W. 170 (1938) (The evidence did not sustain the finding
of the jury that the windstorm caused the damage through which rain water
from the flooded street entered the building.); Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v.
Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P. 2d 1016 (1942) (rain entered building through
windows and doors blown out by wind); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Sproles, 73 S. W. 2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
1 Peerless Hosiery Co. v. Northern Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1953),
aff'd, 199 F. 2d 957 (2d Cir. 1953) (A storm on November 25 damaged the
roof. Roof repairmen were unavailable. On December 7 rain entered the building through the opening made by the wind and damaged more goods. The
mere lapse of time did not preclude recovery. Recovery was denied, however,
because the insured failed to exercise reasonable care to protect the goods after
the initial damage to the roof. The policy placed a duty on the insured to
protect the property from further damage.) ; Auch v. New Hampshire Fire Ins.
Co., 65 Dauph. 335 (Pa. Co. Rep. 1954).
'G147 Me. 249, 86 A. 2d 160 (1952).
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the wind. It did not cover damage caused by running surface water
from a rainstorm and melting snow which entered the building through
an opening made by the wind.
JOHN

Legal Ethics-Enforceability
Testimony on Behalf of Client

of

L.

Canon Prohibiting

RENDLEMAN.

Attorney's

With regard to the propriety of an attorney's testifying for his
client, the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association have this to say:
"When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely
formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client."'
The problem then arises as to whether such a provision is enforceable. Where an attorney, in a civil action, desires to testify for his
client, and the need of his testimony should have been apparent within
ample time for him to withdraw from the case, may the court enforce
this canon by refusing to permit the attorney to testify unless he withdraws?
In the recent case of Millican v. Hunter,2 the Supreme Court of
Florida seems to answer this question in the affirmative. In that case
an action was brought to recover a commission for the sale of a radio
station. A question involved was whether there was sufficient evidence
to show that the property had been listed for sale. Plaintiff's attorney
sought to testify on this point in regard to statements made by one
defendant to another in his presence. Defendant objected to the admission of this testimony without the attorney's withdrawal, on the ground
that it violated the Code of Ethics.3 The trial court determined that
the testimony did not relate to formal matters and was not essential
to the ends of justice, and therefore sustained defendant's objection.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed.
It should be noted that a technical appraisal of the language of
Canon 19 seems to disclose two meanings of the word "withdrawal."
The phrase, "he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel,"
1 Canon 19.
Practically every state has the same or a similar provision incorporated in its state bar association canons of ethics, or in its supreme court
or trial court rifles. Vol. 4 N. C. GEN. STAT., Rules, Regulations, etc., of the
North Carolina State Bar, Art. X, § 19 (1943), is identical.
273 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1954).
'31 FLA. STAT. ANN., Supreme Court Rule B, §(1), subd. 19 (1950). This

provision is identical to Canon 19, supra note 1.
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appears to indicate that by not participating actively in the trial after
testifying for his client, an attorney would be complying with the canon,
even though his partner conducted the remainder of the trial.4 On
the other hand, "a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf
of his client" (italics added), seems technically to indicate that a mere
withdrawal from active conduct of the trial would not be sufficient, but
that the relationship between the client and the testifying attorney
should be completely dissolved. While no court has specifically mentioned this distinction, a review of the cases shows that both meanings
have been recognized.
The language of the Millican case, although not completely clear,
tends toward the strict interpretation of "withdrawal." 5 If the Florida
court actually adopted this view, then, on the basis of the cases surveyed, it seems to stand as the only American court committed to
enforcing the canon on such a strict basis. There are some courts
which indicate that they will "look the other way" when there is a
violation of Canon 19 if the testifying attorney withdraws from active
conduct of the trial, but that they might enforce the canon if there
'For a discussion of such a situation see Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. Di
Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 496-501, 141 Atl. 866, 867-869 (1928), in which the

court says there should be no ethical difference between a sole attorney's testifying for his client and one attorney of a partnership testifying while his partner actively conducts the case. However, the opinions of the American Bar
Association Committee on Ethics no longer take such a strict view. Opinion
33 (1931) said that relations between partners of a law firm are so close that
no member of a firm should take a case which any one member is prohibited
from taking. In Opinion 50 (1931), the Committee stated 'broadly that an
attorney should not accept a case in which he has reason to believe that he
or any of his partners will be a material witness and should withdraw when
and if such becomes apparent. Opinion 185 (1938) held that it was improper
for a lawyer to accept employment in a case where it would be his duty to
attack the essential testimony to be given by his partner on behalf of the other
side. But in Opinion 220 (1941), the Committee says that the aforementioned
opinions are too rigid and comes to the conclusion that it is not always improper for an attorney to appear in a case in which his partner is a material
witness. The opinion says that the propriety of a lawyer's appearance in such
a situation should depend on the particular facts of the case, and then suggests
the advisability of the following addition to Canon 19: "It is improper for an
attorney to act as counsel in a matter as to which he or his partner has testified or will be required to testify, except by special permission of the tribunal
in which he is to appear as counsel."
' "The purpose of [the rule] is to inhibit a lawyer from testifying in his
client's case except as to matters specified therein. If the urgency to testify
arises after trial starts, other counsel should take charge or if that cannot be
done with convenience to the parties, a continuance should be granted after a
full disclosure to the court unless it is shown that prejudice and injustice can
be avoided. If counsel is aware of the necessity for his testimony before the
trial begins, he should discuss the matter with his client and decide whether
other counsel should be substituted or if he should retire from the case. The
rule on the point is so clear that counsel should anticipate the reason and effect
of his testimony beforehand and if it goes beyond formal matters he should
advise his client and make proper arrangements for other counsel to handle
the trial." Millican v. Hunter, 73 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 1954).
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is not a withdrawal at least to that extent." However, in most states
in which this question has arisen, it is held that, despite the serious
breach of professional ethics involved, an attorney may testify for his
client without ceasing to take an active part in the conduct of the
trial,7 and though no emergency has arisen which would make his
'In Christensen v. United States, 90 F. 2d 152 (7th Cir. 1937), it was held
error to exclude attorney's testimony, but it was said that the trial court would
have been justified in excluding him from further participation in the trial.
In Nye Odorless Incinerator Corp. v. Felton, 35 Del. 236, 162 At. 504 (1931),
the testimony of defendant's attorney was upheld, but the court indicated that
this was because it related only to formal matters. In Storbeck v. Fridley, 240
Iowa 879, 38 N. W. 2d 163 (1949), where defendant's attorney testified over
objection after withdrawing from the case, the court upheld the testimony, but
indicated that it did so only because the attorney withdrew. (Query: Does
this indicate that the Iowa court intends to take a stricter view than that taken
by the older cases cited in note 7, infra?) Cox v. Kee, 107 Neb. 587, 186 N. W.
974 (1922), was a case in which the refusal of the trial court to let plaintiff's
attorney testify without withdrawing was affirmed. But, the court indicated that
it required only a withdrawal from active participation: "[The propriety of
withdrawing holds] especially true where, as in the instant case, other capable
attorneys are associated and the interests of the litigant will not be jeopardized. . .

."

Id. at 590, 186 N. W. at 975.

Weil v. Weil, 125 N. Y. S. 2d

368 (1st Dep't 1953), was a divorce case based on adultery, where the husband's attorney, who had made the pretrial investigation, repeatedly referred
to his presence at events he investigated, vouched for the truthfulness of his
witnesses, and testified for his client. The court said this conduct alone vnigIst
have been ground for reversal, but reversed for other reasons. Other cases in
the same general tenor are: Hagerty v. Radle, 228 Minn. 487, 37 N. W. 2d 819
(1949) ; Callen v. Gill, 7 N. ; 312, 81 A. 2d 495 (1951) ; Security Trust Co. v.
Stapp, 332 Pa. 9, 1 A. 2d 236 (1938); Carey v. Powell, 32 Wash. 2d 761, 204
P. 2d 193 (1949).
7 Ford v. District of Columbia, 96 A. 2d 277 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953)
(error where trial court refused to allow defendant's attorney to testify as to
contradictory statements made by complaining witness at preliminary hearing
before another judge unless he withdrew); Miller v. Urban, 123 Conn. 331,
195 AtI. 193 (1937) (Plaintiff's objection to defendant's attorney's testimony
on grounds that he was defendant's only attorney of record and had participated in the conduct of the trial was sustained by the trial court. The court
said that "the offer to testify was ethically improper, but the exclusion of the
testimony, on that ground, was legally erroneous." Id. at 335, 195 Atl. at 195.) ;
Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P. 2d 692 (1946) ; Shlensky v.
Shlensky, 369 Ill. 179, 15 N. E. 2d 694 (1938); Reisch v. Bowie, 367 Ill. 126,
10 N. E. 2d 663 (1937); Waterman v. Bryson, 178 Iowa 35, 158 N. W. 466
(1916) (Appellant contended that there had been no fair and impartial trial
because plaintiff's attorney testified and then commented on his testimony in
his summation to the jury. The court said, "it is not error for an attorney
to testify, though he remain in the case. . . ." Id. at 39, 158 N. W. at 467.) ;
McLaren v. Gillispie, 19 Utah 137, 56 Pac. 680 (1899) (error where trial court
refused to allow defendant's sole attorney to testify unless he withdrew from
the case).
In Sengebush v. Edgerton, 120 Conn. 367, 180 Atl. 694 (1935), it was held
error for the trial court not to allow defendant's sole attorney to testify on
hearing of a motion for a new trial in regard to alleged newly discovered evidence. "When the attorney in this case offered to testify, the court could not
treat him as disqualified, but the most it could do would be to remind him of
the impropriety of his conduct." Id. at 370, 180 AtI. at 696. However, the error
was held harmless because of the cumulative and corroborative nature of the
proposed new evidence.
In these cases attorneys were allowed to testify, but they had not participated actively in the conduct of the trial, although they had assisted in prepara-
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testimony necessary to prevent injustice3
Of course, where an attorney is himself a party in an action and
chooses to conduct his own case, he may take the witness stand to
testify for himself.9
The position of the federal courts on forcing an attorney to withdraw from the litigation if he testifies for his client as to a material
matter is not quite clear. While, as in the vast majority of states, 10
it is well settled that a lawyer is a competent witness for his client, 1
it appears that whether he must withdraw is left to the discretion of
12
the trial court.
In North Carolina the question of the enforceability of this canon 3
has not been answered, although it is settled that a lawyer is com4
petent to testify for his client.'
When an ethical standard is stated with enough clarity to make it
undoubtedly a violation for an attorney to testify for his client without
at least withdrawing from active participation in the trial, it may be
asked what justification the courts can give for failing, in most cases,
to enforce it. The reason most generally advanced is that it would
be unfair to penalize the client for an ethical violation committed by
his attorney.'3 Whatever validity this argument might have in relation
tion and received fees: Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. Di Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 141
Atl.8 866
(1928) ; the v.
Kellogg, 289
528, courts'
124 N. permitting
E. 633 (1919).
In these casesBarto
courts upheld theIll.trial
of attorneys to
testify without withdrawing, but justified on the ground that from the record
it seemed possible that the testimony was necessary to prevent injustice: Kintz v.
P. J. Menz Lumber Co., 47 Ind. App. 475, 94 N. E. 802 (1911); Burgdorf v.
Keeven, 351 Mo. 1003, 174 S. W. 2d 816 (1943).
For dicta indicating that it should be within the-discretion of the trial court
to determine whether an attorney's testimony is necessary to prevent injustice,
see: Holbrook v. Seagrove, 228 Mass. 26, 29, 116 N. E. 889, 890 (1917) ; Hagerty
v. Radle, 228 Minn. 487, 506, 37 N. W. 2d 819, 830 (1949) ; Security Trust Co.
v. Stapp, 232 Pa. 9, 14, 1 A. 2d 236, 238 (1938).
'Kaeser v. Bloomer, 85 Conn. 209, 82 At. 112 (1912).
" "The overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that, although
it is a grave breach of professional ethics for an attorney of a party to testify
as to anything other than matters of a formal nature without withdrawing from
the litigation, he is not incompetent so to testify, and his testimony is clearly
admissable, if otherwise competent." Annotation, 118 A. L. R. 954 (1939);
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1911 (3d ed. 1940).
I'French v. Hall, 119 U. S. 152 (1886); Steiner v. United States, 134 F.
2d 931 (5th Cir. 1943); Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F. 2d
352 (5th Cir. 1942); Christensen v. United States, 90 F. 2d 152 (7th Cir.
1937) ; Baldwin v. National Hedge & Wire-Fence Co., 73 Fed. 574 (3d Cir. 1896).
" Christensen v. United States, 90 F. 2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1937) (It was
error to exclude testimony of defendant's attorney, though the trial court would
have been justified in excluding him from further participation in the trial.).
"BSee note I supra.
"1
re Will of Kemp, 236 N. C. 680, 684, 73 S. E. 2d 906, 910 (1953)
County Trustee of Brunswick v. Woodside, 31 N. C. 496, 502 (1849); Slocum

v. Newby, 5 N. C. 423 (1810);

STANsBSJRY, NORTH

CAROLINA EVIDENCE

§ 62

(1946).
"E.g., Paine v. People, 106 Colo. 258, 264, 103 P. 2d 686, 689 (1940) ; Cuve-
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to appellate courts' refusals to reverse for violations of the canon, it
does not excuse the trial court for allowing the violation in the first
place.
On the other hand, there are sound reasons which can be advanced
for not allowing an attorney to testify for his client. Professor Wigmore says that the most persuasive argument "is concerned with the
dangerous effects of the practice upon the public mind. In short, it
does not fear that lawyers may as witnesses distort the truth in favor
of the client, but it fears that the public will think that they may, and
that the respect for the profession and confidence in it will be effectively diminished. This is at once the most potent and most common
reason judicially advanced.""'
As it now stands, Canon 19 does not prohibit the testimony of attorneys in two situations: first, it permits lawyers to testify in behalf
of their clients concerning formal matters, such testimony generally
being of minor significance; and second, it permits lawyers to testify
without withdrawing where the testimony is concerned with matters of
very great significance, where the exclusion of the testimony would
defeat the ends of justice. Therefore, it can be argued that even if
Canon 19 were enforced strictly, there would still be only a limited
middle area of testimony for which the testifying lawyer would be
required to withdraw. This situation gives rise to the question of
whether it might not be better to replace Canon 19 with a clearer
and stricter canon which would, under no circumstances, allow an
attorney to testify for his client without withdrawing from further
participation in the trial.
However, if the present canon is not replaced, the following plan
would seem to make its meaning clearer and its enforcement more
certain, while providing some degree of protection for both the profession and the client:
(1) Leave to the discretion of the trial judge the questions of
whether the testimony the lawyer desires to give for the client is
lier v. Town of Dumont, 221 Iowa 1016, 1021, 266 N. W. 517, 520 (1936);
Waterman v. Bryson, 178 Iowa 35, 39, 158 N. W. 466, 467 (1916).
1 6 WIGMORE, Evmm'icE § 1911 (3d ed. 1940). This argument is discussed
at some length in Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. Di Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 496-501,
Other reasons given are: (1) Disqualification
141 Atl. 866, 867-869 (1928).
by interest, due to the general partisan relationship existing in favor of the
client, regardless of any specific interest in the cause, such as money or prestige.
This argument, says Prof. Wigmore, had considerable force when pecuniary interest was a disqualification in general, but the old cases refusing to allow lawyers to testify on these grounds have no present significance. (2) A rarely
advanced argument that the testimony under oath of the attorney and his other
statements during the course of the trial might be intermingled in the minds of
the jurors, so that they unconsciously give the weight of the testimony under
oath to all that he says.
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of a formal nature or so significant that it is essential to the ends
of justice.
(2) If the testimony is determined by the trial judge to fit either
of these two categories, then the attorney should be allowed to
testify for his client without withdrawing from the case.
(3) If the testimony is determined by the trial judge not to fit
either of these categories, then the attorney should not be permitted
to testify for his client unless he withdraws completely as counsel.
(4) If, however, a trial judge should allow an attorney to testify
for his client without first determining the nature of the proposed
testimony, and it is found on appeaJ that the testimony fits neither
of the permitted categories and should not have been admitted
without the withdrawal of the testifying attorney, then the appellate
court should not reverse at the expense of the client.
(5) Rather, in such a situation, a stated and suitable punishment
for the offending attorney should be incorporated into the rules
and regulations of the state bar association, the enforcement procedure being handled by the regular enforcement machinery for such
regulations.
WILLIAM E. ZIMTBAUM.

Pleadings-Last Clear Chance-North Carolina Requirements
Last clear chance in North Carolina, as a substantive doctrine, can
be defined in terms which have been consistently repeated and approved since the introduction of the concept late in the last century.1
A typical definition would be that the "contributory negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery where it is made to appear that
the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided the injurious consequences to the plaintiff, notwithstanding
plaintiff's negligence; that is, that by the exercise of reasonable care
defendant might have discovered the perilous position of the party injured or killed and have avoided the injury, but failed to do so." 2 Our
inquiry here is to determine what allegations, if any, are required in
the plaintiff's pleadings before a trial court in North Carolina should
submit to the jury the issue of last clear chance.
The most recent declaration by the North Carolina Supreme Court
concerning methods by which a plaintiff may avail himself of the doctrine of last clear chance was Collas v. Regan,3 which held that he was
'Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 (1881).'
'Ingram v. Smoky Mt. Stages, Inc., 225 N. C. 444, 447, 35 S. E. 2d 337,
339 (1945).

-240 N. C.472, 82 S.E.2d 215 (1954).
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not entitled to have the jury consider the doctrine because his pleadirigs had not sufficiently raised the issue. The court said of the appellant's contention that the trial judge erred in refusing to submit
the issue that it could not now overrule past decisions holding that
last clear chance must be pleaded, and added that, in any event, the
evidence on the point was insufficient to support the submission of
the issue. 4 As precedent for its position, the court cited two cases
which it characterized as "practical applications of the basic rule that
a plaintiff can recover only on the case made by his pleadings."
The earlier of the two cited cases, Hudson v. Norfolk Southern
Railroad Co.,6 held that a judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff
must be reversed because of the trial judge's error in instructing the
jury that the burden of proof on the issue of last clear chance was
on the defendant. Then, the court quoted from 11 Corpus luris 282
in reference to the burden of both pleading and proof, and stated: "In
order to invoke the 'last clear chance' doctrine, plaintiff must plead
and prove that the defendant, after perceiving the danger, and in time
'7
to avoid it, negligently refused to do so."
On this near-dictum was built the second cited case, Bailey and
8
King v. North Carolina Railroad.
The facts there were as follows:
the plaintiffs' intestates, while riding in a truck in the City of Durham,
approached the defendant's track where the view was unobstructed for
several hundred yards, and then attempted to cross in front of an
oncoming passenger train, which was approximately 400 yards from the
crossing, traveling at a rate in excess of the speed limit and sounding
neither bell nor whistle. When on the track, the truck stalled, and as the
plaintiffs' witness described it, "the truck looked like it was trying to
get off, kinder moved back and forth and settled down at the time the
train hit it,"' a killing both occupants. In affirming a judgment of
non-suit, granted on defendant's motion at the close of the plaintiffs'
evidence, the court held that the testimony introduced by the plaintiffs conclusively proved their intestates' own negligence, and then
stated: "Furthermore, the plaintiffs do not plead the last clear chance,
which is required before such doctrine is available, paragraph 8(f) of
the complaint not being susceptible of such construction.' 0 At that
'Ibid. The evidence showed that the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's
automobile as he was crossing the street at night, while carrying a bag of groceries. The only allegation of negligence appearing in the plaintiff's complaint

was- that the defendant failed to maintain a proper lookout. See Transcript of
Record.
,Id.at 473, 82 S. E. 2d at 216.
6 190 N. C. 116, 129 S. E. 146 (1925).
7
Id. at 119, 129 S. E. at 147.

8223
N. C. 244, 25 S. E. 2d 833 (1943).
9
0Id.

at 246, 25 S. E. 2d at 835.
Id. at 248, 25 S. E. 2d at 835.
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point the court'again quoted the above-mentioned passage from Corpus
Juris and cited Hudson v. Norfolk Southern Railroad as authority for
its conclusion.
A look at the appeal record reveals that the plaintiffs, in paragraphs 8(a) through 8(e) of their complaint, alleged specific acts of
negligence, i.e., excessive speed, failure to keep a proper lookout, unsafe condition of the crossing; and then in paragraph 8(f) alleged that
"had the operators of said passenger train been operating said train
at a reasonable rate of speed, used due care and kept a proper lookout
that it would have discovered the said Chevrolet truck and its two
occupants upon said crossing as they had a clear view of at least 350
to 400 yards and recognized their position of peril and could have
stopped said train in ample time to have avoided the collision and the
death of the plaintiff's intestate.""
It seems fairly apparent, to this writer at least, that while the
plaintiffs' actual allegations do not explicitly parrot the Corpus Juris
phraseology suggested by the court as an acceptable standard for
pleading last clear chance, the allegations do attempt to emphasize the
intestates' position of peril or danger, which seems to be a key substantive element, and one which was missing from the Collas pleadings. 12 If, as suggested in the Collas case, Bailey and King v. North
Carolina Railroad stands as a definitive expression of the North Carolina view on pleading last clear chance, what is its full significance and
what procedural lessons can be learned from it? A review of some
general pleading problems and an inspection of the North Carolina
judicial history on pleading last clear chance will be of some help.
The effect of procedural law on the application of 'the doctrine of
last clear chance varies considerably among the states. 13 Some states
consider the doctrine to be essentially one of evidence and not of
pleading. 14 McIntosh apparently conceived North Carolina to be in
a somewhat comparable position, as he briefly stated that when "the
defendant pleads contributory negligence, it is deemed to be denied
without reply, and the plaintiff may also take advantage of the last
clear chance or plead it especially in reply."'15 For his authority he
cited Nathan v. Charlotte St. Ry. 16 where, in response to the defend1

Transcript of Record, p. 7, Bailey and King v. North Carolina Railroad,

223 N. C. 244, 25 S. E. 2d 833 (1943).
note 4 supra.
annotation, 25 A. L. R. 2d 257 (1952).
", Pfisterer v. Key, 218 Ind. 521, 33 N. E. 2d 330 (1941); Nielson v. Richman, 68 S. D. 104, 299 N. W. 74 (1941); Masso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 75
Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941 (1913).
" McINTosr, NORT
CAROLINA PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 478 (1929).
20 118 N. C. 1066, 24 S. E. 511 (1896). The allegations in the complaint
were that the plaintiff paid his fare to ride the defendant's streetcar. While
being conveyed to his destination, he was thrown to the tracks and struck by
2See

"See
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ant's objection that the issue of last clear chance was improperly submitted to the jury because it was not raised in the complaint, the court
stated: "In contemplation of law, the injury is not attributed to the
wrongful act unless it is shown to be the immediate and proximate
cause. So that, the allegation by the plaintiff that the injury was
due to the defendant's carelessness, and the denial of that, coupled
with the averment by the defendant that the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff was the cause, necessarily involves the question of
whether the defendant negligently omitted to avail itself of the last
clear chance to avoid the accident by the performance of a legal duty"
(italics added),17 The court then affirmed its position in an earlier
case' 8 and held that if by refusing to submit the issue of last clear
chance the trial court had prevented the plaintiff from presenting to
the jury the law applicable to the evidence, "then it would be no
longer discretionary with the judge whether he would permit it to be
passed upon, but would become the right of the plaintiff to demand that
it should be."' 0
This idea was reinforced in a later case where a similar objection
was raised by the defendant that the trial court erred in submitting
the issue of last clear chance and in refusing a request for binding
instructions in his favor should .the jury find the plaintiff guilty of
negligence. The court answered defendant's exception by pointing
out that the trial court may not properly instruct the jury that the
proximate cause of the injury was the plaintiff's negligence when
the evidence indicates that the "negligence may have been concurrent,
or the last negligence may have been the plaintiff's, or notwithstanding the negligence of the plaintiff, the defendant could, with the exercise of ordinary care have prevented his horse striking, and his conveyance running over, the plaintiff. The jury and jury alone were
competent to determine the fact, for there was evidence for their con20
sideration."
In contrasting the Bailey with the Nathan case, the impression is
received that the North Carolina requirements for pleading facts which
permit recovery on the theory of last clear chance have been stiffened
in favor of the defendant. Yet it is difficult to determine from the
language of the Bailey decision whether, in fact, its apparent conflict
another of the defendant's cars, all of which was caused by the negligent, careless and wrongful operation of its streetcars by the defendant. See Transcript
of Record.
17
1d. at 1069, 24 S. E. at 511.
11 Baker v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R., 118 N. C. 1015, 1023, 24 S. E.
415, 417 (1896).
" Nathan v. Charlotte St. Ry., 118 N. C. 1066, 1069, 24 S. E. 511 (1896).
20 Wheeler v. Gibbon, 126 N. C. 811, 36 S. E. 277 (1900).
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with the Nathan case may not largely be due to a substantive rather
than a procedural difference.
Since the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, North Carolina
has not required explicit characterization or labeling of the theory under
which the plaintiff expects to recover, 21 but, quite the contrary, asks
only for a clear, concise statement of the facts which show a cause
of action under any theory.2 2 Although it is true that the plaintiff's
pleadings must properly apprise the defendant of the alleged cause of
action so that he may prepare his defense, the court has stated that
24
the ccmplaint should not anticipate a possible defense in the answer.
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the doctrine of last clear chance
does not begin to operate unless the plaintiff is guilty of negligence, 25
it is unlikely that the Bailey case means to impose upon plaintiffs the
burden of initially confessing their own negligence.
In the scope of this note, it would be impossible even to attempt
to span the substantive law of last clear chance in North Carolina with
its endless shadings and distinctions ;26 nevertheless, some mention of
it is necessary at this point. The court has held that the doctrine of
last clear chance does not apply to situations where the defendant's
train has struck a pedestrian plaintiff, who as a licensee or trespasser,
was on the defendant's track and apparently in full command of his
faculties. Railroads, in such instances, have been absolved on the
theory that the engineer is entitled to expect up to the moment of
impact that the pedestrian will remove himself ;27 therefore, any negligent failure by the defendant to keep a proper lookout or to give
warning of its approach would merge with *the concurring negligence
of the plaintiff and bar recovery. An essential substantive element here
seems to be the "condition" of the plaintiff, i.e., whether his position
was such that the defendant was put on notice of the plaintiff's inability to escape. 28 Unless such notice of disability appears, the defendant has no later chance to avoid the collision than does the plaintiff.
The Bailey case, although clearly distinguishable on its facts from
the pedestrian cases, follows their reasoning rather closely by holding,
"Thomas v. Atlantic and North Carolina R. R., 218 N. C. 292, 10 S. E. 2d

722 (1940).
"N. C. GEx. STAT. § 1-122 (1953) ; Hill v. Buxton, 88 N. C. 27 (1883).
" Hussey v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 98 N. C. 34, 3 S. E. 923 (1887).
" Joyner v. P. L. Woodward & Co., 201 N. C. 315. 160 S. E. 288 (1931).
By way of dictum the court added that if a defense is anticipated and not negatived in the complaint it is subject to demurrer.
" Redmon v. Southern Ry., 195 N. C. 762, 143 S. E. 829 (1928).
"8For an interesting discussion of the substantive aspect, see Note, 33 N. C. L.
REV. 138 (1954).
" Beach v. Southern Ry., 148 N. C. 153, 61 S. E. 664 (1908).
" Neal v. Carolina Central R. R., 126 N. C. 634, 36 S. E. 117 (1900).
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in effect, that the intestates themselves had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision, in spite of the obvious differences in maneuverability
between pedestrians and occupants of stalled vehicles. If such is the
substantive law of last clear chance as applied to vehicle-train collisions,
allegations based on similar facts will not permit consideration of last
clear chance because the proof could not satisfy the legal definition
which the court has placed on the words "peril" or "danger." 29 Therefore, the fault would lie not with the pleading form, but with a failure
of plaintiff's proof to avoid a finding that his negligence was concurrent, or "contributory" as a matter of law. The Bailey case might
easily have been decided without reference to the pleading form,
thereby preventing some of the precedural mystery of its holding.
Regardless of whether the court considers the doctrine of last
clear chance to be a theory alternate to and distinct from ordinary
negligence, or as merely a facet of the over-all inquiry into the proximate cause of the injury, the results are the same. A plaintiff hoping
to take advantage of the doctrine is evidently no longer permitted to
rely on the ordinary allegations of negligence with the privilege of getting special instructions to the jury on the issue should the evidence
produce a case where the last clear chance doctrine would be applicable.
The recent North Carolina decisions seem to mean that specific facts
which would give rise to the operation of the doctrine should be pleaded
in the complaint on an alternative basis in a separate count, or included
by way of reply30 to an answer which sets up a defense of contributory
negligence.
ROBERT

B. MILLMAN, JR.

Taxation-Ad Valorem Tax on Flight Equipment of Interstate
Airlines
Interstate business must pay its way1 and its "way" may properly
be regarded as the protection, services, and other benefits afforded by
2
those authorities through whose jurisdictions such business operates.
By daily use of airports, the aircraft of interstate carriers directly
receive a major part of the services and other benefits furnished by
the taxpayers of the jurisdiction in which the airports are located. It
would seem to follow that such aircraft properly may be the subject
of ad valorem property taxes.
"' Dowdy and Burns v. Southern Ry., 237 N. C. 519, 75 S. E. 2d 639 (1953).
"0See Redwine v. Bass, 215 N. C. 467, 2 S. E. 2d 362 (1939).
'Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 259 (1919).

'Ibid. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board, 347 U. S. 590, 606

(1954) ; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, 174 (1949);
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 364 (1939).
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In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board the Supreme
Court of the United States for the first time considered and upheld
a state tax upon the flight equipment of an interstate carrier doing
business within the state but incorporated in another state. The Court
held against the airline's principal argument that its aircraft "never
attained a taxable situs within Nebraska" 4 and said that eighteen stops
per day in that state are "sufficient to establish Nebraska's power to
tax even though the same aircraft do not land every day and even though
none of the aircraft is continuously within the State." 5 It seems clear
that this decision means that the aircraft of interstate airlines are within
the tax jurisdiction of each state in which they make daily stops.
It would seem that similar property in North Carolina is taxable,
since "all property, real and personal, within the jurisdiction of the
State, not especially exempt, shall be subject to taxation." 6 The flight
equipment of foreign commercial airlines is not exempt from taxation
under the North Carolina Constitution or tax laws. 7
Property taxable by the state is taxable by the subdivisions thereof
through delegation of power. 8 In North Carolina, property taxation
by local authorities is provided for in the Machinery Act.9 At least
as late as 1944, North Carolina tax administrators had found a sufficient degree of uncertainty regarding the application of the Machinery
Act to the aircraft of interstate airlines to deter them from attempting
to list, value, and collect a tax on such property. 10 The purpose of
this note is to examine some of the problems giving rise to this uncertainty. The sections of the Machinery Act discussed in this note
have not been amended so as to change the problems which existed in
1944 as regards air commerce..'
-347 U. S. 590 (1954).
'Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board, 347 U. S.590, 598 (1954).
' Id. at 601. In so holding, the Supreme Court for the first time applied
to aircraft the traditional "doctrine of apportionment, as the basis of property
taxation," i.e., that "a State may levy ah ad valorem tax on the basis of a showing that the total time spent in a State by different units of a carrier's property
is such that a certain proportion of that property may be said to have a permanent location in that State." Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska: State Board,
347 U. S. 590, 607 (1954) (dissenting opinion). The court has previously applied
this doctrine to railroad cars, Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141
U. S. 18 (1891), and to barges, Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336

U. S. 169 (1949).
IN. C. GENq. STAT. § 105-281 (1950).
N. C. CoNsT. Art. V, §§ 3, 5; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-297, 105-396 (1950).
'64 C. J.. S., Municipal Corporations § 2000 (1950).
I N. C. Gmx. STAT. § 105-271 et seq. (1950). Preamble: "An act to provide

for the listing and valuing of all property, real, personal and mixed, at its true
value in money, and to provide' for the taxation thereof by counties, municipalities
and other local tax authorities upon a uniform ad valorem basis."
10

H. R Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Multiple Taxation of Air Cominerce 19 n. 11 (1945).
" See N. C. Sass. LAws 1945, c. 973; N. C. Sass. LAWS 1947, c. 836; N. C.
Sass. LAws 1951, c. 728; N. C. SEss. LAws 1951, c. 1102.
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Section 800 (1) of the Machinery Act' provides for the listing
of all tangible property at the "residence" of the owner, defining the
"residence" of a foreign or domestic corporation as its "principal office" within North Carolina. The Machinery Act furnishes neither
a definition of "principal office" nor a criterion for determining its location. The corporation domestication statute,13 however, provides that
every foreign corporation, "before being permitted to-do business in
this state," shall file in the office of the Secretary of State of North
Carolina an attested statement setting forth, among other things, its
"principal office" in North Carolina.14 The Secretary of State is
directed by the statute to require every foreign corporation doing business in North Carolina fully to comply with this provision.'8 Thus
it appears that the principal office of a foreign airline lawfully doing
business in North Carolina must be recorded in the office of the Secretary of State. It seems a logical conclusion that such principal office
is the one at which the property of a foreign corporation shall be listed
for taxation under Section 800 (1) of the Machinery Act. Although
this analysis furnishes no satisfactory definition of "principal office,"
it establishes an element of certainty for tax listing purposes.
Section 800 (1) further provides, "if a corporation ...has no principal office in this State" it may list its tangible personal property "at
any place at which said property is situated." Under the preceding
analysis, a foreign corporation lawfully doing business in North Carolina must have a principal office in this state, therefore it would seem
clear that this provision of Section 800 (1) does not apply to such
corporations. 16 However, this provision does not specifically exclude
foreign corporations from its application.
Furthermore, Section
800 (4)17 provides that "tangible personal property shall be listed at
the place where such property is situated, rather than at the residence' 8
of the owner if the owner or person having control thereof hires or
occupies [among other things, an] office . . . therein for use in connection with such property." Thus, a significant question of construction appears unavoidable: Where would the flight equipment of a
foreign airline doing business in North Carolina be "situated" for tax
listing purposes?
'IN. C. GEr. STAT. § 105-302 (1) (Supp. 1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-117 et seq. (1950).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-118 (1950; Supp. 1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-120 (1950).
" Presumably, this provision was enacted to encompass the property of domestic corporations and that of foreign corporations having property in North Carolina but doing no business in the state, e.g., a tract of timber purchased but left
standing
by a foreign lumber company.
17
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302 (4)

(1950).

SI.e., "principal office" in the case of foreign corporations.
Act § 800 (1), discussed in the text, supra.

See Machinery
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The North Carolina court has recognized that there is "no ddcision
in this jurisdiction establishing any practical criterion for determining
when a specific chattel is situated in a particular place."' 0 In other
cases, our court has relied upon the definition, "having a site, situation or location permanently fixed; located." 20 This seems to be the
definition adopted in a wide variety of contexts by many courts throughout the United States.21 Although ordinary words of a statute must
be given their natural, approved and recognized meaning, 2z it seems
apparent that the usual meaning of "situated" is inappropriate to apply
a tax on instrumentalities of interstate carriers which make only brief
stops within any given jurisdiction.
Even if a satisfactory meaning of "situated" could be determined
within the context of Section 800 (4), as applied to foreign air carriers,
there might be some doubt that this provision applies to such corporations at all. At first blush, it might seem apparent that every major
airline would hire or occupy an office at each major airport through
which it operates for use in connection with its flight equipment. However, it is believed that the common practice is for agents to "hire or
occupy" desk and advertising space at such airports. Even if such
space were deemed an "office" for the purposes of Section 800 (4), a
mere ticket agent is obviously not the owner of airline flight equipment,
and it seems clear that such an agent has no control over such aircraft, but merely furthers his principal's business in relation to the
public.
The last sentence of Section 800 (4) provides, "When tangible
personal property which may be used by the public generally . . . is
placed at or on a location outside of the county of the owner or lessor,
such tangible personal property shall be listed for taxation in the county
where located." Since our court has defined "situated" as meaning
"located" 23 familiar problems once more arise. It would seem that
the instrumentalities of common carriers, whether motor vehicles or
aircraft, may properly be classed as "tangible personal property which
may be used by the public generally." Such property is certainly
"placed at or on a location outside of the county of the owner" when
employed in interstate commerce. Does this provision of Section
800 (4) apply only to domestic corporations? There is nothing in
the Act which so limits its application. Is the county of the owner
"0Montague Bros. v. W. C. Shepherd Co., 231 N. C. 551, 554, 58 S. E. 2d
118, 121 (1950).
"' Ibid. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Walters, 230 N. C. 443, 446, 53
S. E. 2d 520, 522 (1949).
"39

WoRDs & PHRASES 463 (Perm. Ed. 1953).

" Watson Industries v. Shaw, 235 N. C. 203, 69 S. E. 2d 505 (1952); Victory Cab Co. v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 572, 68 S.E. 2d 433 (1951).
22 See note 20 supra.
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that of the owner's principal office, where the owner is a foreign corporation? That would seem a reasonable construction, 24 but if so held
by the court, then the problems regarding the location of that office, as
discussed in connection with Section 800 (1), supra, again arise.
A more difficult problem, underlying those already considered, remains to be examined. The Machinery Act, Section 302,25 provides
that "All property, real and personal, shall be listed ... in accordance
with ownership and value as of the first day of January each year."
Even if this were interpreted to mean that each aircraft which landed
in a particular jurisdiction on January first could be listed for taxation,
there would be unlimited opportunity for tax avoidance by merely
eliminating New Year's Day flights in North Carolina, or by reducing
the number of stops within the state on that day. Even if these devices were not resorted to, the various local authorities concerned would
be deprived of the tax revenue from aircraft landing within their jurisdiction during the other 364 days of the year. Apparently the North
Carolina Legislature recognized this problem when it provided for state
assessment and certification of apportioned value to local units for
taxation of public service companies and all other companies exercising the right of eminent domain. 26 Unfortunately, no such provisions
27
exist which are applicable to interstate air carriers.
It seems apparent, therefore, that the Machinery Act does not provide for taxation of the flight equipment of interstate airlines doing
business in North Carolina. A valuable source of revenue 28 is thereby
lost. What might be done to make this revenue available? There
appear to be three major possibilities:
FIRST: The wording of the Machinery Act sections considered
in this note might be amended to provide specifically for the listing
and assessing of transient property of interstate carriers.
SECOND: The list of public service companies contained in Article
24

The phrase was so construed for purposes of the venue statute, N. C.

§ 1-79 (1953), in Roberson v. Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 120, 68 S. E.
1064
(1910).
'IN.
C. GEN. STAT. § 105-280 (1950).
11 MAcIaiNY AcT Art. XVI, § 1600 et seq., N. C. GEN'. STAT. § 105-350
GEN. STAT.

et seq. (1950).

"'Even if commercial airlines are public service corporations, they are not
included in the list of such companies provided for in Art. XVI of the Machinery
Act, supra note 26, nor do they have the power of eminent domain in this state,
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 40-2 (Supp. 1953).
2 H. R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Multiple Taxation of Air Coininerce 76 (1945). Table II. State and local property taxes paid by domestic
air carriers operating in the United States, by States, 1939-43.
[Selected] States
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
California
$31,033
$29,599
$21,809
$34,949
$35,973
Illinois
24,569
26,977
32,512
40,617
45,409
Minnesota
31,749
37,263
46,442
40,376
30,280
29
37
3
5
North Carolina

1955]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

XVI, Section 1600 et seq. of the Machinery Act 29 might be amended
to include airlines, so as to allow state assessment and certification of
apportioned value to local units for taxation.
THIRD: A special statute might be enacted specifically to encompass the flight equipment of airlines operating in and through North
Carolina ° Such a statute should (1) require central assessment by
a state board or agency, (2) include a formula by which to determine
apportioned value allocable to this state, and (3) provide for central
collection of taxes and distribution thereof to local authorities. The
Nebraska statute3 ' would be a valuable model for such an act because
it is relatively simple and concise and because it has the sanction of
the United States Supreme Court in the Braniff case.
ROYAL G. SHANNONHOUSE.
Taxation-Effects of Federal Taxes on Partnership "Buy and Sell"
Agreements Funded by Life Insurance
In these days of high corporate taxes, many small and medium
sized businesses prefer to operate as partnerships, thus avoiding the
consequences of double taxation which are felt by closely held and
small family corporations. In assuming the partnership form, the
business associates are confronted with a problem with which corporate organizations are not concerned. That is that under the general law, upon the death of a partner, the partnership is automatically
dissolved, unless otherwise provided for in the partnership agreement.,
In case of dissolution, the surviving partners are trustees for the decedent's partnership interests and are accountable to his estate. This
involves a valuation of the business and a possible sale of part or all
of the assets in order to pay the estate its due. Even if provisions
were made for continuance of the partnership, undoubtedly many a
profitable business would be wrecked by the incompatible interests
of the surviving partners and the decedent's representatives.
In order to solve this problem many partners have entered into
"buy and sell," or "survivor purchase," agreements during their life" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-350 et seq. (1950).
"There is no apparent reason why such
a statute should not include the
trucks and busses of earth-bound carriers as well. Since the Machinery Act
does not provide specially for such property, it would seem that the sections
of that Act discussed in this note would be applicable to that property. Furthermore, in view of the number of highway carriers operating in this state, the
need for a special tax provision regarding such carriers seems even greater
than the need for such a provision applicable to airlines. However, the problems involved in the taxation of highway carriers are beyond the scope of this
note.
"NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1244 through 77-1250 (1950). See also ARIz. CODE
§ 73-2001 et seq. (Supp. 1952) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 270.071 et seq. (1947).
'UNIFoR PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 31; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-61 (1943).
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times, thereby assuring the survivor or survivors that they will acquire
the decedent's interest, and that the business will be carried on under
their control. Estate and income taxes cannot be ignored in drawing
up such an agreement, and care taken in drafting the instrument may
save the estate or the surviving partners many dollars in taxes. Another
purpose which the agreement should serve is to give the decedent's
interest a definite valuation, either by fixing a specific sum of money
or by setting out the method by which the interest is to be evaluated. 2
This will avoid any subsequent dispute between the survivors and the
decedent's executor and in addition may avoid protracted and costly
litigation with the government, by pegging the valuation for estate tax
purposes. Of course, the problem of valuation would not arise if a
partner sold his interest during his lifetime.
One problem which arises immediately is: How will the survivor
finance the purchase of the decedent's interest at the price agreed upon?
Because of present high rates of personal income taxes, it is difficult
for most individuals to accumulate and have on hand sufficient ready
cash to enable them to purchase a partner's interest. Therefore, other
methods of supplying purchase money must be found. It is here that
insurance on the partners' lives has come into frequent use in the last
thirty years. It provides the surviving partner a large sum of ready
cash tax free. In turn this cash may be urgently needed by the decedent's personal representative to settle the estate, thus avoiding sale
of non-liquid assets. It is universally recognized that a partner has
an insurable interest in the life of a co-partner for this purpose, and
some states have passed statutes expressly so providing. a Several
plans and their variations are in use by partnerships, and all involve
the following common elements: (1) policies of life insurance will be
taken out on the partners' lives, the proceeds to be used for purchasing
the deceased partner's interest; (2) the agreement will limit the value
of the partner's interest; (3) an agreement is made by each partner
not to sell his partnership interest during his lifetime except to the
other partner or partners; (4) the agreement should be a bona fide
business transaction; and (5) the deceased partner's estate is legally
bound to sell the decedent's interest to the surviving partners.4
2For an excellent article on the different methods of valuation, see Forster,
Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale Agreeinent,
4 STAr. L. REv. 325 (1952).
8
E.g., N. C. GN. STAT. § 58-204.2 (Supp. 1953).
"Under Section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, no capital gain
results to the decedent's estate upon the transfer of his interest under a binding
agreement because, upon death, the basis is changed from cost to fair market
value at the time of death. If the decedent's estate under the agreement gets
more than the fair market value of his interest, it is conceivable that it would
have to pay a capital gains tax on the excess.
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The value of the decedent's interest in the partnership for estate
tax purposes is limited to the value specified in the agreement, whether
it be a stated sum, book value at the time of death, or an amount
reached by any other method of valuation,5 but the interest is includible in his gross estate only to the extent it exceeds the sum received
as proceeds from the insurance policy." Had there been no binding
agreement not to sell during decedent's lifetime, then the full value
of his interest would be includible, but in any case that value is reducible by the amount of insurance proceeds received. The transaction
must also be a bona fide business arrangement, not made with testamentary intent to give some favored friend or relative the decedent's
interest at a cost below the fair market value. Thus in Claire Gianini
Hoffman v. Conmissioner the decedent had given his brother a unilateral option to acquire his partnership interest upon his death at
twenty per cent of its value, but reserved the right to dispose of his
interest during his life. This option was assigned to the petitioner, the
optionee's sister. The petitioner contended that the value of the interest
was limited by the option agreement, but the Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner in including the full value of the interest in decedent's
gross estate, saying:
"We are of the opinion that while a bona fide contract, based
upon adequate consideration, to sell property for less than its
value may fix the value of the property for purposes of the estate
tax, a mere gratuitous promise to permit some favored individual, particularly the natural object of the bounty of the promisor, to purchase it at a grossly inadequate price can have no
such effect.""
Where the taxpayer can successfully carry the burden of proving the
transaction was bona fide and at arm's length, the court has disregarded
the fact that the optionee or survivor who is receiving the interest at
a price below the market value is a natural object of decedent's bounty.9 In any case where a bona fide transaction is found to exist, the
adequacy of the consideration must be measured at the time the con' Since the contract among the partners is specifically enforceable, the courts

have recognized that the mutual agreements are determinative of value, as
market value can be no more than the agreed price specifically enforceable by
the agreement. See Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1935); Estate of
Lionel Weil, 22 T. C. No. 158 (1954).
'The courts have held in many cases that it would be double taxation to
tax both the value of decedent's partnership interest and the consideration paid
for it. See Estate of Tompkins v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 1054 (1949).
72 T. C. 1160 (1943). See also Estate of Mathews v. Commissioner, 3 T. C.
525 (1944).
'Claire Gianini Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 1160, 1179 (1943).
' See Bensel v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 246 (1937), aff'd, 100 F. 2d 639
(3d Cir. 1938).
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tract was entered into rather than the time the option was exercised.' 0
Each plan has different tax consequences and this note proposes
to explain the operation and the tax results of the most common of
these plans." The applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 are:
(1) the provisions of Section 2031, which deal generally with what
property is includible in a decedent's gross estate;
(2) the specific provisions of Section 2042, dealing with the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in decedent's gross estate
when they are payable to his estate or to other beneficiaries,
if the decedent possessed any of the incidents of ownership;
(3) the provisions of Section 2043(a), covering transfers for insufficient consideration;
(4) the provisions of Section 101 and its subsections which concern the treatment of life insurance proceeds in the income tax
field, where the deceased partner's estate has sold to the survivors the policies the decedent held on their lives.
The first plan we shall consider is the type in which the partnership applies for the policies and pays for the premiums out of partnership funds, but the insured in each case designates the first beneficiary
and reserves the right to change the beneficiary or any other right
incident to ownership of an insurance policy.', In this case the proceeds of the life insurance would be included in decedent's gross estate
under Section 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
says that the proceeds of those policies, "with respect to which the
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with another person," are
includible in his gross estate. But, as has been noted, his interest in
the partnership is not includible except as to the excess of its value
over the amount received as insurance.18
Under this first type of plan, there is a possible trap into which
the unwary partners may fall. In Legallet v. Commissioner 4 the partnership paid the premiums on policies of insurance on the lives of the
two partners and charged their cost to the individuals equally. There
10
Ibid.
11

While this note deals with partnership interests, similar arrangements may

exist in the case of stockholders of closely held corporations, and the discus-

sions regarding the effects of such transactions are to a large extent applicable

to both situations. See Ness, Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements
and Options to Purchase Stock on Death, 49 CoL. L. Rxv. 796 (1949).
" A slight variation of this plan, with the same results, would be one in
which the partners individually apply for the insurance, but the premiums are
paid for with partnership funds.

"' See note 6 supra.

1441 B. T. A. 294 (1940).
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was a binding agreement to the effect that the survivor would purchase the interest of the one first to die, the proceeds from the insurance policy to be applied to the purchase price by the decedent's
estate. One partner designated his widow as the beneficiary of the
proceeds from the policy on his life, and upon his death she received
these proceeds from the insurance company. They went to her as
part payment of decedent's partnership interest, the survivor, Legallet,
giving his notes for the balance. Upon a subsequent sale of some of
the merchandise and accounts receivable of the partnership, Legallet
tried to include in his cost basis for income tax purposes the amount
which the beneficiary received as life insurance. The Tax Court agreed
with the Commissioner that Legallet had not paid for the insurance,
the premium payments by the partnership being attributed to the decedent on the alter ego theory. Therefore, the survivor's basis was
only the actual amount he had paid in notes. But the court admitted
that had the survivor received the insurance proceeds himself, as beneficiary, and then turned them over to the decedent's estate, the result
would have been different. Some writers, however, argue that the
same result would not be reached by the court today if the partnership agreement clearly showed that it was a business arrangement, and
that the proceeds were intended to be part of the purchase price paid
by the survivor.'5 Others say that the partnership entity plan of purchasing insurance should be used when there are more than two partners because it is simpler, and the Legallet case would apply only if
and when a partner sells his partnership interest during his lifetime.' 6
The second type of plan to be considered is also one in which the
partnership applies for and takes out the insurance policy on each partner's life and pays all premiums out of partnership funds, but differs
from the first plan in that the partnership designates itself as the beneficiary-the partners as individuals having no right to change the
beneficiary, nor other incidents of ownership. The value of decedent's
interest is limited here also by the agreement if it is found to be a
bona fide transaction and if he was prohibited from selling to outsiders
during his lifetime. The difference between this plan and the first plan
is that here the insurance proceeds are not includible in decedent's
gross estate as such. They are only considered as a factor which increases the value of his partnership interest, since in a similar case,
Atkins v. Commissioner,'7 it was held that the policies belonged to the
1
For some interesting arguments in favor of the entity approach to partnership insurance in certain situations, see Forster, Entity Approach to Partnership Isurance, 90 TRusTs AND EsTATEs 752 (1951).
See BowE, LIFs INSURANCE AND ESTATE TAX PLANNING 62-66 (NashPress, 1952).
ville: Vanderbilt University
(1943) ; cf. Doerken v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 809 (1942).
1f2 T. C. 332
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partnership, and, therefore, the proceeds became an asset before they
were turned over to decedent's estate. Under the Regulations18 if the
decedent paid the premiums directly or indirectly, whether or not he
had any of the incidents of ownership, the proceeds are includible in
his gross estate. Although the decisions10 up to the present have held
that decedent did not pay for the insurance indirectly when the partnership paid the premiums, it is possible that a contrary decision will
be arrived at in the future under the alter ego theory. Such a decision
would be particularly applicable in a case where the decedent owned
substantially all the partnership. 20 In this situation both the insurance
proceeds and the value of decedent's interest would be includible in his
gross estate, in which case the court's avowed policy of not taxing
both the interest and the consideration given for it would seem not
applicable since the decedent, being considered to have paid for the
insurance himself, the proceeds would not be consideration flowing
from the surviving partners. The dangers of the Legallet case discussed above are also present in this second plan.
The third and last type of plan to be considered is perhaps the
2
best for most partnerships under the present code and regulations. '
Under this plan each partner applies for and takes out a policy on the
life of every other partner, pays the premiums out of his own pocket,
and reserves to himself all incidents of ownership, instead of having
the partnership entity do these things as in the second plan. The
major question presented under this "cross-insurance" plan is: Who
should be made the beneficiary of the policy? There are several possibilities, and each presents its own peculiar problems.
If the estate of the decedent is made the beneficiary, the proceeds
will be includible in the gross estate under Section 2042(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and since the value of decedents' interest is limited according to the agreement, no additional estate tax
problems would be presented. The possible application of the rule
of the Legallet case should be forestalled, though, by the terms of a
prior written agreement which clearly states that each partner, not
the partnership, will pay the premiums on the policies he owns. Further, some provision should be made which will bind the decedent's
personal representative to the purchase agreement. The terms of the
18U. S. Treasury Regulations 105, § 81.27(a) (1) (1954).
"0Atkins v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 332 (1943); Estate of Tompkins v. Commissioner,
13 T. C. 1054 (1949).
2 "A decedent similarly pays the premiums or other consideration if payment is made by a corporation which is his alter ego or by a trust whose income is taxable to him, as, for example, a funded insurance trust." U. S.
Treasury Regulation 105, § 81.27(a) (2) (1954).
'For a contrary argument in the case of a partnership consisting of many
members see Forster, Entity Approach to PartnershipInmirance, supra note 15.
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original agreement or a clause in the decedent's will directing his executor to carry out the agreement should accomplish this.
Another possible beneficiary is the wife of the decedent. Since her
husband did not pay for the insurance, and he had no incidents of ownership, the proceeds are not includible in his gross estate unless the
Commissioner changes his position in the future concerning application of the Lehnmn cross transaction doctrine to partnership buy and
sell agreements. 22 The full value of decedent's partnership interest as
limited by the prior agreement is includible in his gross estate. The
unpleasant possibility again arises that this arrangement may result in
the same income tax problem as was presented in the Legallet case,
although it could again probably be avoided by the terms of the binding prior agreement as above suggested. The Legallet case should
be distinguished on the ground that there was personal insurance, instead of true business insurance. If it seems desirable to the partners,
the widow can be paid the proceeds in installments, instead of in one
lump sum. Each partner should retain the right, in the policy or
policies which he owns, to determine settlement options and beneficiaries, but as a safeguard the policy should contain the provision
that the owner cannot change the settlement plan or beneficiary unless
he notifies his partners.2 3 This provision gives the partners a check
on each other and will not allow a plan to be defeated by a survivor.
Care should be exercised, though, not to give the husband of the beneficiary any control or incidents of ownership in the policy. The hazards
of these settlement plans where decedent's wife is made the beneficiary
are that the decedent's executor may not be able to convey to the surviving partner without running the risk of having unsatisfied creditors
or pretermitted heirs of the decedent surcharge him. There is also
the possibility of litigation over the sale price if it is not expressly and
clearly set out in the prior agreement. These pitfalls may be avoided
by having the survivor retain the right to withdraw from the proceeds
any amount required to satisfy the claims against decedent's estate.
After the time has run within which creditors can file claims against
" In Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), two brothers
set up identical trusts for each other, neither one reserving any rights to himself, but each giving the beneficiary the right to withdraw a certain amount
from the corpus during his lifetime. One of them died and the court upheld
the Commissioner in including the corpus in his gross estate, saying that the
person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor,
even though in form the trust is created by another. In a special ruling made
in 1947 the Commissioner said this did not apply to survivor-purchase agreements. See 5 P-H 1947 FED. TAx Stav. 1 76,311 (1947).
21'Such a provision might raise the question whether the insured partner
has an incident of ownership by indirect control of the policy on his life. Such
control could arise by the threat of possible retaliation by the insured in changing the beneficiary in the policy he owns on his partner's life.
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the estate, and the personal representative has made a satisfactory con-

veyance of decedent's interest to the survivor, then the survivor can
assign his right of distribution under the policy to the wife. The only
trouble with this method is that while the proceeds are in the survivor's hands, they are liable for his debts. An alternative would be
to give the same rights to a trustee, and let him handle the transaction.
In any case, the use of settlement options should not interfere with
the basic plan.
Where the partnership is made the beneficiary and the agreement
provides that the proceeds will be used to purchase decedent's interest, the payment to the estate will be included in decedent's gross
estate up to the value of the business interest purchased. As has been
said before, the fair market value of the business interest controls for
estate tax purposes, but if under a bona fide business agreement a
lesser amount were paid, this should be binding upon the Commission-

er.2 4

The only danger of making the partnership the beneficiary is

that the rule of Atkins v. Commissioner25 may be applied, to increase
the value of decedent's interest. In that case it was held that the
policies belonged to the partnership, and therefore, the proceeds became an asset before they were turned over to decedent's estate.
Another possible beneficiary is a trust, with an agreement that the
trustee should use the proceeds to purchase decedent's share of the
business from the estate. The tax consequences are the same as if the
partnership were made the beneficiary, but possible advantages are
(1) that the Atkins case would probably not be applied, and (2) that
if the proceeds were unconditionally paid to the trustee for the purpose
of paying the estate, they would never have become a part of the
partnership assets and thus would not be subject to the claims of any
partnership creditors. To insure this result, the trustee should never
be one of the surviving partners.
The last, and probably the safest, beneficiary taxwise is the surviving partner who owns the policy as an individual. He can use the
money to purchase decedent's interest according to the agreement,
has no income tax on the proceeds, 26 and can include the proceeds in
"4See note 5 supra. But in Estate of Trammell v. Commissioner, 18 T. C.
662 (1952), and Estate of Gannon v. Commissioner, 21 T. C. No. 121 (1954),
the court said that although the agreement may be binding on the partners, it
was not binding on the Commissioner in fixing valuation of the estate for
estate tax purposes. In the Trammell case there was no binding agreement
that the decedent would not sell during his lifetime, but this provision did
exist in Gannon v. Comnssiomer. In both instances the surviving partner or
partners were given the option to purchase decedent's interest at a specified
valuation. Although the court made no mention of it, one reason for the decisions might be the fact that in both cases the survivors were closely related
to decedent; his wife in one, and his brothers in the other.
252 T. C. 332 (1943).
" INT. REv. CODE § 101(a) (1).
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his cost basis, thus avoiding the result of the Legcdlet case. This
method would also avoid the possible application of the Atkins case,
but again there is the danger that the proceeds in the survivor's hands
will be subject to the claims of his creditors.
Under the cross-insurance plan, the decedent's estate will be left with
policies which the decedent owned on the lives of the survivors. Provision should be made in the agreement for their disposition to the insured at the accrued cash value, or for their retention by the estate, in
which case they will be valued at their surrender or accrued cash value.
Under Section 22(b) (2) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, if the
policies were sold to the insured, the proceeds received by the beneficiary less the purchase price and subsequently paid premiums would
have been subject to income tax. This has been changed by Section
101(a) (2) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which in such
situations excludes from gross income the entire amount of proceeds
if the transfer of the policy is to the insured, to a partner of the insured, to a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in which the insured is a shareholder or officer.
The partners can set up a cross-ingurance plan also by transferring
to each other or to the partnership policies which they already hold
on their own lives, and under this new Code provision no taxation
of the proceeds will later result. This arrangement could save the
parties a large amount of money because they can take advantage of
the old premium rates, instead of having to take out new policies at
higher rates. Any inequities which might arise from the difference
in costs of the different premiums could be remedied by the partners
in the distribution of profits or in any other manner they saw fit.27 If
the policies contain double indemnity clauses, provision should also
be made for the disposition of the added proceeds in case the clause
comes into effect. This will avoid possible litigation between the decedent's estate and the survivors,8
No matter what type of buy and sell agreement is used, if it is
funded by life insurance the agreement should not provide that a higher
price will be paid for a partner's interest upon his death than upon a
termination of his interest during life, as this would be an admission
that the parties are not actually agreeing to the true value of the business interest, and are carrying personal life insurance under the name
of business life insurance.
17 In case one or more partner is not insurable, some plan may fie worked
out whereby his estate or beneficiary will get the proceeds from an annuity,
or annuities -paid for by the other partners, or by the partnership.
"See Tompkins v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 1054 (1949), where no provision was made for disposition of the added proceeds, but possible litigation
was avoided by the survivor when he paid them to decedent's estate.
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In a personal service partnership where the tangible assets are
limited, the members may wish to provide for the decedent's estate
by an agreement under which the estate is to receive a part of the
partnership income for a stated period, instead of one lump sum. It
is important that this agreement be written clearly so that it will be
understood that the decedent's estate is sharing in the partnership income as a member,29 and that the payments do not constitute a purchase
of decedent's interest. If the latter situation is found to exist, the
entire income of the partnership will be taxed to the survivors,80
whereas a finding to the effect that the estate is sharing in the income
as a partner will allow the survivor to exclude from his gross income
the payments made to the estate. The estate in turn can take advantage of Section 691(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
allows as a deduction from gross income the amount paid in estate
taxes because of the inclusion of the right to the income in the estate.
The agreement should provide that payments to the estate be in the
form of a percentage of current profits in order to strengthen the idea
that the payments are "income" to the estate. A plan under which
the estate is to receive a predetermined lump sum payment, or a
certain specified amount in each payment without regard to what the
actual partnership income amounts to may raise the suspicion of a
purchase.2 1 These arrangements should be drawn with great care in82
order to reduce the danger of an adverse construction by the courts.
In drafting these agreements, there are five basic rules which, if
followed in planning a partnership buy and sell agreement, should give
the desired tax results:
v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 125 (1946).
3"Coates
0
Wilkins v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 519 (1946).
31 Compare the cases in notes 29 and 30, sitpra.
"2Ina note in 47 COL. L. Rav. 289 (1947), the author suggests that the following provisions be included in the agreement for clarity:

(1) Recite clearly that the agreement is a substitution of the payments for a
precise accounting on uncollected fees, unfinished work, etc., in which the deceased partner had an actual interest.

(2) If the state partnership laws permit, recite in the agreement that the estate of the deceased partner is considered a partner; otherwise that the payments

over the period fixed are the equivalent of a formal winding up of the partnership.
(3) Provide that the estate will share losses as well as profits.
(4) Avoid such terms as "sale," "purchase," "interest," "assets," and "payment
for good will"; conversely, use words like "profit," "share," and "gain and
loss."
(5) Make the amount payable contingent-a percentage of prospective profits
and losses.
(6) If the enterprise requires substantial capital, separate the capital account
and make it subject to a separate accounting. (The author seems to have digressed from personal service partnerships in this suggestion.)
(7) After the death of the partner obtain a statement from his personal representative that the amount which is paid is considered by him as income to the
estate.
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1. Although mutual options may be given the partners to purchase
or to liquidate upon the death of a partner, preferably the agreement should bind the decedent's estate to sell, and the survivor
to purchase.
2. The agreement should provide a clear and definite basis for
evaluating the decedent's interest.
3. The sale of the decedent's business interest should be restricted
to the other partners during life as well as at death.
4. The agreement must preclude the sale of any partner's interest
during lifetime at a price higher than that payable at death. It
should not be a substitute for testamentary disposition.
5. The agreement should reflect a "business purpose."
6. The wills of the partners should be consistent with the agreement and should direct the executors to carry out its terms.
JOHN J. DORTcH.
Torts-Application of Emergency Doctrine in North Carolina
The following charge by the trial court as it related to the application of the doctrine of "sudden emergency" was approved by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in a recent case:'
"The Court instructs you that a person confronted with a
sudden emergency is not held by law to the same degree of care
as in ordinary circumstances, but only to that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person would use under similar
circumstances. The standard of conduct required in an emergency, as elsewhere, is that of a prudent person.
The Court further instructs you that this principle is not
available to one who by his own negligence, brought about or
contributed to the emergency. That means, in simple language,
that a person who creates an emergency, or contributes to it,
cannot take advantage of the principle.
The Court further instructs you that one who is required
to act in an emergency is not held by law to the wisest choice
of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of ordinary care
and prudence similarly situated would have made."
The purpose of the doctrine of sudden emergency has been well
stated by the West Virginia court :2
"The general principles which require one to act in such a
manner as to avoid injury to himself, and to take such steps to
(1954).
S. E. 2d IBarnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N. C. 721, 724, 20ldfield v. Woodall, 113 W. Va. 35, 37, 166 S. E. 691, 692 (1932).
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avoid accidents as would be taken by a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances, are not enforced in all their rigor
as to situations of sudden danger. This is a recognition of the
fallibility of human nature in sudden crises and the greater probability of errors of judgment occurring when a danger is eminent and where a person is compelled instantly, without delaying
for deliberation, to adopt some course of conduct to avoid injury."
The purpose of this note is to discuss the application of the doctrine
of emergency in North Carolina from three aspects, namely:
(1) What is the nature of the peril necessary to invoke the doctrine ?
(2) Is the availability of the doctrine affected by how or by whom
the emergency was created?
(3) Is it a question of law for the court or fact for the jury as
to whether the doctrine of emergency is available, and as to whether
the person invoking the doctrine acted so as to free himself of negligence?
Nature of the Peril
Authorities seem to be split on the question of whether the danger
necessary to invoke the doctrine of emergency be real3 or only apparent to the person so imperiled. 4 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has never decided the question directly. 5 However, in two
cases, the court quoted with approval a Massachusetts case which
applied the apparent peril test in determining whether the doctrine
of emergency was available. As thus applied, the test is:
3Horton Motor Lines v. Currie, 92 F. 2d 164 (4th Cir. 1937); McLaren v.
F. Bird Inc., 296 Ill. App. 345, 15 N. E. 2d 993 (1938); Trudeau v. Sina Con, 62 N. W. 2d 492 (1954) ; Roby v. Auker, 149 Neb.
tracting Co., Minn. 734, 32 N. W. 2d 491 (1948); Lubliner v. Ruge, 21 Wash. 2d 881, 153 P. 2d
694 (1944); Hill v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 334, 100 P. 2d 98 (1940).
' Palma v. Moren, 44 F. Supp. 704 (M. D. Pa. 1942); Hooper v. Bronson,
123 Cal. App. 2d 243, 266 P. 2d 590 (1954); Budds v. Keeshin Motor Express
The above cases apply the
Co., 326 Ill. App. 59, 61 N. E. 2d 579 (1945).
subjective test in determining whether there was an apparent danger. The following cases-apply the objective test and hold that the apparent danger must
be a reasonable one: Southwestern Freight Lines v. Floyd, 58 Ariz. 249, 119
P. 2d 120 (1941) ; Hedgecock v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N. E. 2d 93 (1942)
(reasonably well founded) ; Allen v. Pearce Dental Supply Co., 149 Kan. 549, 88
P. 2d 1057 (1939) (reasonable to a person ordinarily prudent); Higgins v.
Terminal Ry. Association of St. Louis, 231 Mo. App. 837, 97 S. W. 2d 892
(1936) (reasonably well founded); Helvich v. George A. Rutherford Co., 114
N. E. 2d 514 (Ohio App. 1953), appeal dismissed 160 Ohio St. 571, 117 N. E.
2d 439 (1954) (reasonable apprehension).
'In Jernigan v. Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 838, 178 S. E. 587, 591 (1935), the
court approved a charge in which the trial court charged the jury using the
term "apparent peril." It is noted, however, that this point in the charge was
not the one to which exception was taken on appeal, so the case is probably
not authority for saying that North Carolina recognizes the apparent peril
doctrine.
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"If the peril seemed imminent, more hasty and violent action
was to be expected than would be natural at quieter moments,
and such conduct is to be judged with reference to the stress of
appearances at the time, and not by the cool estimate of the
actual danger formed by outsiders after the event." 6
It would seem, therefore, that if the question were ever squarely up
for decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court would probably decide that apparent danger is sufficient to allow the invoking of the
doctrine. It also seems that the court would require that this apparent peril must be a reasonable one. It is not enough if the person
attempting to invoke the doctrine of emergency thought he was in an
emergency when a reasonably prudent person so situated would not
have thought so. The requirement that the apprehension be a reasonable one has been applied in North Carolina in the field of assault. 7
It should be equally applicable here, for it would prevent false claims
of emergency by one attempting to overcome the charge of negligence.
Cause of the Emergency
There is also a split of authority as to the origin of the emergency
necessary to allow the doctrine to be invoked. Some jurisdictions hold
that in order for the plaintiff to take advantage of the doctrine, the
emergency must be created by the wrongful conduct of the defendant.8
Other jurisdictions hold that the doctrine is not available to one who
creates the emergency,9 whereas the majority hold that it is available
unless the emergency is negligently or willfully created by the one
invoking it."0
'Gannon v. R. R., 173 Mass. 40, 41, 52 N. E. 1075 (1899), quoted with
approval in Mills v. Waters, 235 N. C. 424, 426, 70 S. E. 2d 11, 12-13 (1952),
and Ingle v. Cassiday, 208 N. C. 497, 499, 181 S. E. 562, 563 (1935).
' State v. Williams, 186 N. C. 627, 120 S.E. 224 (1923). The test as applied
is that if a person, by a display of force, causes another to reasonably apprehend imminent danger, and thereby forces him to do otherwise than he would
have8 done, he commits an assault.
Hedgecock v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N. E. 2d 93 (1942); Lee v. City
Ice Co., 64 S. W. 2d 736 (Mo. App. 1933); Helvich v. George A. Rutherford
Co., 114 N. E. 2d 514 (Ohio App. 1953) appeal dismissed 160 Ohio St. 571,
117 N. E. 2d 439 (1954). The above cases hold that the emergency must be
created by the negligence of the defendant in order for the plaintiff to invoke the
doctrine; but the doctrine should be even more applicable if the conduct creating'
the emergency was willful.
'C. J. Peck Oil Co. v. Diamond, 204 F. 2d 179 (5th Cir. 1953); Fagan
Elevator Co. v. Pfiester, 244 Iowa 633, 56 N. W. 2d 577 (1953) ; Metzinger v.
Subera, 175 Kan. 542, 266 P. 2d 287 (1954) ; Meistinsky v. City of New York,
12810N. Y. S. 2d 483 (1954).
Kisor v. Tulsa Refining Co., 113 F. Supp. 10 (W. D. Ark. 1953) (negligently created) ; Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal. 2d 712, 264 P. 2d 1 (1953) (negligently created) ; Puza v. Hamway, 123 Conn. 205, 193 A. 776 (1937) (negligently
created) ; Wallace v. Kramer, 296 Mich. 680, 296 N. W. 838 (1941) (negligently created) ; Trudeau v. Sina Contracting Co., Minn. -,
62 N. W. 2d
492 (1954) (failure to use ordinary care); Spalt v. Eaton, 118 N. J. Law. 327,
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The last view seems to adopt the better reasoning, since the purpose
of the doctrine is to make allowances for one who is momentarily
incapable of deliberation. Therefore, it is only the incapacity to deliberate which should be considered, not its origin, unless this incapacity was negligently or willfully produced in whole or in part by
the person attempting to profit by it. North Carolina, in applying the
doctrine, takes the majority view, for it has prohibited the application
of the doctrine only in those cases where the party who seeks to invoke
it has negligently or willfully contributed in bringing it about.11 In
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. McLean Trucking Co., 12 the court held
that the benefit of sudden emergency is available to the defendant unless
the emergency is produced or contributed to by his negligence. It
seems to follow that the doctrine would be available if the emergency
were created by some outside force, or by a third party. North Carolina so held in Goode v. Barton.'3
It is noted that the charge of the trial judge in the principal case
first correctly stated the law to be that the doctrine of emergency is
not available to one who negligently contributed to it. He then, in attempting to explain, further said:
"That means, in simple language, that a person who creates
an emergency or contributes to it, cannot take advantage of the
principle." 14
The latter part of this charge seems to be in error, for one may create
ati emergency and still avail himself of the doctrine if the creation
were not negligent or willful. The North Carolina Supreme Court
apparently concluded that the jury was not misled by the latter phrase,
and that the doctrine had been sufficiently explained to them.
Fact or Law
The majority view in this country is that whether an emergency
existed is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury,15 but if the facts
192 A. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (tortious); Feuquay v. Echer, 195 Okla. 285, 157
P. 2d 745 (1945) (negligently created); Moore v. Meyer and Power Co., 347
Pa. 152, 31 A. 2d 721 (1943)

117 Vt. 525, 97 A. 2d 250 (1953)
'Atlantic

(negligently created); Stevens v. Nurenburg,

(at fault).

Coast Line R. R. v. McLean Trucking Co., 238 N. C. 422, 78 S.E.

2d 159 (1953) ; Powell v. Lloyd, 234 N. C. 481, 67 S.E. 2d 664 (1951) ; Sparks
v. Willis, 228 N. C. 25, 44 S.E. 2d 343 (1947); Hoke v. Greyhound Co., 227
N. C. 412, 42 S.E. 2d 593 (1947). In Powell v. Lloyd, supra at 488, 67 S. E.
2d at 668, the dissenting justice said: "The rule of sudden emergency cannot be
invoked by one who has brought that emergency upon himself by his own
wrong or who has not used due care to avoid it."
12238 N. C. 422, 78 S. E. 2d 159 (1953).
13238 N. C. 492, 78 S.E. 2d 398 (1953).
In this case the emergency was
created by a severe ice and snow storm.
" Barnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N. C. 721, 724, S. E. 2d (1954).
" DePonce v. System Freight Service, 66 Cal. App. 2d 295, 152 P. 2d 234

(1941); Pollard v. Weeks, 60 Ga. App. 644, 4 S.E. 2d 722 (1939); Hedgecock
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are not in dispute, it becomes a question of law for the court. 16 Whether
a person acting in the emergency was acting as a reasonably prudent
person .would have acted under the same or similar circumstances is
likewise for the jury.17 The North Carolina Supreme Court early
applied the doctrine that the question of negligence in an emergency
is one for the jury.' 8 It would appear that such a rule might be applied
with reasonable consistency, but a brief reiew of several cases will
show the inconsistency with which the doctrine has been applied in
North Carolina.
In Ingle v. Cassiday,'9 the court, in upholding an involuntary nonsuit, held as a matter of law that an emergency faced the defendant,
and that he acted as a person of ordinary care and prudence, similarly
situated, would have acted. This case was decided over the vigorous
dissent of Mr. Justice Clarkson.2 The case marked the beginning of
decisions in which the court has seemingly abandoned the principle
that the determination of the existence of an emergency, and the determination of whether there was negligence under the doctrine, are
questions for the jury.
In Mills v. Waters,21 the court upheld a nonsuit by holding, as a
matter of law, that the defendant was faced with an emergency and
that he acted prudently thereunder. It seems that in this case there
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury had the court not entered
v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N. E. 2d 93 (1942); Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md.

666, 72 A. 2d 30 (1950); Kinder v. Erie R. Co., 109 N. J. Law. 469, 162 A.

387 (1932); Helvic v. George A. Rutherford Co., 114 N. E. 2d 514 (Ohio
App. 1953), appeal dismissed 160 Ohio St 571, 117 N. E. 2d 439 (1954) ; Vogreg
Wash. - , 268 P. 2d 642 (1954). In
v. Shepard Ambulance Service, Baker v. Shettle, supra at 671, 172 A. 2d at 32, the court said, "It is held by
the weight of authority, that if there is evidence in a case legally sufficient to
show
1 0 that an emergency existed, it becomes a question of fact for the jury."
Helvich v. George A. Rutherford Co., supra note 15.
Kirk v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 833, 161 P. 2d 673, 164 A. L. R.
1 (1945) ; Schultz v. Chicago, R. I. and P. R. Co., 167 Kan. 228, 205 P. 2d 965
(1949); Pampu v. City of Detroit, 315 Mich. 618, 24 N. W. 2d 588 (1946);
St. Johnsburg Trucking Co. v. Rollins, 145 Me. 217, 74 A. 2d 465 (1950);
Schultz v. Meyerholtz, 91 Ohio App. 566, 109 N. E. 2d 35 (1951); Litz v.
Zoeller, 365 Pa. 45, 73 A. 2d 387 (1950); Reddick v. Longacre, 228 S. W. 2d
264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Frenier v. Brown, 116 Vt. 538, 80 A. 2d 524 (1951) ;
American Products Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wash. 2d 246, 109 P. 2d 570, 132 A. L. R.
1010 (1941).
18 Bullock v. Williams, 212 N. C. 113, 193 S. E. 170 (1937); Jernigan v.
Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 178 S. E. 587 (1935); Smith v. Atlantic and Yadkin
Ry. Co., 200 N. C. 177, 156 S. E. 508 (1931); Luttrell v. Hardin, 193 N. C.
266, 136 S. E. 726 (1927); Clark v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R. Co., 109
N. C. 430, 14 S. E. 43 (1891). In Bullock v. Williams, supra at 117, 193 S. E.
at 172, the court approved the charge of the trial judge that the determination
is ordinarily one for the jury.
10 208 N. C. 497, 181 S. E. 562 (1935).
" Mr. Justice Clarkson in his dissent in Ingle v. Cassiday, supra note 19, at
page 500, 181 S. E. at 564, stated that "the defense of sudden emergency is one
holding among American courts."
for the jury. This is the universal
21235 N. C. 424, 70 S. E. 2d 11 (1952).
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a nonsuit under the emergency doctrine.
Here the court said that
it gave due consideration to the cases holding that weight and sufficiency of the evidence are for the jury.
In Henderson v. Henderson,23 the court said:
"Viewing the circumstances in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, as required in passing upon a motion for judgment of
involuntary nonsuit, the defendant was confronted suddenly by
an emergency caused solely by the gross negligence of (third
party)....

... and his failure to anticipate the unforeseeable when confronted by a sudden emergency caused by no fault of his own
cannot be deemed a basis of actionable negligence."
In this case, the court affirmed a dismissal of the suit at the conclusion
of the plaintiff's evidence.
The practice of upholding nonsuits on the ground that the defendant
was under an emergency and acted prudently thereunder as a matter
of law is not unusual in North Carolina.2 The cases in which the
court has applied the majority view and allowed the jury alone to
decide these issues seem to be in the minority. 25 The court has also
reversed nonsuits against the plaintiff on the ground that the evidence

26
indicated the plaintiff to be acting in an emergency.
In spite of the apparent failure of the North Carolina Supreme
Court to follow consistently any rule as to whether the questions relating to an emergency should go to the jury, it is still possible to
make several observations which may be of some help to attorneys
in unravelling this dilemma.
(1) Is seems evident that if the person attempting to invoke the
doctrine wins a jury verdict, this verdict will probably not be disturbed on appeal on the ground either that he was not faced with an
emergency, or if an emergency, that he was negligent. In other words,

22 In this case the defendant attempted to sweep spilled gasoline out of a
service station. During the sweeping motion, some of the gasoline came in
contact with an open stove, whereby the plaintiff was burned.
23239 N. C. 487, 492, 80 S. E. 2d 383, 386 (1954).
2
Henderson v. Henderson, supra note 23; Morgan v. Saunders, 236 N. C.
162, 72 S. E. 2d 411 (1952); Mills v. Waters, 235 N. C. 424, 70 S. E. 2d 11
(1952); Ingle v. Cassiday, 208 N. C. 497, 181 S. E. 562 (1935). In Patterson
v. Ritchie, 202 N. C. 725, 164 S. E. 117 (1932), the court went to the extreme
by reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant
was confronted by a situation in which he had to act quickly, and under the
circumstances he was not negligent, but rather acted prudently.
2 Smith v. Carolina Coach Co., 214 N. C. 314, 199 S. E. 90 (1938); Jernigan v. Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 178 S. E. 587 (1935).
" Powell v. Lloyd, 234 N. C. 481, 67 S. E. 2d 664 (1951); Wall v. Bain,
222 N. C. 375, 23 S. E. 2d 330 (1942) ; Harper v. Construction Co., 200 N. C.
47, 156 S. E. 137 (1930).
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the court probably would not reverse a jury verdict by holding as a
matter of law that there was no emergency, or that the party did not
act prudently in the emergency.
(2) If the defendant invokes the doctrine as a defense to a charge
of negligence, and the trial court nonsuits the plaintiff on the ground
that there was an emergency, and that the defendant was not negligent
under the emergency as a matter of law, the chances are very strong
that the nonsuit will be affirmed on appeal.
(3) If the defendant invokes the doctrine, and the case goes to
the jury which decides for the plaintiff, the supreme court may sustain or reverse, depending on whether it thinks, as a matter of law,
that the defendant's actions were prudent under the emergency.
Conclusion
It would seem that the most logical way to apply the doctrine of
emergency would be:
(1) If there is any evidence that would support a finding that
an emergency existed, then the question of the existence of the emergency should be determined by the jury.
(2) If it is determined that an emergency did exist, the question
of whether a person acted during the emergency as a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would act should always be submitted
to the jury. It is submitted that the amount of care required in an
emergency is never a question of law. To determine the amount of
care required to find one free of negligence, it is first necessary to
determine how great an emergency existed, and to what extent
the emergency destroyed the prudence which would otherwise
be displayed by the person involved or by the reasonably prudent
person. The determination of these questions in themselves, under
any conditions, is a determination as to which reasonable men may
differ, therefore requiring submission to the jury.
Thus, under the above, a nonsuit could never be predicated or sustained on the ground that the defendant was faced with an emergency
and acted prudently thereunder. Nor could a jury verdict be upset on
the basis of an emergency, because it would have to be assumed that
the jury considered the emergency question in reaching its verdict.
It is submitted that the application of the above conclusions would
help to alleviate the inconsistencies which are now present in the application of this phase of the law of negligence in North Carolina.
ROBERT

C.

BRYAN.
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Trial and Appellate Practice-Improper Comment by Solicitor in
Argument to Jury
What result should follow where on appeal defendant assigns as
error improper comment' of a prejudicial nature by the solicitor in his
argument to the jury, to which defendant has failed to object until
after verdict?
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently2 re-examined this
problem of trial and appellate procedure and reached a decision which
invites examination and comment not only as an example of the court's
avoidance of an undesirable result, but because of questions raised by
the decision as to future appeals under like circumstances.
In the instant case defendant appealed a conviction under the
"drunken driving" statute3 and assigned as error improper comment
by the solicitor in his argument. The tenor of the comments was
to the effect that the defendant was a wealthy intruder, this status
being contrasted with the supposed menial station of the jurors.
Further remarks were purely speculative, unfounded, not based on
evidence introduced at the trial, and clearly outside the limits of proper
summation. 4 There was no objection made at the time, but after the
verdict was rendered defendant moved to set it aside because of the
prejudicial remarks of the solicitor. The motion was refused, the
trial judge asserting that he had endeavored to impress on the jury
that it was their duty to give a man from Texas as fair a trial as a
man from North Carolina and to give a man of means as fair a trial
as a man of no means. The supreme court held that although the defendant's assignment of error could not be sustained because it was
based on an exception not taken in apt time, "to sustain this trial
below would be a manifest injustice to the defendant's right to a fair
1
Speaking of the statute of 1844 which expanded the privilege of counsel
to allow argument of law as well as of fact to the jury, [now N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 84-14 (1950)], Brogden, J. said, "The declaration is broad and comprehensive
and early lent itself to a construction by the profession that the field of jury
argument was unlimited and boundless. Hence, in the course of time it became
necessary for the courts to fence in the field by imposing certain restrictions
upon counsel in presenting causes to the jury. These restrictions are reflected
in certain legal inhibitions imposed by the courts." Conn v. Seaboard Airline
R. R., 201 N. C. 157, 159, 159 S.E. 331, 333 (1931). There is a classification of
these restrictions in the Con case. See also Note, 4 N. C. L. REv. 132 (1926) ;
Note, 28 N. C. L. Rxv. 342 (1949); Sutrvey of Decisions of North Carolina
Supreme Court, 32 N. C. L. Rzv. 380, 438 (1954); Notes, 39 VA. L. REV. 85
(1954), 10 LA. L. REv. 486 (1950).
I State v. Smith, 240 N. C. 631, 83 S.E. 2d 656 (1954).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953).
'An example of the statements made is: "Just because he is a man of property and can afford a Lincoln car, are you going to allow him to drive through
here and run down your little daughter, or your little son, or your's or your's,
or your's? I say, No I You must find him guilty." State v. Smith, 240 N. C.
631, 633, 83 S.E. 2d 656, 657 (1954).
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and impartial trial." 5 Accordingly, defendant was awarded a new
trial, the court invoking its constitutional power 6 to supervise and control proceedings in the inferior courts.
It is the general rule that objection to improper comment of counsel must be made at some time before verdict in order that it be
assigned as error 7 and the objection if not made is deemed waived
and is lost. The rule requiring objection before verdict is grounded
in the consideration that objection will call the attention of the presiding judge to the remark and enable him to instruct the jury to
disregard the remarks by either interrupting counsel at the time or,
in his discretion, by including this instruction in the charge to the
jury.8 To this extent at least, objection after verdict would be
superfluous. Another reason usually strongly asserted is that the rule
removes the possibility that counsel might speculate on defendant's
chances with the jury in contemplation of later assignment of the
remarks as error on appeal. 9 The lone exception to this rule recognized in prior decisions applies to those cases wherein the death penalty
' State v. Smith, 240 N. C. 631, 636, 83 S. E. 2d 656, 659 (1954).
IN.
C. CoNs -uTIoN Art. IV § 8.
7
State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953); State v. Lea,

203 N. C. 13, 164 S. E. 737 (1932) ; Perry v. Western N. C. R. R., 128 N. C.

471, 39 S. E. 27 (1901); Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C. 96 (1886). For citations
to other cases see State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S. E. 7 (1911) and
State v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S. E. 838 (1903). The exception must also
be made in a regular manner. In State v. Wilson, 158 N. C. 599, 73 S. E. 812
(1912), the trial judge permitted the exception to be made in stating the case,
although no exception was noted at the time. The court held that this was too
late and that the judge should not permit it to be made in stating the case. But
cf. Perry v. Western N. C. R. R., 128 N. C. 471, 39 S. E. 27 (1901), where
the court considered an exception which had not been clearly made below but
allowed by the trial court stating that as the trial court had allowed the exception evidently for the purpose of giving the defendant the fullest opportunity
of appeal, the court would examine it in the same spirit in which it was allowed.
In the capital cases the remarks may be considered by the court ex mero motu,
whether presented to it as an exceptive assignment of error or not. State v.
Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 623 (1953) and cases cited therein. See
comment on the Dockery case in Survey of Decisions of North Carolina Supreme
Court, 32 N. C. L. REv. 380, 438 (1954). Where the solicitor agrees that the
exception made after verdict and the assignment of error based thereon shall
constitute the case on appeal, this meets the requirements of Rule 21, Rules of
Practice of Supreme Court, 221 N. C. 544 (1942). State v. Hawley, 229 N. C.
167, 48 S. E. 2d 35 (1948) (capital case).
8 State v. Suggs, 89 N. C. 527 (1883).
'"A party will not be permitted to treat with indifference anything said or
done during the trial that may injuriously affect his interests, thus taking the
chance of a favorable verdict, and afterwards, when he has lost, assert for the
first time that he has been prejudiced by what occurred. His silence will be
taken as tacit admission that at the time he thought he was suffering no harm,
but perhaps gaining an advantage, and consequently it will be regarded as a
waiver of his right afterwards to object. Having been silent when he should
have spoken, we will not permit him to speak when by every consideration of
fairness he should be silent. We will not give him two chances. The law
helps those who are vigilant-not those who sleep upon their rights. He who
would save his rights must be prompt in asserting them." State v. Tyson, 133
N. C. 692, 699, 45 S. E. 838, 840 (1903).
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may be imposed.' 0 In those cases it must appear that the prejudice
arising from the remarks of the solicitor is such that its effect could
not have been removed from the minds of the jurors by any instruction that the trial judge might have given."
The corollary to these rules is also discussed in the instant case,
e.g., the duty of the trial judge where counsel in his argument to the
jury exceeds the bounds of propriety.
Even where there is no objection, it is the right and duty of the
trial judge to interfere sua sponte where counsel's comments are be12
yond the bounds of propriety and calculated to prejudice the jury.
This duty is not absolute, however, and failure to interfere even where
the abuse is gross is not reversible error.13 Here again there is an
exception to this general rule in those cases where the death penalty
may be imposed.1 4 Once objection is made, the duty to interfere may
or may not be absolute depending on the nature of the improper comment. It is consistently said that the decision as to whether he will
interfere upon objection to the improper remark, or wait and instruct
the jury at the time of the charge to disregard the remark is a matter
in the discretion of the trial judge.15 If the comment is mere "cross
firing with small shot"' 6 or "harmless,' 7 there is discretion as to when
the trial judge will interfere. However, if the comment is held to
be a "gross abuse of the privilege of counsel and manifestly calculated
to prejudice the jury"' 8 there is a duty resting on the trial judge to
interfere at once when objection is made, stop counsel immediately, and
in
instruct the jury to disregard the remark.' 9 Failure to interfere
20
It
the latter instance is reversible error, but in the former it is not.
would then appear that where the comment is a gross abuse there is
and cases cited
10 State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 632 (1953)
State v. Evans, 177 N. C. 564, 98 S.E. 788 (1919).
cf.
But
therein.
"1See note 10 supra.
11Cuthrell v. Greene, 229 N. C. 475, 50 S. E. 2d 525 (1948); Lamborn v.
Hollingsworth, 195 N. C. 350, 142 S.E. 19 (1928); Forbes v. Harrison, 181
N. C. 461, 107 S.E. 19 (1921) ; State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S.E. 7
(1910); Cawfield v. The Asheville Street R. R., 111 N. C. 597, 16 S.E. 703
(1892).
1"See note 12 supra.
",
State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 632 (1953) and cases cited
therein.
11State v. Bowen, 230 N. C. 710, 55 S.E. 2d 466 (1949) ; State v. Brackett,
218 N. C. 369, 11 S.E. 2d 146 (1940); State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130
S. E. 72 (1925); State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S.E. 7 (1911); State
838 (1903).
v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S.'E.
10 State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 502, 504 (1877).
"'State v. Compo, 233 N. C. 79, 62 S.E. 2d 632 (1953).
" State v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 194, 45 S.E. 838, 839 (1903).
1" State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 632 (1953) ; State v. Tucker,
190 N. C. 708, 130 S.E. 721 (1925) ; State v. Peterson, 149 N. C. 533, 63 S.E.
87 (1908); Jenkins v. The North Carolina Ore Dressing Co., 65 N. C. 563
(1871).
"oSee note 19 supra.
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no discretion, and further, that when the court decides that the comment is not prejudicial but harmless, failure of the trial judge to act
at any time is not reversible error.22 The amount of interference neces23
sary upon objection will vary with the nature of the remark.
The burden resting on defendant's counsel to protect and preserve
the legal rights of his client is shifted upon objection to the trial
judge,24 whose duty it then becomes to protect the defendant or the
prejudiced party. This protection is ostensibly available whether objection is made or not, as there is a right and duty resting in the trial
judge to interfere at any time counsel "travels outside the record" 25
or makes unfair comment which is prejudicial. As has been said,
however, it is discretionary with the trial judge as to whether he
chooses to assert this right or exercise this duty without objection.
But, might failure to interfere without objection be reversible error?
Except in the death cases the court has not laid down any tests for
deciding this question but has made only general statements of a prospective nature. 26 Assuming that objectionable comment inconsistent
with orderly justice would be subject to the trial judge's immediate
interference and expurgation, it becomes apparent that the area of
" See note 19 supra.
"State v. Bowen, 230 N. C. 710, 55 S. E. 2d 466 (1949) ; Maney v. Green-

wood, 182 N. C. 579, 109 S.E. 636 (1921).

2 Ordinarily the degree of interference rests in the discretion of the court.
Maney v. Greenwood, 182 N. C. 579, 109 S. E. 636 (1921); State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 302 (1877). Where the remark is harmless or not prejudicial
under the circumstances, interference sufficient to satisfy the requirement may
be minimal. State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 302 (1877) (The court said it
was not clear from the record what the trial judge said or whether it was
heard by the jury, but there was no prejudice at any rate). It may amount
to no more than merely stopping counsel. State v. McCourry, 128 N. C. 594,
38 S. E. 883 (1901) (statement by trial judge that he did not remember any
such evidence).
See also State v. Rogers, 94 N. C. 860 (1886); Cannon v.
Morris, 81 N. C. 139 (1879). Cf. State v. Russell, 233 N. C. 487, 64 S. E. 2d
579 (1951); State v. Compo, 233 N. C. 79, 62 S. E. 2d 579 (1951); State v.
Correll, 229 N. C. 640, 50 S. E. 2d 117 (1948); State v. Brackett, 218 N. C.
369, 11 S. E. 2d 146 (1940). Where the abuse is gross, stronger interference is
required. The language should be explicit, positive, and peremptory. Massey v.
Alston, 173 N. C. 215, 91 S. E. 964 (1917) ; State v. Thompson, 217 N. C. 698,
9 S. E. 2d 375 (1948) (Trial judge told jury that he had no recollection of
evidence commented upon by counsel but that the jury would have to depend
on their own recollection. Held insufficient). Nor is explanation by the solicitor sufficient. State v. Buchanan, 216 N. C. 709, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939). Cf.
State v. Pfifer, 197 N. C. 729, 150 S. E. 353 (1920).
"'State v. Green, 197 N. C. 624, 150 S. E. 18 (1929) ; Lamborn v. Hollingsworth, 195 N. C. 350, 142 S. E. 19 (1928); Massey .v.Alston, 173 N. C. 215,
91 S. E. 964 (1917).
"Cuthrell v. Greene, 229 N. C. 475, 481, 50 S. E. 2d 525, 529 (1948).
2'"There may be cases where it would be the duty of the judge to stop the
counsel, when his remarks and conduct are in violation of all rules of decorum
and propriety that should be observed in the administration of justice when
nothing the judge could say in his charge to the jury could rectify the wrong
or efface the prejudice produced." Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C. 96, 98 (1886). Cf.
State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953).
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inquiry is not well defined and the distinguishing line between what
is prejudicial and merely harmless is wavering and at times indistinguishable.2 7 The remark may be prejudicial on its face but allowable within the framework of the case. 28 Accordingly, the nature of
the wrong for which the defendant is being prosecuted and his apparent guilt or innocence may affect the evaluation of the comment, 2D
as may factors most apparent to the trial judge at the time.80 It would
seem that the trial judge is in the best position properly to make this
evaluation but the conclusion is easily drawn that the evaluation is
actually made after the appeal when the court sitting in calm review
decides whether the comment was gross, or whether the trial judge
has sufficiently removed the effect of the prejudicial remark. The
court has assumed' the responsibility for making the evaluation through
the rule that failure of the trial judge to interfere at once upon objection is reversible error where the abuse of counsel is gross.8 ' There
is no discretion in the trial judge unless the comment is clearly harmless. 2 Thus, there would seem to be no real importance attached to
the discretion, as error in its exercise is not reversible error. Whatever the operation of the rule, however, it cannot be denied that it
affords the defendant or prejudiced party the maximum protection of
the court.
The court in avoiding the general rule as to objection before verdict in the instant case has deviated from a clear line of authority.8 3
27 Compare Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. C. 54 (1868)
zoith Maney v. Greenwood,
182
N.
C.
579,
109
S.
E.
636
(1921).
11 "Gentlemen, you are dealing with a small time racketeering gangster"
held not prejudicial in State v. Correll, 229 N. C. 640, 642, 50 S. E. 2d 717,
718 (1948). "The time has come when the decent people in North Carolina
must stand up and defend the virtue and integrity of the fireside, and home
against the vicious assaults of human vultures and wolves" held not prejudicial
in State v. Meares, 182 N. C. 809, 811, 108 S. E. 477, 479 (1921). See also
State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 507, 130 S. E. 308 (1925).
20 Compare State v. McNair, 204 N. C. 106, 169 S. E. 184 (1933) ; State v.
Lea, 203 N. C. 13, 184 S. E. 737 (1932); State v. Ballard, 191 N. C. 122, 131
S. E. 370 (1925) ; State v. Saleeby, 183 N. C. 740, 110 S. E. 844 (1922). Also
see cases cited in footnote 24 and contrast these cases and the cases cited above
with State v. Thompson, 217 N. C. 698, 9 S. E. 2d 375 (1940) ; State v. Pfifer,
197 N. C. 729, 150 S. E. 353 (1929) ; State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130 S. E.
720 (1925).
0 Factors apparent to the trial judge:
(1) Did defendant "open the door"
to the argument complained of by the opposing counsel? (2) Did the prosecutor or counsel making the comment "have" the jury at the time? (3) What
was the appearance and manner of the offending counsel when the statement
was made? (4) Tone of voice. (5) Prior conduct of prosecution and defense
in examination and argument. (6) Quality of the jury.
2" State v. Bowen, 230 N. C. 710, 55 S. E. 2d 466 (1949) ; State v. Brackett,
218 N. C. 369, 11 S. E. 2d 146 (1940); State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130
S. E. 72 (1925) ; State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S. E. 7 (1911) ; State v.
Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S.E. 838 (1903).
22 State v. Compo, 233 N. C. 79, 62 S. E. 2d 632 (1953); State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 502 (1877).
" State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953); State v. Lea,
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This rule was applied indiscriminately in the capital and non-capital
cases before the exception in the latter cases was recognized.3 4 Whether the court in recognizing this error ex mero Motu intended to extend
the rule as applied in the capital cases to the non-capital cases is questionable. There is no rational basis for assuming this to be true on
the authority of this decision alone, and those cases where the court
has indicated that it will recognize the defect ex mero motu do not
afford a basis for reaching that conclusion.3 5 In the capital cases as
indicated supra, the reason for the exception to the general rule is
that there is serious doubt that the prejudice could be removed even if
the jurors were instructed to disregard the extraneous remarks. This
would not seem to be the case in the decision under consideration and
no use was made of the test. It might well be inferred, however, from
the fact that the court felt that the instruction here was insufficient,36
in the light of the instruction given, that such was the case. There
is no reason why the jurors might not be as strongly prejudiced in
a non-capital as a capital case, but the positive pronouncement in the
latter is in accord with the rigid scrutiny applied in capital cases where
the decision is cloaked with such finality. Here the error seems to be
that the trial judge, having recognized the error, did not take sufficient
action to remove it, the charge not going far enough in the opiftion of
the court. Earlier cases make it clear that the sufficiency of the corrective action is also within the discretion of the trial court. 37 The
inference could be drawn that there had been an abuse of discretion
by the trial judge, but this discretion is not reviewed, apparently for
the reason that the trial judge acted without objection to the improper
comments.
203 N. C. 13, 164 S. E. 737 (1932) ; Perry v. Western N. C. R. R., 128 N. C.

471, 39 S. E. 27 (1901); Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C. 96 (1886). For citations
to other cases see State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S. E. 7 (1911); and
State v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S. E. 838 (1903).
11 Compare State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953) with
State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 507, 130 S. E. 308 (1925).
11 State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953) ; State v. Hawley,
229 N. C. 167, 48 S. E. 2d 35 (1948) ; State v. Little, 228 N. C. 417, 45 S. E.
2d 542 (1947); State v. Isaacs, 225 N. C. 310, 34 S. E. 2d 410 (1945).
" There were two dissents in the instant case on the point that the charge
of the trial judge was sufficient to allay any prejudice which might have been
roused by the remarks of the solicitor. Bobbitt, J., wrote the dissenting opinion
in which Johnson, J., concurred, arguing strongly that conceding the rules in
the majority opinion were correct, this was not a case for the application of the
remedy applied as the charge to the jury was sufficient. Higgins, J., dissented
on the point that the case was within the general rule and that the exception
came too late. Compare with the charge given in the instant case those approved in State v. Brackett, 218 N. C. 369, 11 S. E. 2d 146 (1940); State v.
McNair, 204 N. C. 106, 169 S. E. 184 (1933); State v. Murdock, 183 N. C.
779, 1 S. E. 610 (1922).
Maney v. Greenwood, 182 N. C. 579, 109 S. E. 636 (1921) ; State v. UnderM7
wood, 77 N. C. 302 (1877).
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Attempting to reason from the" rule applied in those cases where
the trial judge charges the jury ex mero notu, but where there is

reversible error in the charge, throws no light on this matter.38

An

instruction to the jury to disregard the comment of counsel where
there is no abuse must be specially requested regardless of whether
there is or is not objection at the time. 9 This would indicate that
improper comment is not a matter of substance for which error might
be assigned if the charge were insufficient, but this particular point
has not been presented to the court for decision.
It would seem that the defendant in the instant case was extremely
fortunate in having appealed with a favorable set of circumstances.
The examination of the assignment of error was precluded under the
general rule, as the exception came after verdict. On the other hand,
the comment had been recognized below and an attempt made to remove its effect. It was also manifest that the remarks were improper,
and obviously prejudicial. The result would seem to indicate a balancing of a desire for the maintainance of regularity of procedural rules
against circumstances which the court felt required rectification, although prevented from doing so directly by procedural considerations.
In this situation the court resorted to the broader constitutional remedy
40
in the interest of a fair trial.
"8There is error in failing to charge on a substantial feature of the case
regardless of whether a request is made for special instructions. State v.
Puckett, 211 N. C. 66, 189 S. E. 183 (1937); State v. Ellis, 203 N. C. 836,
167 S. E. 67 (1933). The rule is generally stated that failure to charge on substantive features of the case arising on the evidence is prejudicial even in the
absence of request for special instructions. But if subordinate elaboration is
desired, and the instruction is proper as far as it goes, a party deeming more
specific instruction necessary must request it. Thus, failure to charge on matters which the court would consider subordinate elaboration would not be error.
State v. Ardrey, 232 N. C. 721, 62 S. E. 2d 53 (1950); McCall v. Glouster
Lumber Co., 196 N. C. 597, 146 S. E. 579 (1929). This would seem to indicate that, excluding the capital cases, if counsel fails to object to the improper
remark, the trial judge would not be under a duty to charge the jury and the
failure to do so would not be reversible error. Upon objection, where the abuse
is gross and manifestly calculated to prejudice the jury there is no necessity
that the trial judge charge on the matter, having already instructed the jury
to disregard the statement. If the trial judge, therefore, attempted to charge
the jury ex mero otit,
and the charge were insufficient, no error would be
apparent as there is no substantial matter, but subordinate elaboration. Cf.
State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 507, 130 S.E. 308 (1925) ; State v. O'Neal, 29 N. C.
251 (1847).
"0See note 38 supra.
'°"The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review upon appeal, any
decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference... .
and the court shall have the power to issue any remedial writ necessary to
give it general supervision and control over the proceedings in the inferior
courts." N. C. CoNsTiTUrroN Art. IV § 8. This power, as applied in the instant case, has been rarely invoked, and those instances in which it was invoked
seemed to present situations where all other legal mechanics were unavailable
to rectify the conflict in opposing rules to the detriment of the party clearly
entitled to relief. In State v. Cochran, 230 N. C. 523, 53 S. E. 2d 663 (1949),
the defendant was clearly innocent of any violation of the law. This case is
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As to the weight counsel might give this case in appealing under
like circumstances, it would seem that there would have to be an extreme abuse of the privilege of counsel in order to elicit this same
response from the court.
The field for speculation is narrow and marked by many obstacles,
and counsel who takes the risk of not interposing objection in apt
time is toying with his client's chances of receiving a favorable jury
verdict, as well as waiving his right to appeal on the basis of the
remarks if the verdict is an adverse one.
WALTER LEE HORTON, JR.

cited by the court in the instant case.
61, 76 S. E. 2d 340 (1953)

See also Elledge v. Welch, 238 N. C.

(Error appeared as to one defendant who had not

appealed. Nevertheless, since the record showed that she was incompetent, her
rights were committed to the care of the court. In the exercise of the supervisory power, the court took jurisdiction in her behalf). In Ange v. Ange, 235
N. C. 506, 71 S. E. 2d 19 (1952) even though the appeal under consideration
was subject to dismissal, the court took jurisdiction to correct error in the
judgment. In the following cases, however, the court refused to alter decisions,
stating that it would only consider questions of law or legal inference, although
it would appear that these cases present as strong a situation for the exercise
of the supervisory power as the instant case: Alston v. Southern Ry. Co., 207
N. C. 114, 176 S. E. 922 (1934) (Refused to alter decision where plaintiff's
attorney had signed a release to the defendant without authority); State v.
Lawrence, 199 N. C. 481, 154 S. E. 741 (1930) (no review of trial judge's
discretion in allowing guards to be stationed outside the courtroom while the
trial was in progress).

